Event Notification Report for September 09, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/08/2002 - 09/09/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39175
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK ROBBINS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK ROBBINS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 09/09/2002
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2002
Event Time: 10:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2002
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2002
Event Time: 10:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MEDICAL EMERGENCY INVOLVING CONTRACT EMPLOYEE
"Today at approximately 10:08 AM a report was received in the control room of a medical emergency involving a contract employee at the Point Beach nuclear power plant. Onsite medical personnel responded and commenced first aid including CPR. CPR was continued until ambulance personnel arrived on site. The individual was transported to a local hospital.
"We have been informed by a subsequent report from the hospital that the individual died from an apparent heart attack.
"The Manitowoc County coroner's office and OSHA have been informed of the fatality. At this time no press release is planned."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Today at approximately 10:08 AM a report was received in the control room of a medical emergency involving a contract employee at the Point Beach nuclear power plant. Onsite medical personnel responded and commenced first aid including CPR. CPR was continued until ambulance personnel arrived on site. The individual was transported to a local hospital.
"We have been informed by a subsequent report from the hospital that the individual died from an apparent heart attack.
"The Manitowoc County coroner's office and OSHA have been informed of the fatality. At this time no press release is planned."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39178
Rep Org: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTUMENTS, INC
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTUMENTS, INC
Region: 3
City: EDEN PRAIRIE State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EMERSON PROCESS MGMT.
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTUMENTS, INC
Region: 3
City: EDEN PRAIRIE State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EMERSON PROCESS MGMT.
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 09/09/2002
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2002
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DAVID LEW (R1)
DAVID AYRES (R2)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
TIM MCGINTY (IRO)
DAVID LEW (R1)
DAVID AYRES (R2)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
TIM MCGINTY (IRO)
NOTIFICATION UNDER 10 CFR PART 21 FOR MODEL 1153 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS
The following is taken from a facsimile report sent by Emerson Process Management:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, section 21.21(b), Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (RNII) is writing to inform you that:
(a) certain Model 1153 differential pressure transmitters with model codes beginning with '1153D' or '1153H' shipped between March 2001 and August 2002, and
(b) spare sensor modules shipped between March 2001 and August 2002 with kit part numbers:
01153-0320-0232
01153-0320-0352
01153-0320-0252
"may not meet RNII's published temperature effect specification. Other Model 1152, 1153 and 1154 pressure transmitters are not affected. A list of affected Model 1153 pressure transmitters and spare sensor modules shipped to the end user's facility is provided in Attachment A.
"1.0 Name and address of the individual providing the information:
Mr. Jeffrey W. Schmitt
Vice President & General Manager
Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
12001 Technology Drive
Eden Prairie, MN 55344
"2.0 Identification of items supplied:
Certain Model 1153 differential pressure transmitters with model codes beginning with 1153D or 1153H shipped between March 2001 and August 2002 and;
"Spare sensor modules shipped between March 2001 and August 2002 with kit part numbers:
01153-0320-0232
01153-0320-0352
01153-0320-0252
"See Attachment A for complete listing of affected equipment shipped to the end user's facility.
"3.0 Identification of firm supplying the item:
Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
12001 Technology Drive
Eden Prairie, MN 55344
"4.0 Nature of the failure and potential safety hazard:
During the course of quality testing and data review, RNII has determined that certain Model 1153 differential pressure transmitters and spare sensor modules may not meet the published temperature effect specification. The temperature effect specification establishes an expected analog output error interval during normal ambient temperature variations occurring between 40 [degrees] F (4.4 [degrees] C) and 200 [degrees] F (93.3 [degrees] C). While analysis is still ongoing, the root cause of the potential nonconformance has been narrowed to the effect of temperature changes on the transmitter module.
Based on data review and analysis, RNII has established the following ambient temperature effect specification for transmitters affected by this notification. This specification supercedes the published temperature effect specification for all pressure transmitters affected by this notification.
