Event Notification Report for July 19, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/18/2002 - 07/19/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
39074390763907739078
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39074
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS CORNAX
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS CORNAX
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 07/19/2002
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2002
Event Time: 14:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2002
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2002
Event Time: 14:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES LINVILLE (R1)
CHRIS GRIMES (NRR)
TIM MCGINTY (IRO)
BETH HAYDEN (PA)
JAMES LINVILLE (R1)
CHRIS GRIMES (NRR)
TIM MCGINTY (IRO)
BETH HAYDEN (PA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION AT IP2 OF ONSITE FATALITY
The licensee reported an onsite fatality occurred that prompted the need to notify the New York State Public Service Commission and the local Fire Department which responded to the site. Specifically, a contract worker was electrocuted while trimming trees onsite, behind the emergency diesel generator building, adjacent to a 138 KV feeder.
The event resulted in the protective relaying tripping the feeder and a loss of offsite power (LOOP) resulted. The plant remained online at 100% power. The emergency diesel generators were started and powered two of the safeguard buses.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
The licensee reported an onsite fatality occurred that prompted the need to notify the New York State Public Service Commission and the local Fire Department which responded to the site. Specifically, a contract worker was electrocuted while trimming trees onsite, behind the emergency diesel generator building, adjacent to a 138 KV feeder.
The event resulted in the protective relaying tripping the feeder and a loss of offsite power (LOOP) resulted. The plant remained online at 100% power. The emergency diesel generators were started and powered two of the safeguard buses.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39076
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 07/19/2002
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2002
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY AT THE JOINT EMERGENCY NEWS CENTER
"The following event description is based on information currently available. It through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 1OCFR5O.73.
"On July 19, 2002 at approximately 10:30 AM Mountain Standard Time Palo Verde Emergency Planning personnel were notified that installed communications to and from the Joint Emergency News Center (JENC) had been totally disabled when an underground cable was cut. The affected cable and the JENC are located in Phoenix, AZ.
"This loss of communications capability does not affect the assessment or response capability of Palo Verde, state or county personnel in the event of an emergency The JENC and its communications capability are an integral part of media notification and information dissemination as described in the Palo Verde Emergency Plan.
"As a compensatory measure, the state has access to cellular phones for use in the JENC. The state will deploy those phones in the event of an actual emergency. In addition, most media personnel normally carry their own cellular phones The phone company has assigned their highest priority to this repair. The latest estimate for repair is approximately one-half day.
"The cable was cut yesterday at approximately 3:00 PM on Thursday, July 18, 2002 but the state was not informed until approximately 09:00 AM today and then the state notified Palo Verde at approximately 10:30 AM."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
*****UPDATE ON 7/19/02 AT 19:22 FROM MARKS TO LAURA*****
"The state has notified Palo Verde that JENC communications were restored at 13:28 MST on July 19, 2002."
Notified R4DO (L. Howell).
"The following event description is based on information currently available. It through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 1OCFR5O.73.
"On July 19, 2002 at approximately 10:30 AM Mountain Standard Time Palo Verde Emergency Planning personnel were notified that installed communications to and from the Joint Emergency News Center (JENC) had been totally disabled when an underground cable was cut. The affected cable and the JENC are located in Phoenix, AZ.
"This loss of communications capability does not affect the assessment or response capability of Palo Verde, state or county personnel in the event of an emergency The JENC and its communications capability are an integral part of media notification and information dissemination as described in the Palo Verde Emergency Plan.
"As a compensatory measure, the state has access to cellular phones for use in the JENC. The state will deploy those phones in the event of an actual emergency. In addition, most media personnel normally carry their own cellular phones The phone company has assigned their highest priority to this repair. The latest estimate for repair is approximately one-half day.
"The cable was cut yesterday at approximately 3:00 PM on Thursday, July 18, 2002 but the state was not informed until approximately 09:00 AM today and then the state notified Palo Verde at approximately 10:30 AM."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
*****UPDATE ON 7/19/02 AT 19:22 FROM MARKS TO LAURA*****
"The state has notified Palo Verde that JENC communications were restored at 13:28 MST on July 19, 2002."
Notified R4DO (L. Howell).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39077
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY OLMSTEAD
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY OLMSTEAD
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 07/19/2002
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2002
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2002
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2002
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
APPENDIX "R" BREAKER COORDINATION AND SEPARATION ISSUES AT CALLAWAY
"On July 2,2002, with Callaway Plant in Mode 1 at 100% power, an Operability Determination was completed that revealed the potential for Safety Related components and electrical load centers to experience a common cause failure if a fire were to occur in a specific location. If the postulated fire were to occur in 1974' Auxiliary Building Fire Area A-1, safety related load centers NG01A and NG02A (opposite trains) could experience a fire induced ground fault condition due to cable damage on downstream loads. This ground fault condition could cause the loss of either or both NG01A and NG02A. NG01A and NG02A supply post fire safe shutdown equipment such as the "A" and "B" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump room coolers. Discussions with Wolf Creek on July 19, 2002 in conjunction with the ongoing evaluation concluded this scenario could impact post fire safe shutdown equipment.
"In addition, it has been identified that cables in Fire Area A-1 for the "A" and "B" RHR pump room coolers, which are post fire safe shutdown equipment, have less than 20 feet of horizontal separation and do not meet the separation requirements of Appendix R lII.G.2, as committed to.
"Based on the guidance provided in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, this situation meets the criterion of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) for an 8-hour notification.
"The following compensatory actions have been taken:
- An hourly fire watch was established for the affected area on 7/2/02 as the evaluations were completed.
- Circuit Breakers associated with Essential Service Water Sump Heaters have been isolated, pending completion of a design change to address electrical coordination consistent with the FSAR.
- An Operations Night Order detailing actions to be taken to restore NG01A and or NG02A if a fire were to occur that affected these load centers. Actions include measures to isolate faulted circuits.
- Permanent revisions to Fire Area Pre-plans are under evaluation to incorporate the guidance of the Operations Night Order.
"The licensee is continuing its review to determine the extent of Cable Separation/Breaker Coordination issues that may lead to similar consequences."
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On July 2,2002, with Callaway Plant in Mode 1 at 100% power, an Operability Determination was completed that revealed the potential for Safety Related components and electrical load centers to experience a common cause failure if a fire were to occur in a specific location. If the postulated fire were to occur in 1974' Auxiliary Building Fire Area A-1, safety related load centers NG01A and NG02A (opposite trains) could experience a fire induced ground fault condition due to cable damage on downstream loads. This ground fault condition could cause the loss of either or both NG01A and NG02A. NG01A and NG02A supply post fire safe shutdown equipment such as the "A" and "B" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump room coolers. Discussions with Wolf Creek on July 19, 2002 in conjunction with the ongoing evaluation concluded this scenario could impact post fire safe shutdown equipment.
"In addition, it has been identified that cables in Fire Area A-1 for the "A" and "B" RHR pump room coolers, which are post fire safe shutdown equipment, have less than 20 feet of horizontal separation and do not meet the separation requirements of Appendix R lII.G.2, as committed to.
"Based on the guidance provided in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, this situation meets the criterion of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) for an 8-hour notification.
"The following compensatory actions have been taken:
- An hourly fire watch was established for the affected area on 7/2/02 as the evaluations were completed.
- Circuit Breakers associated with Essential Service Water Sump Heaters have been isolated, pending completion of a design change to address electrical coordination consistent with the FSAR.
- An Operations Night Order detailing actions to be taken to restore NG01A and or NG02A if a fire were to occur that affected these load centers. Actions include measures to isolate faulted circuits.
- Permanent revisions to Fire Area Pre-plans are under evaluation to incorporate the guidance of the Operations Night Order.
"The licensee is continuing its review to determine the extent of Cable Separation/Breaker Coordination issues that may lead to similar consequences."
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39078
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Steven Henry
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Steven Henry
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 07/19/2002
Notification Time: 18:09 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2002
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2002
Notification Time: 18:09 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2002
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
APPENDIX R CABLE SEPARATION AND BREAKER COORDINATION ISSUES AT WOLF CREEK
"On July 19, 2002 at approximately 0945 CDT, based on discussions with Callaway, conditions were discovered where a postulated fire could lead to the loss of motor control centers that power post fire safe shutdown equipment in both trains. Wolf Creek is in Mode 1, at 100% power.
"A postulated fire in the Auxiliary Building 1974' Fire Area A-1 could cause loss of motor control centers NG01A ("A" train) and NG02A ("B" train). NG01A and NG02A supply post fire safe shutdown equipment such as "A" and "B" train pump room coolers and miscellaneous valves.
"10 CFR 50 Appendix R requires that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain post fire safe shutdown will be available. Conditions have been identified where there is mis-coordination of the ground fault protection on feeder breakers. This could cause the entire MCC to be lost in the case of a ground fault. Feeder breakers on both MCCs have been identified as having ground fault protection mis-coordination. The cables for the associated loads have less than 20 feet of horizontal separation causing the above identified MCCs to be potentially lost due to a fire in Fire Area A-1. This does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.lll.G.
"In addition, it has been identified that post fire safe shutdown cables in Fire Area A-I for the "A" and "B" RHR pump room coolers have less than 20 feet of horizontal separation and do not meet the separation requirements of 10 CFR 50
Appendix R.lll.G.
"Based on the guidance provided in NUREG 1022 Revision 2, this situation meets the criterion of I0 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an 8-hour ENS notification, as it relates to being in an unanalyzed condition.
"The licensee has implemented a 1-hour fire watch and is developing compensatory measures.
"The licensee is continuing its review to determine if there are any other cable separation/breaker mis-coordination issues that may lead to similar consequences."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
"On July 19, 2002 at approximately 0945 CDT, based on discussions with Callaway, conditions were discovered where a postulated fire could lead to the loss of motor control centers that power post fire safe shutdown equipment in both trains. Wolf Creek is in Mode 1, at 100% power.
"A postulated fire in the Auxiliary Building 1974' Fire Area A-1 could cause loss of motor control centers NG01A ("A" train) and NG02A ("B" train). NG01A and NG02A supply post fire safe shutdown equipment such as "A" and "B" train pump room coolers and miscellaneous valves.
"10 CFR 50 Appendix R requires that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain post fire safe shutdown will be available. Conditions have been identified where there is mis-coordination of the ground fault protection on feeder breakers. This could cause the entire MCC to be lost in the case of a ground fault. Feeder breakers on both MCCs have been identified as having ground fault protection mis-coordination. The cables for the associated loads have less than 20 feet of horizontal separation causing the above identified MCCs to be potentially lost due to a fire in Fire Area A-1. This does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.lll.G.
"In addition, it has been identified that post fire safe shutdown cables in Fire Area A-I for the "A" and "B" RHR pump room coolers have less than 20 feet of horizontal separation and do not meet the separation requirements of 10 CFR 50
Appendix R.lll.G.
"Based on the guidance provided in NUREG 1022 Revision 2, this situation meets the criterion of I0 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an 8-hour ENS notification, as it relates to being in an unanalyzed condition.
"The licensee has implemented a 1-hour fire watch and is developing compensatory measures.
"The licensee is continuing its review to determine if there are any other cable separation/breaker mis-coordination issues that may lead to similar consequences."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.