Event Notification Report for August 15, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/14/2002 - 08/15/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39132
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DONALD McGEE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DONALD McGEE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 08/16/2002
Notification Time: 00:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2002
Event Time: 21:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2002
Notification Time: 00:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2002
Event Time: 21:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
MARK LESSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW BUS VOLTAGE ON REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS
"An automatic reactor trip occurred at 2126 on 8/15/02. The reactor trip was caused by low bus voltage for reactor coolant pumps and the cause is under investigation. All safety systems responded properly. Both motor driven AFW pumps automatically started due to low steam generator level. At 2155, a second AFW actuation was received due to low steam generator level in one steam generator while recovering level. Both motor driven AFW pumps were already running in response to the first actuation signal."
A voltage transient occurred when central distribution near Raleigh, NC (about 20 miles away) was restoring a 230 kV to 115 kV bank that had tripped due to a lightning strike.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"An automatic reactor trip occurred at 2126 on 8/15/02. The reactor trip was caused by low bus voltage for reactor coolant pumps and the cause is under investigation. All safety systems responded properly. Both motor driven AFW pumps automatically started due to low steam generator level. At 2155, a second AFW actuation was received due to low steam generator level in one steam generator while recovering level. Both motor driven AFW pumps were already running in response to the first actuation signal."
A voltage transient occurred when central distribution near Raleigh, NC (about 20 miles away) was restoring a 230 kV to 115 kV bank that had tripped due to a lightning strike.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39133
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: M. C. PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: M. C. PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 08/16/2002
Notification Time: 10:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2002
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2002
Notification Time: 10:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2002
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
GARY SHEAR (R3)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT - LACK OF APPROVED NCS EVALUATION FOR OPERATION
The following is taken from a facsimile report:
At 1613, on 08-15-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a fissile material operation was identified without an approved NCS evaluation. Two full 2S sample cylinders, which originated outside of C-310, were evacuated to the cascade via the sample cabinet in C-310. No NCSE exists to cover refeed operations of 2S cylinders in the C-310 Liquid Sampling System. Thus, no NCSA controls have been established to perform this operation in C-310.
The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been notified of this event.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Two full 2S cylinders do not contain sufficient mass of uranium to support a criticality. However, double contingency was not maintained because no NCSA controls have been established to perform this operation in C-310.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR)
In order for a criticality to be possible, more than a critical mass would have to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC
Since this operation does not have an NCSA for it, there is no controlled parameter.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORMS OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDES PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
2S Cylinder N-260 - [ ]grams UF6 with an enrichment of [ ]% U-235. 2S cylinder N-19 - [ ] grams UF6 with an enrichment of [ ]% U-235.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
Refeed of 2S cylinders in the C-310 Liquid Sampling System has not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained,
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Revise procedures to prevent the refeed of 2S cylinders, which originated outside of C-310, in the C-310 Liquid Sampling System.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/11/02 AT 2224 FROM THOMAS WHITE TO GERRY WAIG * * *
"During the event investigation, it was discovered that no NCSE/A exists to cover the transport of 2S cylinders containing fissile material from another facility to C-310. Therefore, no NCSA controls have been established to perform this operation.
"Double contingency was not maintained because no NCSA controls have been established to transport 2S cylinders containing fissile material to C-310.
"Transport of 2S cylinders containing fissile material to C-310 has also not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety, Therefore, double contingency was not maintained."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of the event report update.
Notified R3DO (Christine Lipa) and NMSS EO (Janet Schlueter).
The following is taken from a facsimile report:
At 1613, on 08-15-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a fissile material operation was identified without an approved NCS evaluation. Two full 2S sample cylinders, which originated outside of C-310, were evacuated to the cascade via the sample cabinet in C-310. No NCSE exists to cover refeed operations of 2S cylinders in the C-310 Liquid Sampling System. Thus, no NCSA controls have been established to perform this operation in C-310.
The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been notified of this event.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Two full 2S cylinders do not contain sufficient mass of uranium to support a criticality. However, double contingency was not maintained because no NCSA controls have been established to perform this operation in C-310.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR)
In order for a criticality to be possible, more than a critical mass would have to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC
Since this operation does not have an NCSA for it, there is no controlled parameter.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORMS OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDES PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
2S Cylinder N-260 - [ ]grams UF6 with an enrichment of [ ]% U-235. 2S cylinder N-19 - [ ] grams UF6 with an enrichment of [ ]% U-235.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
Refeed of 2S cylinders in the C-310 Liquid Sampling System has not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained,
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Revise procedures to prevent the refeed of 2S cylinders, which originated outside of C-310, in the C-310 Liquid Sampling System.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/11/02 AT 2224 FROM THOMAS WHITE TO GERRY WAIG * * *
"During the event investigation, it was discovered that no NCSE/A exists to cover the transport of 2S cylinders containing fissile material from another facility to C-310. Therefore, no NCSA controls have been established to perform this operation.
"Double contingency was not maintained because no NCSA controls have been established to transport 2S cylinders containing fissile material to C-310.
"Transport of 2S cylinders containing fissile material to C-310 has also not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety, Therefore, double contingency was not maintained."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of the event report update.
Notified R3DO (Christine Lipa) and NMSS EO (Janet Schlueter).