Event Notification Report for September 23, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/22/2002 - 09/23/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
3921139212392133921439209
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39211
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: GARY SALYERS
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: GARY SALYERS
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 09/23/2002
Notification Time: 21:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2002
Event Time: 17:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2002
Notification Time: 21:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2002
Event Time: 17:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROLS
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: On 09/23/02, The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a violation of NCSA-705_ 039 Control # 10 related to analysis of solution transferred to the Oil and Grease Removal Unit (OGRU) in the X-705 building. Specifically, the sample results utilized did meet control # 10 of the Nuclear Critically Safety Analysis (NCSA) did not coincide with the material transferred. This represents the Loss of both controls for MASS which is a loss of double contingency controls applicable to the Fissile Material Operation (FMO). The material transferred was determined to be from a Non-Fissile Operation.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is low. The container that was processed was from the motor cleaning operation in the X-720 Building which has determined to be a Non-Fissile Material Operation.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): Criticality could occur by processing material with a U235 mass greater than a critical mass into a unfavorable geometry container.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): The controlled parameter in this operation is mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The maximum amount of material in this event is 15 grams U235. The controlled enrichment is less than or equal to 20 wt. % U235. The form of the material is a water based solution that is contaminated with oil.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The NCS control that was lost is mass. The NCSA requires that before a container processed two independent samples are obtained a batch calculation is performed with the data which is verified by a second operator and then checked by a member of supervision. Since the container which was processed did not match the container both checks were not correct.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: The Oil and Grease Removal Unit was declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent on 09/23/2002."
Operations will inform the DOE Site Representative and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: On 09/23/02, The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a violation of NCSA-705_ 039 Control # 10 related to analysis of solution transferred to the Oil and Grease Removal Unit (OGRU) in the X-705 building. Specifically, the sample results utilized did meet control # 10 of the Nuclear Critically Safety Analysis (NCSA) did not coincide with the material transferred. This represents the Loss of both controls for MASS which is a loss of double contingency controls applicable to the Fissile Material Operation (FMO). The material transferred was determined to be from a Non-Fissile Operation.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is low. The container that was processed was from the motor cleaning operation in the X-720 Building which has determined to be a Non-Fissile Material Operation.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): Criticality could occur by processing material with a U235 mass greater than a critical mass into a unfavorable geometry container.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): The controlled parameter in this operation is mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The maximum amount of material in this event is 15 grams U235. The controlled enrichment is less than or equal to 20 wt. % U235. The form of the material is a water based solution that is contaminated with oil.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The NCS control that was lost is mass. The NCSA requires that before a container processed two independent samples are obtained a batch calculation is performed with the data which is verified by a second operator and then checked by a member of supervision. Since the container which was processed did not match the container both checks were not correct.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: The Oil and Grease Removal Unit was declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent on 09/23/2002."
Operations will inform the DOE Site Representative and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39212
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MALONEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MALONEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/23/2002
Notification Time: 23:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2002
Event Time: 23:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2002
Notification Time: 23:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2002
Event Time: 23:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
Person (Organization):
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
CONTAMINATED WORKER TRANSPORTED OFFSITE FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
At 2335EDT on 9/23/02 a worker involved in decontamination activities inside the Unit 3 containment was transported offsite to Lawrence and Memorial Hospital in New London, CT for medical assistance. EMTs administered oxygen to the worker who they believed was suffering from heat stress and hypertension. A rad survey conducted onsite showed contamination levels of 1000 ccpm on his right thigh. An HP technician and supervisor accompanied the worker to the hospital where he was decontaminated.
* * * UPDATE 0035EDT ON 9/24/02 FROM MALONEY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The HP supervisor who accompanied the contaminated worker to the hospital notified the site that rad surveys completed at 0015EDT confirmed that the ambulance, the ambulance travel path and the hospital treatment room were free of contamination and free released.
The licensee will inform state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 2335EDT on 9/23/02 a worker involved in decontamination activities inside the Unit 3 containment was transported offsite to Lawrence and Memorial Hospital in New London, CT for medical assistance. EMTs administered oxygen to the worker who they believed was suffering from heat stress and hypertension. A rad survey conducted onsite showed contamination levels of 1000 ccpm on his right thigh. An HP technician and supervisor accompanied the worker to the hospital where he was decontaminated.
* * * UPDATE 0035EDT ON 9/24/02 FROM MALONEY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The HP supervisor who accompanied the contaminated worker to the hospital notified the site that rad surveys completed at 0015EDT confirmed that the ambulance, the ambulance travel path and the hospital treatment room were free of contamination and free released.
The licensee will inform state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39213
Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: GEOPACIFIC TESTING
Region: 4
City: State: OR
County:
License #: ORE-90987
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY LINDSEY
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Licensee: GEOPACIFIC TESTING
Region: 4
City: State: OR
County:
License #: ORE-90987
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY LINDSEY
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 09/24/2002
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2002
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
JOHN PELLET (R4)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE LOST DURING TRANSPORT
A Troxler gauge, model # 3440, serial # 19495 was lost while being transported from Beverton, OR to North Portland, OR. The gauge is an 8 millicurie Cs-137, 40 millicurie Am-Be 241 source and is licensed to GeoPacific Testing Inc, Tigard, OR 97224. The licensee discovered the lost gauge on 9/23/02 at approximately 1700 PDT and notified the State of Oregon on 9/23/02 at 1858 PDT. The gauge was lost north of Highway 26 between the intersection of Emily Lane and Northwest Bethany Blvd and Northwest Germantown Rd. A search is being conducted to recover the lost gauge. A press release is planned. The Oregon State Police, Oregon Emergency Response System, Washington County Sheriff, Beaverton Police and the Portland Police have been notified. The State of Oregon also intends to notify NRC Region 4.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/24/02 AT 2138 EDT FROM TERRY LINDSEY TO GERRY WAIG * * *
The Troxler moisture density gauge lost during transit was discovered by a passing volunteer fireman from Scapoose, OR. The fireman happened by the gauge, picked up the gauge and case, and secured it at the fire house. The gauge was found on 185th Ave., along the original route traveled when lost, approximately 15 minutes after it was lost. The gauge was reported found after news of the missing gauge was aired today on local media. The gauge is currently being stored by the Scapoose Fire Dept. and will be returned to GeoPacific Testing tomorrow.
