Event Notification Report for September 22, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/21/2002 - 09/22/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39207
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ALAN RABENOLD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ALAN RABENOLD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/22/2002
Notification Time: 03:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2002
Event Time: 01:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2002
Notification Time: 03:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2002
Event Time: 01:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
MARK RING (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DURING MAIN TURBINE TRIP TESTING
"At 0146, Reactor Scram occurred when the Main Turbine Tripped during the weekly testing of the Main Turbine Protection Devices Trip Test Instruction. The tripping of the Main Turbine caused a Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scram. All rods inserted. Reactor Level dropped below Level 3 due to the Scram. The Main Feed System restored level above Level 3, following the Scram. No Safety Related Injection Systems were required to maintain Reactor Level. Currently the Reactor is being maintained in Hot Stby Mode 3 with RPV Pressure at 900 PSIG and RPV level at 196 [inches] with the Feed System.
"The Main Turbine Protection Device Trip Test did not function properly and caused the Main Turbine to trip. A team is being formed to determine why the trip lockout test failed to prevent a Main Turbine Trip."
Decay heat is being rejected to the Main Condenser. Plant electrical loads transferred to the Startup Transformer as required.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0146, Reactor Scram occurred when the Main Turbine Tripped during the weekly testing of the Main Turbine Protection Devices Trip Test Instruction. The tripping of the Main Turbine caused a Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scram. All rods inserted. Reactor Level dropped below Level 3 due to the Scram. The Main Feed System restored level above Level 3, following the Scram. No Safety Related Injection Systems were required to maintain Reactor Level. Currently the Reactor is being maintained in Hot Stby Mode 3 with RPV Pressure at 900 PSIG and RPV level at 196 [inches] with the Feed System.
"The Main Turbine Protection Device Trip Test did not function properly and caused the Main Turbine to trip. A team is being formed to determine why the trip lockout test failed to prevent a Main Turbine Trip."
Decay heat is being rejected to the Main Condenser. Plant electrical loads transferred to the Startup Transformer as required.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39208
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: K.A. BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: K.A. BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/23/2002
Notification Time: 00:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2002
Event Time: 16:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2002
Notification Time: 00:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2002
Event Time: 16:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
MARK RING (R3)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
24 HOUR REPORT INVOLVING A VALID ACTUATION OF A "Q" SAFETY SYSTEM DUE TO A UF6 RELEASE
"At 1642, on 9-22-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of an activation of a Q safety system in the C-333 process building. Operations personnel reported receiving a Process Gas Leak Detection (PGLD) alarm at Unit 5 Cell 9. The operators responded to the area according to their emergency response procedure and reported that a haze was visible in the area. Building personnel then reported that multiple PGLD alarms were received from other cells in the area. The location of the PGLD detectors that were alarming indicated that the UF6 release was located at the Unit 5 cell bypass housing. All cells in Unit 5 were shutdown to reduce the process pressure to below atmosphere. Following shutdown of the equipment, air sampling in multiple locations through out the building were obtained by the plant emergency squad. After it was determined that all air samples showed no indication of an ongoing release, an all clear on the emergency was given by the PSS. Trouble shooting by building personnel is in progress to determine the location of the system breach.
"The PSS determined that this event is a 24 Hour Event Report due to the valid activation of a TSR required Q safety system.
"The NRC Resident inspector has been notified of this event."
The duration of the release was estimated as approximately 10 minutes. Urine samples for four (4) maintenance personnel and ten (10) operators working in the area will be processed as a precautionary measure.
"At 1642, on 9-22-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of an activation of a Q safety system in the C-333 process building. Operations personnel reported receiving a Process Gas Leak Detection (PGLD) alarm at Unit 5 Cell 9. The operators responded to the area according to their emergency response procedure and reported that a haze was visible in the area. Building personnel then reported that multiple PGLD alarms were received from other cells in the area. The location of the PGLD detectors that were alarming indicated that the UF6 release was located at the Unit 5 cell bypass housing. All cells in Unit 5 were shutdown to reduce the process pressure to below atmosphere. Following shutdown of the equipment, air sampling in multiple locations through out the building were obtained by the plant emergency squad. After it was determined that all air samples showed no indication of an ongoing release, an all clear on the emergency was given by the PSS. Trouble shooting by building personnel is in progress to determine the location of the system breach.
"The PSS determined that this event is a 24 Hour Event Report due to the valid activation of a TSR required Q safety system.
"The NRC Resident inspector has been notified of this event."
The duration of the release was estimated as approximately 10 minutes. Urine samples for four (4) maintenance personnel and ten (10) operators working in the area will be processed as a precautionary measure.