Event Notification Report for July 18, 2002

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION FOR OIL SPILL >10 GALLONS


Licensee notified the National Response Center and State Department of Environmental Protection of an oil spill >10 gallons. Hydraulic oil spilled from a fork lift onto the ground inside plant property and cleanup is in progress.

Site has no resident inspector.

ATMOSHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVE PRESSURE LOCKING CONCERN

"At approximately 1600 hours on July 18, 2002, an engineering evaluation concluded that under certain conditions 1MS-156, a manually operated main steam atmospheric dump valve (ADV), could have been susceptible to Pressure Locking which could have prevented the opening of the valve during a postulated event. This notification involves a single unit 1 ADV (1MS-156) on 1 of 2 steam flow paths. Due to a dissimilar valve design, this condition does not affect either the unit 2 or unit 3 ADVs

"Research into the condition has determined that 1MS-156 was potentially susceptible to pressure locking during the time of reactor operation, from initial valve installation in November 1997, to when this condition was rectified on July 10, 2002 (by the installation of a pressure relief device on the valve bonnet) . Since the cause of the pressure locking has been fixed, there is no current operability concern.

"The ADVs are credited for opening for decay heat removal and cooling down the Reactor Coolant System to reduce pressure. In several event scenarios involving postulated Steam Generator tube leaks, this is desirable in order to minimize offsite dose releases. Failure of 1MS-156 during such an event could increase the time required to achieve cold shutdown (Mode 5) and the postulated off-site doses associated with the accident analysis. However, the analyses for such events (for example, the UFSAR Chapter 15 accident analysis for SG tube rupture) do not assume any failures of the ADVs.

"This is a historical condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3) (v) . This regulation requires that an 8-hour ENS report be made of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) . Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) . Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) - Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Investigation into the cause of this condition is ongoing."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

UNIT 2 CORE COOLING BAR ON THE SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) WAS NOTED TO BE INOPERABLE.

At 2255 hours on 07/18/02, the Unit 2 Core Cooling Bar on the SPDS was noted to be inoperable. A reboot the system was attempted, but the SPDS indication did not change. Further checks showed that multiple computer points (46 total) had been turned off (off scan), which made the data points invalid. These points would not have been immediately available if needed. The points were all placed on scan, and the Unit 2 Core Cooling SPDS Bar returned to its normal condition. The remaining SPDS functions were functional during this time, only the Unit 2 Core Cooling SPDS Bar was affected.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * RETRACTED AT 1344 EDT ON 7/25/02 BY JOHN DUFF TO FANGIE JONES * * *

The licensee determined after further review that the loss of the Unit 2 Core Cooling Bar on the SPDS did not constitute a major loss of emergency assessment capability. There were other indications readily available and the balance of the SPDS was operable. This event notification is retracted.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO (Mark Lesser) was notified.

POTENTIALLY MISSING PHOSPHORUS-32 SHIPPING PACKAGES

Single packages containing P-32 (~14 day half-life) were destined for four different out-of-state locations (in CA, KS, NY and TX). Intended shipping dates were July 18, August 5 and August 6, 2002. Carrier reported packages potentially missing within 2-3 days after intended shipping dates. The per-package activities ranged from 250 microcuries to 1 millicurie. All subject radioactive material contents are presently well past ten half-lives. After several months of shipper-carrier joint investigation, the cause(s) remain undetermined. Actions have been taken by shipper and carrier to prevent recurrence.

* * * * UPDATE RECEIVED BY RIPLEY FROM CARPENITO 1448 EST ON 03/07/03 VIA FAX

"Five additional single-package shipments (four P-32 and one I-125), destined for five different locations, shipped August 27, October 17, November 4 and 26, and December 13, 2002, were reported to MARCP as missing on 2/14/03. The per-package activities ranged from 250 to 500 microcuries of P-32 and 50 microcuries I-125. All subject packages were shipped before the shipper and carrier corrective actions had been implemented in late December 2002. No packages shipped since the corrective actions have been implemented have been reported to MARCP as missing."

Notified NMSS EO (Reamer) and R1 DO (Shanbaky)