Event Notification Report for July 24, 2002

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

A Troxler gauge model 3440, serial number 31621, was stolen out of the bed of a truck in front of a private residence. The vehicle was parked at 2300 on 7/24/02 and the gauge was found missing at 0700 on 7/25/02. The gauge contains 8 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241:Be. Local law enforcement has notified and a press release is planned for the local newspaper.

* * * UPDATED AT 1220 EDT ON 8/6/02 BY JOSH GRISHAM TO FANGIE JONES * * *

The gauge has been recovered in good condition.

Notified R2DO (Caudle Julian) and NMSS EO (Charlie Miller).

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO DECREASING OIL LEVEL AND INCREASING THRUST BEARING TEMPERATURE ON ONE OF FOUR REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS

Indications of lowering oil level were observed on the 11A reactor coolant pump. While the licensee was investigating whether or not the indications were valid, thrust bearing temperature began to increase. As a result, operators manually tripped the reactor from 100% power at 1628, and operators subsequently secured the 11A reactor coolant pump. All control rods fully inserted, and all systems function as required in response to the manual reactor trip. None of the primary or secondary relief valves lifted, and there were no emergency core cooling system injections and engineered safety feature actuations.

The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Normal charging and letdown, pressurizer heaters and sprays, and the remaining three reactor coolant pumps are currently being utilized for primary system level, pressure, and transport control. Water is currently being supplied to the steam generators via normal condensate and feedwater, and secondary steam is being dumped to the condenser. The auxiliary feedwater system remains in standby. Containment parameters remain normal, and offsite power is available. All emergency core cooling systems and engineered safety features are operable and available with the exception of the 1B emergency diesel generator, which was removed from of service for planned maintenance this morning.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

NOTIFICATION UNDER 10 CFR PART 21 OF FAILURE OF ELECTRIC CABLE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Rockbestos Surprenant Cable Corp.:

"This letter shall serve as the initial notification by Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp. that a basic component supplied for use in nuclear power plants may contain a defect or fail to comply, which is reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 21.

"Written notification shall be provided by September 8, 2002.

"The following information is supplied in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 21.

"I. Name and address of individual informing the Commission:

Richard C. Brown-Quality Assurance Manager
The Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp.
20 Bradley Park Road
East Granby, CT 06026

"II. Identification of the basic component supplied which fails to comply or contains a defect:

"The cable identified below failed to comply with the vertical tray flame
test when subjected to the requirements as described in IEEE-383-1974
section 2.5.4:

2/C 14 AWG 600V Firewall SR (Silicone Rubber) with overall Rockhide braid
Sales Order: 52727
Shop Order: 220557
Item: C643385
Reel No.: 02F0693G

"This cable was subsequently placed in an MRB location an[d] issued a nonconformance report on 7/24/02.

"III. Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:

" The Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp.. East Granby, CT facility

"IV. Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created:

"Nature of Defect: Incorrect lacquer material applied to overall Rockhide braid.
Potential Hazard: The lacquer material applied to the overall Rockhide braid may contribute to the
propagation of flame, resulting in a burn of the entire length of the tray as described in IEEE-383-1974
section 2.5.4.

"V. The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:

"On the basis of our testing and evaluation it was determined on 7/24/02 that a defect or failure to comply as
defined by 10 CFR 21 existed.

"VI. The number and location of all basic components which contain a defect or fails to comply:

"Our initial investigation indicates that the affected cables are limited to eight part numbers/shipments of
multiconductor Firewall SR (Silicone Rubber) cables with overall Rockhide braid manufactured from 1999
through July 2002.

"VII. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization
responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:

"Production and shipment of all Firewall SR (Silicone Rubber) cables with overall Rockhide braid was
stopped on 7/24/02 and all cables in house were identified and nonconformance reports issued as a result
of the flame test failure.

"Manufacturing instructions and bills of material for all Firewall SR (Silicone Rubber) with overall Rockhide
braid products are being reviewed to ensure that all process documents specify approved lacquers.

"After review by Applications Engineering, samples of the 2/C 14 AWG nonconforming cables were over
braided and lacquered with approved lacquers, and again subjected to the vertical tray flame test of
IEEE-383-1974 section 2.5.4. These samples successfully withstood the requirements of the standard.
Processing documents for the 2/C 14 AWG and other constructions which were in production, were
subsequently issued temporary engineering changes allowing over braid and subsequent lacquer with
approved materials.

"An additional cable sample of 3/C 12 AWG 600V Firewall SR (Silicone Rubber) without the over braid and
utilizing an approved lacquer, was subjected to; and successfully withstood the vertical tray flame test
requirements of IEEE- 383-1974 section 2.5.4.

