Event Notification Report for August 24, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/23/2002 - 08/24/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
39152391493915039151
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39152
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PETE SENA
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PETE SENA
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 08/25/2002
Notification Time: 00:45 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2002
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2002
Notification Time: 00:45 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2002
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
GAS VOIDING IN ECCS PIPING
"At 0425 hrs on 8/24/2002, a gas void was identified in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 2 that exceeded the gas void volume limit of .872 cubic feet. A gas void which exceeds .872 cubic feet could potentially disable a single High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump if ingested. The gas void was located in the 'B' train piping which would be used (only) following the transfer-to-recirculation phase of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Technical Specification Action 3.5.2.a and 3.5.2.d was entered for 'B' ECCS train not being operable. The piping where the void was located leads to a common HHSI pump suction header which connects to both trains' HHSI pumps.
"At 1345 hrs on 8/24/2002, an isolation valve (2SIS-MOV863B) was de-energized closed. De-energizing this isolation valve prevents the gas void traveling to the common HHSI suction header during transfer-to-recirculation flow. This was done as a general precaution to strengthen the operable 'A' HHSI train during the ongoing gas void generation investigation since this gas void generation process was not yet fully understood.
"At 1638 hrs on 8/24/2002 it was calculated that the actual gas void volume in the 'B' train piping was 1.3 cubic feet. It was also identified that the previously established gas void volume limit of .872 cubic feet was incorrect and the applicable gas void volume limit was .319 cubic feet. With an evaluation of the new gas void limit, it was concluded at 2000 hrs that BVPS Unit No. 2 had been vulnerable to a degradation of both trains' HHSI pumps between 0425 and 1345. This would be possible since the gas void could potentially have split in half (0.65 cubic feet) and migrated during post-LOCA transfer-to-recirculation flow through the common HHSI suction header. Each half-sized void could enter each train's HHSI pump, potentially affecting both trains of HHSI pumps (.65 cubic feet would exceed the limit of .319 cubic feet for each pump). This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. This is also reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed to mitigate consequences of an accident.
"Currently with 2SIS-M0V863B de-energized closed, the gas void can not travel to the 'A' train HHSI pump. Actions are being initiated to eliminate this gas void. BVPS Unit No. 2 remains in Tech Specification Action 3.5.2.a and 3.5.2.d for one ECCS subsystem inoperable. The investigation of the gas void generation process is continuing."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
***RETRACTION KEN TIEFENTHAL TO MIKE NORRIS 9/18/02 1743 EDT***
"Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 2 retracts the notification made on 08/25/2002 at 00:45 hrs regarding the event reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) [ENS #39152].
"Subsequent analysis of the event identified that the gas void previously located in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping at BVPS Unit No. 2 would not have rendered either train's High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump incapable of performing its intended safety function. A detailed evaluation of the void size and the exact piping arrangement concluded that for an analyzed void size of 3 cu. ft. (which bounds the as-found void), the void fraction reaching the HHSI pump would have been 5% or less. At this level of void fraction, a HHSI pump at BVPS Unit No. 2 would have continued to operate and pass flow through the discharge lines to the RCS during the short duration when the void was present. The small temporary degradation in flow would also not have adversely affected any transient in progress. Therefore, the HHSI pumps would have been able to pass the void and continue to perform its safety function if the ECCS had been called upon to operate.
"Given that both trains of HHSI were able to perform their safety functions, this void was not a condition that significantly degraded plant safety and did not prevent the ECCS system from being able to fulfill its safety function."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, notified R1DO (Kinneman).
"At 0425 hrs on 8/24/2002, a gas void was identified in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 2 that exceeded the gas void volume limit of .872 cubic feet. A gas void which exceeds .872 cubic feet could potentially disable a single High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump if ingested. The gas void was located in the 'B' train piping which would be used (only) following the transfer-to-recirculation phase of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Technical Specification Action 3.5.2.a and 3.5.2.d was entered for 'B' ECCS train not being operable. The piping where the void was located leads to a common HHSI pump suction header which connects to both trains' HHSI pumps.
"At 1345 hrs on 8/24/2002, an isolation valve (2SIS-MOV863B) was de-energized closed. De-energizing this isolation valve prevents the gas void traveling to the common HHSI suction header during transfer-to-recirculation flow. This was done as a general precaution to strengthen the operable 'A' HHSI train during the ongoing gas void generation investigation since this gas void generation process was not yet fully understood.
"At 1638 hrs on 8/24/2002 it was calculated that the actual gas void volume in the 'B' train piping was 1.3 cubic feet. It was also identified that the previously established gas void volume limit of .872 cubic feet was incorrect and the applicable gas void volume limit was .319 cubic feet. With an evaluation of the new gas void limit, it was concluded at 2000 hrs that BVPS Unit No. 2 had been vulnerable to a degradation of both trains' HHSI pumps between 0425 and 1345. This would be possible since the gas void could potentially have split in half (0.65 cubic feet) and migrated during post-LOCA transfer-to-recirculation flow through the common HHSI suction header. Each half-sized void could enter each train's HHSI pump, potentially affecting both trains of HHSI pumps (.65 cubic feet would exceed the limit of .319 cubic feet for each pump). This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. This is also reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed to mitigate consequences of an accident.
