Event Notification Report for September 12, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/11/2002 - 09/12/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
3919039183391843918539186
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39190
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: S. SKAGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: S. SKAGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/13/2002
Notification Time: 20:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2002
Event Time: 21:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2002
Notification Time: 20:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2002
Event Time: 21:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JANET SCHLUETER (NMSS)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JANET SCHLUETER (NMSS)
LOSS OF ONE BARRIER OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
At 2120 CDT, on 9-12-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of the following:
The C-337A south crane does not meet the intent of NUREG-0554 as required by NCSA 042 SRI 5.5.6, NUREG 0554 section 6.3 requires the crane to have malfunction protection which should include controls to sense and respond to conditions such as excessive electric current, excessive motor temperature, over speed, overload and over travel. Over speed protection is not provided in the event of a gearbox failure. The NCSE/A requires that the crane meet specifications equivalent to NUREG-0554 when lifting cylinders over autoclaves that contain cylinders with liquid UF6 greater than or equal to 1.0 wt.% U235.
Following discovery, the use of this crane to move cylinders over liquid cylinders that contain equal to/greater than 1.0 wt.% U235 was suspended.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The crane used to move cylinders over liquid UF6 cylinders did perform as intended and no cylinder was dropped. Therefore, the process conditions were not lost.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR
In order for a criticality to be possible, a cylinder would have to be dropped on an autoclave that houses a liquid cylinder such that the liquid cylinder ruptured. The rupture liquid cylinder contents would then have to be moderated sufficiently to support a criticality.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.)
Double contingency for lifting cylinders over liquid cylinders located in autoclaves is maintained by requiring the crane to be single-failure proof. Therefore, in the event part of the crane fails, a second design feature would prevent the cylinder from falling onto an autoclave, rupturing rupturing a cylinder, and releasing liquid UF6 into the autoclave, which may contain water and/or steam. The integrity of the cylinder is intended to prevent moderation of the UF6 when placed in the autoclave. Therefore dropping a cylinder onto an autoclave containing a liquid UF6 cylinder could cause a criticality by allowing water or steam(I.e. moderator) to react with UF6.
The first leg of double contingency is based on the unlikely event of dropping a cylinder from an overhead bridge crane that has been designed to lift cylinders. Since the overhead bridge crane that was used has a 20-ton capacity and the proper slings and lifting fixtures were used, this leg of double contingency was maintained.
The second leg of double contingency is based on using a single-failure proof crane to move cylinders over liquid cylinders that contain greater than or equal to 1.0 wt% U235. Because the crane is not single-failure proof meeting the requirements equivalent to NUREG-0554, this leg of double contingency was not maintained.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
10 ton liquid UF6 Cylinder with a net weight of 20750 lbs UF6 enriched to ---- wt.% U235.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
Crane was determined not to be single fail-proof as per applicable NCSE and NCSA requirements.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Further use of this crane to move cylinders over liquid that contain greater than or equal to 1.0 wt% U235 was immediately suspended and procedure changes initiated to reflect requirement.
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
At 2120 CDT, on 9-12-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of the following:
The C-337A south crane does not meet the intent of NUREG-0554 as required by NCSA 042 SRI 5.5.6, NUREG 0554 section 6.3 requires the crane to have malfunction protection which should include controls to sense and respond to conditions such as excessive electric current, excessive motor temperature, over speed, overload and over travel. Over speed protection is not provided in the event of a gearbox failure. The NCSE/A requires that the crane meet specifications equivalent to NUREG-0554 when lifting cylinders over autoclaves that contain cylinders with liquid UF6 greater than or equal to 1.0 wt.% U235.
Following discovery, the use of this crane to move cylinders over liquid cylinders that contain equal to/greater than 1.0 wt.% U235 was suspended.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The crane used to move cylinders over liquid UF6 cylinders did perform as intended and no cylinder was dropped. Therefore, the process conditions were not lost.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR
In order for a criticality to be possible, a cylinder would have to be dropped on an autoclave that houses a liquid cylinder such that the liquid cylinder ruptured. The rupture liquid cylinder contents would then have to be moderated sufficiently to support a criticality.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.)
Double contingency for lifting cylinders over liquid cylinders located in autoclaves is maintained by requiring the crane to be single-failure proof. Therefore, in the event part of the crane fails, a second design feature would prevent the cylinder from falling onto an autoclave, rupturing rupturing a cylinder, and releasing liquid UF6 into the autoclave, which may contain water and/or steam. The integrity of the cylinder is intended to prevent moderation of the UF6 when placed in the autoclave. Therefore dropping a cylinder onto an autoclave containing a liquid UF6 cylinder could cause a criticality by allowing water or steam(I.e. moderator) to react with UF6.
The first leg of double contingency is based on the unlikely event of dropping a cylinder from an overhead bridge crane that has been designed to lift cylinders. Since the overhead bridge crane that was used has a 20-ton capacity and the proper slings and lifting fixtures were used, this leg of double contingency was maintained.
The second leg of double contingency is based on using a single-failure proof crane to move cylinders over liquid cylinders that contain greater than or equal to 1.0 wt% U235. Because the crane is not single-failure proof meeting the requirements equivalent to NUREG-0554, this leg of double contingency was not maintained.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
10 ton liquid UF6 Cylinder with a net weight of 20750 lbs UF6 enriched to ---- wt.% U235.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
Crane was determined not to be single fail-proof as per applicable NCSE and NCSA requirements.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Further use of this crane to move cylinders over liquid that contain greater than or equal to 1.0 wt% U235 was immediately suspended and procedure changes initiated to reflect requirement.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 39183
Rep Org: BRANSCOME, INC.
Licensee: BRANSCOME, INC.
Region: 2
City: HAMPTON State: VA
County:
License #: 45-23669-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID TURNER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: BRANSCOME, INC.
Region: 2
City: HAMPTON State: VA
County:
License #: 45-23669-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID TURNER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/12/2002
Notification Time: 07:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2002
Event Time: 05:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2002
Notification Time: 07:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2002
Event Time: 05:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO TROXLER GAUGE DURING FIRE
A structure fire at the Branscome, Inc. facility located at 1922 W. Pembroke Ave., Hampton, VA 23166 may have damaged their Troxler Model 4640-B gauge, S/N 855. This gauge which is used to measure asphalt thickness contains a 9 millicurie Cs-137 source. The licensee has visually confirmed that the case is melted, however, no rad surveys have been performed in that the Hampton FD is restricting access to the facility.
A structure fire at the Branscome, Inc. facility located at 1922 W. Pembroke Ave., Hampton, VA 23166 may have damaged their Troxler Model 4640-B gauge, S/N 855. This gauge which is used to measure asphalt thickness contains a 9 millicurie Cs-137 source. The licensee has visually confirmed that the case is melted, however, no rad surveys have been performed in that the Hampton FD is restricting access to the facility.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39184
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MAY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MAY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 09/12/2002
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2002
Event Time: 08:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2002
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2002
Event Time: 08:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVID LEW (R1)
DAVID LEW (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
THE PLANT LOST EMERGENCY THE NOTIFICATION SYSTEM TO THE STATE OF VERMONT
The plant lost the primary and alternate Nuclear Alert System telephone links to the State of Vermont at 0740. They verified communication with alternate state police barracks. The system was returned to service at 0920.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
The plant lost the primary and alternate Nuclear Alert System telephone links to the State of Vermont at 0740. They verified communication with alternate state police barracks. The system was returned to service at 0920.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Hospital
Event Number: 39185
Rep Org: FAIRMOUNT GENERAL HOSPITAL
Licensee: FAIRMOUNT GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 2
City: FAIRMOUNT State: WV
County:
License #: 47-17929-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SANDY WELLS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: FAIRMOUNT GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 2
City: FAIRMOUNT State: WV
County:
License #: 47-17929-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SANDY WELLS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/12/2002
Notification Time: 17:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2002
Event Time: 12:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2002
Notification Time: 17:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2002
Event Time: 12:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
JANET SCHLUETER (NMSS)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
JANET SCHLUETER (NMSS)
RADIOACTIVE MEDICAL WASTE PACKAGE
A patients radioactive waste was inadvertently sent from Fairmount General Hospital on 08/28/02 to Stericycle, Medical Waste Facility located in Warren, Ohio. When the package arrived at the Stericycle Medical Waste Facility it triggered their radiation monitor. On 09/06/02 Stericycle informed Fairmount General Hospital that they had received a radioactive waste package from them and that they were not licensed to hold radioactive materials at their facility. Fairmount General Hospital picked the package up today from Stericycle and it is has been placed in a radioactive decay room at the Hospital. The source of the radioactivity at this time is unknown. The package has only internal fixed contamination and the internal radioactive level of the package is 0.2 millirems per hour.
A patients radioactive waste was inadvertently sent from Fairmount General Hospital on 08/28/02 to Stericycle, Medical Waste Facility located in Warren, Ohio. When the package arrived at the Stericycle Medical Waste Facility it triggered their radiation monitor. On 09/06/02 Stericycle informed Fairmount General Hospital that they had received a radioactive waste package from them and that they were not licensed to hold radioactive materials at their facility. Fairmount General Hospital picked the package up today from Stericycle and it is has been placed in a radioactive decay room at the Hospital. The source of the radioactivity at this time is unknown. The package has only internal fixed contamination and the internal radioactive level of the package is 0.2 millirems per hour.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39186
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: K. GRACIA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: K. GRACIA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/12/2002
Notification Time: 20:18 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2002
Event Time: 18:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2002
Notification Time: 20:18 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2002
Event Time: 18:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID LEW (R1)
DAVID LEW (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 74 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM HIGH EFFICIENCY AIR FILTRATION WERE INOPERABLE AT THE SAME TIME.
"PNPS I&C Design Engineering determined that modifications of CRHEAF-B humidistat after removal of temporary modification bypassing the switch caused the switch to not perform per design. This would inop the system if high humidity was present because the wiring configuration would turn off the heater if high humidity was present. The system would not perform its design function for the mission length required due to this. Due to this both trains of CRHEAF have been determined to have been inop at the same time while the CRHEAF-A was tagged out for planned maintenance. CRHEAF-A has been returned to operable status while repairs to CRHEAF-B are in-progress. Both trains were inoperable for approximately 4 and 1/2 hours. An ACTIVE LCO for 36 hours was entered."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"PNPS I&C Design Engineering determined that modifications of CRHEAF-B humidistat after removal of temporary modification bypassing the switch caused the switch to not perform per design. This would inop the system if high humidity was present because the wiring configuration would turn off the heater if high humidity was present. The system would not perform its design function for the mission length required due to this. Due to this both trains of CRHEAF have been determined to have been inop at the same time while the CRHEAF-A was tagged out for planned maintenance. CRHEAF-A has been returned to operable status while repairs to CRHEAF-B are in-progress. Both trains were inoperable for approximately 4 and 1/2 hours. An ACTIVE LCO for 36 hours was entered."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.