Event Notification Report for July 22, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/21/2002 - 07/22/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39081
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/22/2002
Notification Time: 02:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2002
Event Time: 00:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2002
Notification Time: 02:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2002
Event Time: 00:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR AUTOMATICALLY TRIPPED FROM 100% POWER ON REACTOR TRIP/TURBINE TRIP
The reactor trip/turbine trip from 100% power was caused by a loss of main turbine condenser vacuum that occurred while flushing the condenser waterboxes. The cause is unknown and being investigated at this time. All control rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuated and all emergency and non-emergency systems functioned as designed. The main steam stop valves were manually closed to arrest RCS cooldown. RCS temperature was stabilized using the atmospheric relief valves.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified,
The reactor trip/turbine trip from 100% power was caused by a loss of main turbine condenser vacuum that occurred while flushing the condenser waterboxes. The cause is unknown and being investigated at this time. All control rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuated and all emergency and non-emergency systems functioned as designed. The main steam stop valves were manually closed to arrest RCS cooldown. RCS temperature was stabilized using the atmospheric relief valves.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified,
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39082
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 07/22/2002
Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2002
Event Time: 17:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2002
Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2002
Event Time: 17:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF A HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) FLOW CONTROLLER INDICATION OF 500 GPM DURING RESTORATION FROM A CORE SPRAY SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE TEST AND WITH THE HPCI SYSTEM IN STANDBY
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"During restoration from surveillance testing on the 'B' core spray system, the flow controller for the HPCI system (23FI-108-1) was observed to be reading 500 gpm with the HPCI system in standby. The HPCI system was declared inoperable, and [Technical Specification] 3.5.C.1.b was entered requiring [either] restoration of 'B' core spray or HPCI to operable status within 24 hours or [commencement of a unit] shutdown. 'B' core spray was restored to operability at 1732, and the plant exited [Technical Specification] 3.5.C.1.b and entered [Technical Specification] 3.5.C.1.a placing the plant in a [7-day limiting condition for operation (LCO)]."
"Since no actuations occurred and [since] no shutdown was initiated, this is only reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3) criteria, specifically 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This is based on the guidance in NUREG 1022, Rev. 2. Since HPCI is a single train system, even though [technical specifications] allow a 7-day LCO, declaring HPCI [inoperable] is reportable."
"The only unusual/not understood thing associated with this is the flow indication of 500 gpm. There were no actuations required so all equipment functioned and continues to function as expected. There are no radiological releases associated with this event."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
****RETRACTION ON 08/21/02 AT 0959 ET BY RICH PLASSE TAKEN BY MACKINNON*****
"During troubleshooting, it was noted that manipulation of terminal screws on one of the components caused a step output change similar in magnitude to that observed on the indicator. Components were replaced and the instrument calibrations re-performed, with the resulting indication returning to normal. A review of plant data indicated that an intermittent indication problem was evident in the instrument loop after April 30, 2002, when maintenance had been performed that included the replacement of several instrument loop components. Thus, it appears that the intermittent problem began as a result of this maintenance activity.
"Based on the review of both calibration information as well as satisfactory performance of the two HPCI System surveillances during the affected time frames (including when HPCI was in the "faulted condition"), it was determined that the observed condition had no impact on the capability of the HPCI System to perform its safety function, and thus the system remained operable. Therefore, the above referenced notification is being retracted". NRC R1DO (Cliff Anderson) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this Retraction by the licensee.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"During restoration from surveillance testing on the 'B' core spray system, the flow controller for the HPCI system (23FI-108-1) was observed to be reading 500 gpm with the HPCI system in standby. The HPCI system was declared inoperable, and [Technical Specification] 3.5.C.1.b was entered requiring [either] restoration of 'B' core spray or HPCI to operable status within 24 hours or [commencement of a unit] shutdown. 'B' core spray was restored to operability at 1732, and the plant exited [Technical Specification] 3.5.C.1.b and entered [Technical Specification] 3.5.C.1.a placing the plant in a [7-day limiting condition for operation (LCO)]."
"Since no actuations occurred and [since] no shutdown was initiated, this is only reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3) criteria, specifically 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This is based on the guidance in NUREG 1022, Rev. 2. Since HPCI is a single train system, even though [technical specifications] allow a 7-day LCO, declaring HPCI [inoperable] is reportable."
"The only unusual/not understood thing associated with this is the flow indication of 500 gpm. There were no actuations required so all equipment functioned and continues to function as expected. There are no radiological releases associated with this event."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
****RETRACTION ON 08/21/02 AT 0959 ET BY RICH PLASSE TAKEN BY MACKINNON*****
"During troubleshooting, it was noted that manipulation of terminal screws on one of the components caused a step output change similar in magnitude to that observed on the indicator. Components were replaced and the instrument calibrations re-performed, with the resulting indication returning to normal. A review of plant data indicated that an intermittent indication problem was evident in the instrument loop after April 30, 2002, when maintenance had been performed that included the replacement of several instrument loop components. Thus, it appears that the intermittent problem began as a result of this maintenance activity.
"Based on the review of both calibration information as well as satisfactory performance of the two HPCI System surveillances during the affected time frames (including when HPCI was in the "faulted condition"), it was determined that the observed condition had no impact on the capability of the HPCI System to perform its safety function, and thus the system remained operable. Therefore, the above referenced notification is being retracted". NRC R1DO (Cliff Anderson) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this Retraction by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39083
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DUANE BISTODEAU
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DUANE BISTODEAU
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 07/22/2002
Notification Time: 21:26 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2002
Event Time: 16:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2002
Notification Time: 21:26 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2002
Event Time: 16:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INOPERABILITY OF BOTH CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION TRAINS
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Both control room ventilation (CRV) trains [were] declared inoperable. While [the] 'B' CRV was inoperable for testing, [the] 'A' CRV chiller compressor tripped causing [the] 'A' CRV to be inoperable. [A] 24-hour [limiting condition for operation (LCO)] was entered per [Technical Specification] 3.17.A.3.a. 'B' CRV was restored to operable and [the] 24-hour LCO [was exited] at 1701 [CDT]. [The] 'A' CRV is in a 30-day LCO per [Technical Specification] 3.17.A.2.a. [The] 'A' CRV chiller compressor trip cause [is] unknown."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as applicable state and local officials.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Both control room ventilation (CRV) trains [were] declared inoperable. While [the] 'B' CRV was inoperable for testing, [the] 'A' CRV chiller compressor tripped causing [the] 'A' CRV to be inoperable. [A] 24-hour [limiting condition for operation (LCO)] was entered per [Technical Specification] 3.17.A.3.a. 'B' CRV was restored to operable and [the] 24-hour LCO [was exited] at 1701 [CDT]. [The] 'A' CRV is in a 30-day LCO per [Technical Specification] 3.17.A.2.a. [The] 'A' CRV chiller compressor trip cause [is] unknown."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as applicable state and local officials.