"Currently with 2SIS-M0V863B de-energized closed, the gas void can not travel to the 'A' train HHSI pump. Actions are being initiated to eliminate this gas void. BVPS Unit No. 2 remains in Tech Specification Action 3.5.2.a and 3.5.2.d for one ECCS subsystem inoperable. The investigation of the gas void generation process is continuing."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
***RETRACTION KEN TIEFENTHAL TO MIKE NORRIS 9/18/02 1743 EDT***
"Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 2 retracts the notification made on 08/25/2002 at 00:45 hrs regarding the event reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) [ENS #39152].
"Subsequent analysis of the event identified that the gas void previously located in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping at BVPS Unit No. 2 would not have rendered either train's High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump incapable of performing its intended safety function. A detailed evaluation of the void size and the exact piping arrangement concluded that for an analyzed void size of 3 cu. ft. (which bounds the as-found void), the void fraction reaching the HHSI pump would have been 5% or less. At this level of void fraction, a HHSI pump at BVPS Unit No. 2 would have continued to operate and pass flow through the discharge lines to the RCS during the short duration when the void was present. The small temporary degradation in flow would also not have adversely affected any transient in progress. Therefore, the HHSI pumps would have been able to pass the void and continue to perform its safety function if the ECCS had been called upon to operate.
"Given that both trains of HHSI were able to perform their safety functions, this void was not a condition that significantly degraded plant safety and did not prevent the ECCS system from being able to fulfill its safety function."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, notified R1DO (Kinneman).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39149
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DON KNIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DON KNIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 08/24/2002
Notification Time: 08:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2002
Event Time: 07:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2002
Notification Time: 08:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2002
Event Time: 07:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
KEN BARR (R2)
KEN BARR (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANNED OUTAGE ON ERFIS SYSTEM
"Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) inoperable due to planned outage of the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS).
"At 07:50 Hours on August 24, 2002, the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, ERFIS computer system was removed from service for a planned outage to upgrade this system. The expected duration of the outage is approximately 5 days. During this time, the ERDS and SPDS will be unavailable. Alternate means are identified in the HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, emergency preparedness procedures to collect and distribute data that would normally be available by the SPDS. The HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, Emergency Response Organization remains able to respond to an event during the time the ERFIS is unavailable.
"The planned ERFIS changes. when completed, are not expected to change the ERDS transmission format or data point library. Therefore, additional reports in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, VI. 3. a and b are not expected.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE 1540EDT ON 8/29/02 FROM CHRIS CHURCH TO S. SANDIN
ERFIS was returned to service as of 1058EDT on 8/29/02. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Cahill).
"Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) inoperable due to planned outage of the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS).
"At 07:50 Hours on August 24, 2002, the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, ERFIS computer system was removed from service for a planned outage to upgrade this system. The expected duration of the outage is approximately 5 days. During this time, the ERDS and SPDS will be unavailable. Alternate means are identified in the HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, emergency preparedness procedures to collect and distribute data that would normally be available by the SPDS. The HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, Emergency Response Organization remains able to respond to an event during the time the ERFIS is unavailable.
"The planned ERFIS changes. when completed, are not expected to change the ERDS transmission format or data point library. Therefore, additional reports in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, VI. 3. a and b are not expected.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE 1540EDT ON 8/29/02 FROM CHRIS CHURCH TO S. SANDIN
ERFIS was returned to service as of 1058EDT on 8/29/02. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Cahill).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39150
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE KOCHERT
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE KOCHERT
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 08/24/2002
Notification Time: 09:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2002
Event Time: 08:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2002
Notification Time: 09:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2002
Event Time: 08:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANNED LOSS OF THE EOF FOR 20 HOURS
"During performance of planned maintenance, the Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) will be without ventilation capabilities. These maintenance activities, including electrical isolation and restoration are expected to last approximately 20 hours. Contingency plans for emergency situations have been established.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this constitutes a loss of an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution.
"The NRC Resident has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1445EDT ON 8/24/02 FROM STEVE KOCHERT TO S. SANDIN * * *
At 1335CDT on 8/24/02 the EOF was declared functional and restored to operation.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO(Johnson).
"During performance of planned maintenance, the Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) will be without ventilation capabilities. These maintenance activities, including electrical isolation and restoration are expected to last approximately 20 hours. Contingency plans for emergency situations have been established.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this constitutes a loss of an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution.
"The NRC Resident has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1445EDT ON 8/24/02 FROM STEVE KOCHERT TO S. SANDIN * * *
At 1335CDT on 8/24/02 the EOF was declared functional and restored to operation.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO(Johnson).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39151
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: LEO GETZ
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: LEO GETZ
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 08/24/2002
Notification Time: 10:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2002
Event Time: 07:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2002
Notification Time: 10:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2002
Event Time: 07:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF CALVERT COUNTY EP SIREN ACTIVATION SYSTEM DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKES
"At 07:50 on 8/24/02, notified by system engineer that Calvert County sirens are out of service due to multiple lightning strikes affecting the Calvert control center siren activation circuit. The county is using route alerting as a compensatory measure."
The NRC resident inspector was notified.
"At 07:50 on 8/24/02, notified by system engineer that Calvert County sirens are out of service due to multiple lightning strikes affecting the Calvert control center siren activation circuit. The county is using route alerting as a compensatory measure."
The NRC resident inspector was notified.