All Range Codes: ± 3.0% of Upper Range Limit per 100 [degrees] F (55.6 [degrees] C)
RNII does not have sufficient information relative to each end user's specific applications to determine the potential safety-related impact to each end users plant. Each end user must determine the impact on its plant operations and plant safety and take action as deemed necessary.
"5.0 The corrective action which is taken, the name of the individual or organization responsible for that action, and the length of time taken to complete that action:
(a) RNII has expanded its temperature effect test screen to include all model 1153 pressure transmitters to assure that all further shipments of model 1153 pressure transmitters meet RNII's published temperature effect specification.
(b) RNII has placed a hold on spare sensor module shipments.
(c) RNII has established a new temperature effect specification for pressure transmitters impacted by this notification as noted in Section 4.0.
(d) RNII will verify ambient temperature effect performance to the original specification on any returned Model 1153 differential pressure transmitter or sensor module affected by this notification and repair or replace if required.
(e) RNII will continue root cause analysis of the temperature effect potential non-conformance. Action will be taken consistent with the findings of this analysis to assure conformance to RNII's published temperature effect specifications. Anticipated completion date: 1 November 2002.
(f) RNII will remove the hold on spare sensor modules when actions per 5.0 (e) are complete.
"6.0 Any advice related to the potential failure of the item:
The end user must determine the impact of this potential non-conformance upon its plant's operation and safety and take action as deemed necessary. If the end user determines that return of a pressure transmitter or sensor module is required, RNII should be contacted to facilitate the return process.
Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. has a strong commitment to the nuclear industry and assures you that we are dedicated to the supply of high quality products and services to our customers. We are sorry for any potential impact that this notification might cause. If there are any questions, or you require additional information related to this issue, please contact Mike Dougherty (952) 828-5626, Gerard Hanson (952) 828-3951, Bob Cleveland at (952) 828-8255, or Matt Doyle at (952) 828-3480."
The following is taken from a facsimile report sent by Emerson Process Management:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, section 21.21(b), Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (RNII) is writing to inform you that:
(a) certain Model 1153 differential pressure transmitters with model codes beginning with '1153D' or '1153H' shipped between March 2001 and August 2002, and
(b) spare sensor modules shipped between March 2001 and August 2002 with kit part numbers:
01153-0320-0232
01153-0320-0352
01153-0320-0252
"may not meet RNII's published temperature effect specification. Other Model 1152, 1153 and 1154 pressure transmitters are not affected. A list of affected Model 1153 pressure transmitters and spare sensor modules shipped to the end user's facility is provided in Attachment A.
"1.0 Name and address of the individual providing the information:
Mr. Jeffrey W. Schmitt
Vice President & General Manager
Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
12001 Technology Drive
Eden Prairie, MN 55344
"2.0 Identification of items supplied:
Certain Model 1153 differential pressure transmitters with model codes beginning with 1153D or 1153H shipped between March 2001 and August 2002 and;
"Spare sensor modules shipped between March 2001 and August 2002 with kit part numbers:
01153-0320-0232
01153-0320-0352
01153-0320-0252
"See Attachment A for complete listing of affected equipment shipped to the end user's facility.
"3.0 Identification of firm supplying the item:
Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
12001 Technology Drive
Eden Prairie, MN 55344
"4.0 Nature of the failure and potential safety hazard:
During the course of quality testing and data review, RNII has determined that certain Model 1153 differential pressure transmitters and spare sensor modules may not meet the published temperature effect specification. The temperature effect specification establishes an expected analog output error interval during normal ambient temperature variations occurring between 40 [degrees] F (4.4 [degrees] C) and 200 [degrees] F (93.3 [degrees] C). While analysis is still ongoing, the root cause of the potential nonconformance has been narrowed to the effect of temperature changes on the transmitter module.
Based on data review and analysis, RNII has established the following ambient temperature effect specification for transmitters affected by this notification. This specification supercedes the published temperature effect specification for all pressure transmitters affected by this notification.