"Further flame testing of Firewall SR (Silicone Rubber) cables with overall Rockhide braid is planned on
various sizes and configurations to determine the extent of the failure mode,

"Production and shipment of cables have resumed for those products originally placed on hold after
acceptable results were obtained for the vertical tray flame test as described in IEEE 383-1974 section
2.54.

"VIII. Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the basic component that has been, is being, or
will be given to purchasers:

"Purchasers of Firewall SR (Silicone Rubber) products that were manufactured with the overall Rockhide
braid and lacquer from 1999 through July 2002 will be notified of the failure mode described above by
letter on 8/12/02. Purchasers will be requested to stop any current or planned installation of the
aforementioned cables and to notify Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp. for return of any cables not
installed. Advice related to installed cables will be provided based on the installed conditions.

"The following personnel may be contacted regarding the preceding
notification:

James Morganelli
Senior Quality Engineer
(860) 653-8319

Richard Brown
Quality Assurance Manager
(860) 653-8322

Robert Konnik
Director of Applications Engineering
(860) 653-8340"

NOTIFICATION UNDER 10 CFR PART 21 FOR HIGH LINE PRESSURE CORRECTION METHODOLOGY (INACCURATE TECHNICAL ADVICE RELATED TO ROSEMOUNT TRANSMITTERS)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, Paragraph 21.21(b), Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (RNII) is writing to inform you of an instance in which RNII provided inaccurate technical advice related to high line pressure correction of Rosemount transmitters to one customer. The technical advice was transmitted to Rochester Gas and Electric via letters sent to this customer in April 1991. The letters were intended to provide supplemental guidance to the published RNII product manuals for calibration of pressure transmitters with high line pressure applied. The result of implementation of the technical guidance in these letters would be to improperly correct for the effect of line pressure on transmitter output. A recent communication between RNII and this customer alerted RNII to the inaccurate supplemental technical guidance. RNII has subsequently corrected this advice. The standard procedure for correcting for high line pressure contained in RNII's product manuals is accurate."

"[...]"

"2.0 Identification of items supplied:"

"Model 1152 and Model 1154 Pressure Transmitters are specifically addressed in the communications to the customer. The concept of high line pressure correction is applicable to all RNII pressure transmitter models."

"[...]"

"4.0 Nature of the failure and potential safety hazard:"

"This notification relates to an instance in which RNII provided incorrect, application specific supplemental line pressure correction advice to a single customer. This incorrect advice was contained in letters sent to Rochester Gas and Electric in April 1991. The high line pressure correction procedures provided in RNII pressure transmitter product manuals are not affected and are accurate."

"RNII does not have sufficient information relative to the applications to determine the safety significance of this situation."

"5.0 The corrective action which is taken, the name of the individual or organization responsible for that action, and the length of time taken to complete that action:"

"Corrective Action:"

"RNII has contacted the affected customer, and through a series of verbal and electronic communications, provided the correct supplemental technical information relative to high line pressure effect for the application in question. RNII will follow up these communications with a formal detailed letter to this customer. Completion Date: 31 July 2002."

"Internal RNII Corrective Actions:"

"1. The customer provided RNII with copies of the information originally supplied by RNII regarding the supplemental high line pressure correction advice. RNII reviewed this information along with the current request for clarification of the supplemental high line pressure correction for a specific application."

"2. Transmitter testing was performed to establish additional assurance that the current technical advice given to the customer was correct."

"3. Other customer correspondence files were reviewed to look for occurrences of incorrect supplemental technical information. No occurrences were identified."

"4. Training of appropriate RNII personnel reinforcing the importance of providing accurate supplemental technical information will be performed. Completion Date: 2 August 2002."

"5. Current administrative procedures and controls will be reviewed to provide confidence that supplemental technical information being transmitted to customers is accurate. Following this review, further corrective action will be initiated and implemented if appropriate. Completion Date: 16 August 2002."

"6.0 Any advice related to the potential failure of the item:"

"This notification specifically addresses detailed, supplemental technical information provided to one customer. There should not be any potential failure concern relative to hardware, and RNII's pressure product manuals are unaffected."

(Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.)

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A DISCHARGE OF APPROXIMATELY 13 GALLONS OF FUEL OIL TO THE CHESAPEAKE BAY

Approximately 13 gallons of #2 fuel oil was released to the Chesapeake Bay via the storm drain when the 1B diesel generator fuel oil day tank was overfilled during the calibration of the level switches. The control room was notified at 1226, and the release has been secured at 1355. The spill mitigation plan and ERPIP were both implemented, and the boom is in place at the outfall to catch any residual.

The licensee notified the Maryland Department of the Environment, National Response Center, and NRC resident inspector.