Notified R4DO (John Pellet) and NMSS (John Greeves)
A Troxler gauge, model # 3440, serial # 19495 was lost while being transported from Beverton, OR to North Portland, OR. The gauge is an 8 millicurie Cs-137, 40 millicurie Am-Be 241 source and is licensed to GeoPacific Testing Inc, Tigard, OR 97224. The licensee discovered the lost gauge on 9/23/02 at approximately 1700 PDT and notified the State of Oregon on 9/23/02 at 1858 PDT. The gauge was lost north of Highway 26 between the intersection of Emily Lane and Northwest Bethany Blvd and Northwest Germantown Rd. A search is being conducted to recover the lost gauge. A press release is planned. The Oregon State Police, Oregon Emergency Response System, Washington County Sheriff, Beaverton Police and the Portland Police have been notified. The State of Oregon also intends to notify NRC Region 4.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/24/02 AT 2138 EDT FROM TERRY LINDSEY TO GERRY WAIG * * *
The Troxler moisture density gauge lost during transit was discovered by a passing volunteer fireman from Scapoose, OR. The fireman happened by the gauge, picked up the gauge and case, and secured it at the fire house. The gauge was found on 185th Ave., along the original route traveled when lost, approximately 15 minutes after it was lost. The gauge was reported found after news of the missing gauge was aired today on local media. The gauge is currently being stored by the Scapoose Fire Dept. and will be returned to GeoPacific Testing tomorrow.
Notified R4DO (John Pellet) and NMSS (John Greeves)
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39214
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: EDWARD STECK
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: EDWARD STECK
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 09/24/2002
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2002
Event Time: 18:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2002
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2002
Event Time: 18:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WALTER RODGERS (R2)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
WALTER RODGERS (R2)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT
"Facility: Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.
"Time and Date of Event: Approximately 18:10 hours, Monday, September 23, 2002.
"Reason for Notification: Scrubber ventilation ductwork containing gross contamination was stacked without proper spacing.
"Summary of Process: The scrubber ventilation system ductwork is non-operational and was being removed.
"As Found Condition: A summary of the as found conditions is as follows:
-Scrubber ventilation ductwork was found stacked in the Conversion Decontamination Room.
-Gross contamination was evident in several sections of ductwork.
"Criticality Safety Protection: Criticality safety protection for floor storage of material with 'gross contamination' consists of a 12-inch or greater spacing requirement. Gross contamination is defined as visually observable uranium-bearing material. A criticality would only be possible if an excessive accumulation of uranium occurs, it becomes moderated, and it is not detected before a critical configuration is formed. After assessing the situation, it was determined that this was a nuclear criticality safety event, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented . . . protection remains. . . Therefore, the event requires 24-hour notification in accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1 107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5).
"Summary of Activity:
-Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) was notified by operations.
-Removal of the ventilation ductwork was ceased.
-NCS visually inspected the ventilation ductwork.
-NCS required the ductwork be unstacked and placed in an authorized configuration.
"Conclusions
-There was a violation of spacing requirements.
-At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
-The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A formal causal analysis will be performed."
"Facility: Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.
"Time and Date of Event: Approximately 18:10 hours, Monday, September 23, 2002.
"Reason for Notification: Scrubber ventilation ductwork containing gross contamination was stacked without proper spacing.
"Summary of Process: The scrubber ventilation system ductwork is non-operational and was being removed.
"As Found Condition: A summary of the as found conditions is as follows:
-Scrubber ventilation ductwork was found stacked in the Conversion Decontamination Room.
-Gross contamination was evident in several sections of ductwork.
"Criticality Safety Protection: Criticality safety protection for floor storage of material with 'gross contamination' consists of a 12-inch or greater spacing requirement. Gross contamination is defined as visually observable uranium-bearing material. A criticality would only be possible if an excessive accumulation of uranium occurs, it becomes moderated, and it is not detected before a critical configuration is formed. After assessing the situation, it was determined that this was a nuclear criticality safety event, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented . . . protection remains. . . Therefore, the event requires 24-hour notification in accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1 107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5).
"Summary of Activity:
-Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) was notified by operations.
-Removal of the ventilation ductwork was ceased.
-NCS visually inspected the ventilation ductwork.
-NCS required the ductwork be unstacked and placed in an authorized configuration.
"Conclusions
-There was a violation of spacing requirements.
-At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
-The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A formal causal analysis will be performed."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39209
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: GEORGE VOISHNIS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: GEORGE VOISHNIS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/23/2002
Notification Time: 09:14 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2002
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2002
Notification Time: 09:14 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2002
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DISCHARGE PERMIT VIOLATION
The licensee notified the State of New Jersey due to a fish kill of greater than 100 fish killed, this is a violation of their discharge permit. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee notified the State of New Jersey due to a fish kill of greater than 100 fish killed, this is a violation of their discharge permit. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.