All Range Codes: ± 3.0% of Upper Range Limit per 100 [degrees] F (55.6 [degrees] C)
RNII does not have sufficient information relative to each end user's specific applications to determine the potential safety-related impact to each end users plant. Each end user must determine the impact on its plant operations and plant safety and take action as deemed necessary.
"5.0 The corrective action which is taken, the name of the individual or organization responsible for that action, and the length of time taken to complete that action:
(a) RNII has expanded its temperature effect test screen to include all model 1153 pressure transmitters to assure that all further shipments of model 1153 pressure transmitters meet RNII's published temperature effect specification.
(b) RNII has placed a hold on spare sensor module shipments.
(c) RNII has established a new temperature effect specification for pressure transmitters impacted by this notification as noted in Section 4.0.
(d) RNII will verify ambient temperature effect performance to the original specification on any returned Model 1153 differential pressure transmitter or sensor module affected by this notification and repair or replace if required.
(e) RNII will continue root cause analysis of the temperature effect potential non-conformance. Action will be taken consistent with the findings of this analysis to assure conformance to RNII's published temperature effect specifications. Anticipated completion date: 1 November 2002.
(f) RNII will remove the hold on spare sensor modules when actions per 5.0 (e) are complete.
"6.0 Any advice related to the potential failure of the item:
The end user must determine the impact of this potential non-conformance upon its plant's operation and safety and take action as deemed necessary. If the end user determines that return of a pressure transmitter or sensor module is required, RNII should be contacted to facilitate the return process.
Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. has a strong commitment to the nuclear industry and assures you that we are dedicated to the supply of high quality products and services to our customers. We are sorry for any potential impact that this notification might cause. If there are any questions, or you require additional information related to this issue, please contact Mike Dougherty (952) 828-5626, Gerard Hanson (952) 828-3951, Bob Cleveland at (952) 828-8255, or Matt Doyle at (952) 828-3480."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39179
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK HUBBARD
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK HUBBARD
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 09/09/2002
Notification Time: 22:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2002
Event Time: 15:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2002
Notification Time: 22:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2002
Event Time: 15:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FAILED RELAY CARD CAUSE AUTOMATIC START OF THE "A" EDG AND THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED WATER PUMP
"On September 9, 2002 at 1559, with Wolf Creek in Mode 1 at 100 % power, the Control Room received annunciator 19E, NB01 degraded voltage. Approximately 90 seconds later, the NB01 normal feeder breaker opened. The 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started and loaded onto the bus as expected. After the 'A' EDG restored NB01 bus voltage to normal, annunciator 19E remained locked in. The cause of the actuation appears to be a failure of the relay driver card that supplies the degraded voltage signal to the Load Sequencer Emergency Load Shedder (LSELS). Instrumentation and Control Technicians (INC) expect repairs to be complete by 0000, September 10, 2002.
"As expected, an automatic start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump occurred upon the under voltage condition on NB01. After the bus was re-energized, the shutdown sequencer actuated and emergency loads sequenced as expected.
"Based on the guidance provided in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, this situation meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for an 8-hour ENS notification as it relates to actuation of the emergency ac electrical power systems, which includes emergency diesel generators.
"The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector."
"On September 9, 2002 at 1559, with Wolf Creek in Mode 1 at 100 % power, the Control Room received annunciator 19E, NB01 degraded voltage. Approximately 90 seconds later, the NB01 normal feeder breaker opened. The 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started and loaded onto the bus as expected. After the 'A' EDG restored NB01 bus voltage to normal, annunciator 19E remained locked in. The cause of the actuation appears to be a failure of the relay driver card that supplies the degraded voltage signal to the Load Sequencer Emergency Load Shedder (LSELS). Instrumentation and Control Technicians (INC) expect repairs to be complete by 0000, September 10, 2002.
"As expected, an automatic start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump occurred upon the under voltage condition on NB01. After the bus was re-energized, the shutdown sequencer actuated and emergency loads sequenced as expected.
"Based on the guidance provided in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, this situation meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for an 8-hour ENS notification as it relates to actuation of the emergency ac electrical power systems, which includes emergency diesel generators.
"The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector."