Event Notification Report for July 09, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/08/2002 - 07/09/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39048
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: KEVIN R. BOSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: KEVIN R. BOSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 07/09/2002
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/09/2002
Event Time: 11:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/09/2002
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/09/2002
Event Time: 11:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/09/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
GAIL GOOD (R4)
GAIL GOOD (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO THE LOSS OF BOTH CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING UNITS
"Ft Calhoun Station entered Technical Specification 2.0.1 requiring plant shutdown at 1155 due to having both Control Room air conditioning units inoperable. The Tech Spec was exited at 1220 when one of the two installed units was restarted and confirmed to be providing adequate cooling. Both air conditioner units were inoperable for 25 minutes. No plant shutdown preparations were made during this time. VA-46A remains inoperable with Tech Spec 2.12.2(1) 30 day limiting condition of operation in effect.
"At 1150 the Control Room temperature was observed to be rising but below the 80 degree F log setpoint with the VA-46B unit running.
"At 1155 preparations to start the other unit, VA-46A were made. These startup preps require the momentary opening of the VA-46A disconnect switch, rendering it inoperable during this short period. After starting VA-46A maintenance technicians informed the Control Room staff that the VA-46A compressors had tripped due to low oil level rendering the unit inoperable. Maintenance technicians informed the Control Room that the VA-46B unit compressors were found tripped at 1155 rendering it inoperable.
"The VA-46B unit (the unit originally in operation at the start of this event) was shutdown, reset, and restarted. All compressors loaded. Control Room temperature were observed to be lowering. VA-46B unit was declared operable at 1220. Tech Spec 2.0.1 was exited at 1220.
"Highest temperature observed in the Control Room was 80 degrees"
The licensee is investigating what caused the low oil level in the VA-46A compressors. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"Ft Calhoun Station entered Technical Specification 2.0.1 requiring plant shutdown at 1155 due to having both Control Room air conditioning units inoperable. The Tech Spec was exited at 1220 when one of the two installed units was restarted and confirmed to be providing adequate cooling. Both air conditioner units were inoperable for 25 minutes. No plant shutdown preparations were made during this time. VA-46A remains inoperable with Tech Spec 2.12.2(1) 30 day limiting condition of operation in effect.
"At 1150 the Control Room temperature was observed to be rising but below the 80 degree F log setpoint with the VA-46B unit running.
"At 1155 preparations to start the other unit, VA-46A were made. These startup preps require the momentary opening of the VA-46A disconnect switch, rendering it inoperable during this short period. After starting VA-46A maintenance technicians informed the Control Room staff that the VA-46A compressors had tripped due to low oil level rendering the unit inoperable. Maintenance technicians informed the Control Room that the VA-46B unit compressors were found tripped at 1155 rendering it inoperable.
"The VA-46B unit (the unit originally in operation at the start of this event) was shutdown, reset, and restarted. All compressors loaded. Control Room temperature were observed to be lowering. VA-46B unit was declared operable at 1220. Tech Spec 2.0.1 was exited at 1220.
"Highest temperature observed in the Control Room was 80 degrees"
The licensee is investigating what caused the low oil level in the VA-46A compressors. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39049
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KOTTENSTETTE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KOTTENSTETTE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/10/2002
Notification Time: 03:26 [ET]
Event Date: 07/09/2002
Event Time: 23:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2002
Notification Time: 03:26 [ET]
Event Date: 07/09/2002
Event Time: 23:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
GARY SHEAR (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE DILUTION NITROGEN INVENTORY NOT MEETING TS REQUIREMENTS
During routine daily instrument checks on July 9, 2002, the control room operator found the Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) Nitrogen inventory just above the Technical Specification required inventory line of 67,000 scf (2150 psig and 90°F). The previous day instrument check had the CAD nitrogen inventory at 2250 psig and 94°F (approximately 69,000 scf).
An operator was dispatched to the CAD compressor building to raise nitrogen pressure by operating the CAD compressor. As the in-plant operator was starting the CAD compressor, the control room operator again checked the pressure and temperature of the CAD storage bottles and found that it fell just below the require 67,000 scf line (2110 psig and 84°F). The startup of the CAD compressor requires the draining of the suction receiver and opening of the suction and discharge valves. This process consumed enough nitrogen inventory to go below the Technical Specification value of 67,000 scf.
At 2304, the CAD system was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. A and a seven day LCO entered. The CAD compressor was operated to restore CAD nitrogen volume and the CAD LCO was exited at 2330 when CAD inventory was greater than the required Technical Specification of 67,000 scf.
During subsequent investigation, it had been determined that surveillance NS 730301, Functional Check and Calibration of Containment Atmosphere Dilution System had been performed during the dayshift on July 9, 2002. During this surveillance, it performs a functional check of the CAD system by performing a flow of nitrogen from the CAD bottles through a test rig thus using a portion of the CAD nitrogen inventory. At the completion of the surveillance, the check of the CAD nitrogen inventory was just above the Technical Specification line. The surveillance was completed at 1404 and at that time no action was undertaken to restore margin to the CAD nitrogen inventory Technical Specification requirement.
The NRC resident Inspector was notified
* * * RETRACTED AT 1200 EDT ON 8/27/02 BY STEVE KOTTENSTETTE TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"A follow up root cause of the event was conducted, and as part of that effort, the associated pressure indicator was recalibrated. It was found to be reading about 50 psig Low in the range (2200 pounds) where the reading was taken for nitrogen inventory determination. This means that actual CAD inventory remained greater than 67,000 SCF at all times. Although there was conservative indication of CAD inventory, the CAD system was always capable of performing its required safety function and was never actually inoperable. No LER is required under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v) and the immediate notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) should be retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Kenneth Riemer) was notified.
During routine daily instrument checks on July 9, 2002, the control room operator found the Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) Nitrogen inventory just above the Technical Specification required inventory line of 67,000 scf (2150 psig and 90°F). The previous day instrument check had the CAD nitrogen inventory at 2250 psig and 94°F (approximately 69,000 scf).
An operator was dispatched to the CAD compressor building to raise nitrogen pressure by operating the CAD compressor. As the in-plant operator was starting the CAD compressor, the control room operator again checked the pressure and temperature of the CAD storage bottles and found that it fell just below the require 67,000 scf line (2110 psig and 84°F). The startup of the CAD compressor requires the draining of the suction receiver and opening of the suction and discharge valves. This process consumed enough nitrogen inventory to go below the Technical Specification value of 67,000 scf.
At 2304, the CAD system was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. A and a seven day LCO entered. The CAD compressor was operated to restore CAD nitrogen volume and the CAD LCO was exited at 2330 when CAD inventory was greater than the required Technical Specification of 67,000 scf.
During subsequent investigation, it had been determined that surveillance NS 730301, Functional Check and Calibration of Containment Atmosphere Dilution System had been performed during the dayshift on July 9, 2002. During this surveillance, it performs a functional check of the CAD system by performing a flow of nitrogen from the CAD bottles through a test rig thus using a portion of the CAD nitrogen inventory. At the completion of the surveillance, the check of the CAD nitrogen inventory was just above the Technical Specification line. The surveillance was completed at 1404 and at that time no action was undertaken to restore margin to the CAD nitrogen inventory Technical Specification requirement.
The NRC resident Inspector was notified
* * * RETRACTED AT 1200 EDT ON 8/27/02 BY STEVE KOTTENSTETTE TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"A follow up root cause of the event was conducted, and as part of that effort, the associated pressure indicator was recalibrated. It was found to be reading about 50 psig Low in the range (2200 pounds) where the reading was taken for nitrogen inventory determination. This means that actual CAD inventory remained greater than 67,000 SCF at all times. Although there was conservative indication of CAD inventory, the CAD system was always capable of performing its required safety function and was never actually inoperable. No LER is required under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v) and the immediate notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) should be retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Kenneth Riemer) was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39102
Facility: MAINE YANKEE
Region: 1 State: ME
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: HEBERT/RIVARD
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: ME
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: HEBERT/RIVARD
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/01/2002
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/09/2002
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2002
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/09/2002
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
J. BRADLEY FEWELL (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
J. BRADLEY FEWELL (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
THE LICENSEE REPORTED A LOSS OF LICENSED MATERIAL
During preparation activities for the removal of the reactor vessel, site personnel detached a vessel external neutron flux dosimeter assembly from the vessel and released the dosimeter assembly to the sump area below the vessel for future recovery and disposal. The neutron flux dosimeter was used during plant operation to measure neutron fluence to the immediate adjacent outside wall of the reactor vessel. Subsequently, site personnel were provided access to the area for retrieval and disposal of the dosimeter capsules. One of the dosimeter capsules apparently had become dislodged from the assembly during the earlier release and personnel were unable to locate the dislodged capsule. The dosimeter contains small quantities of dosimetry material including Neptunium 237 (6.46 microcuries) and Uranium 238 (.009 microcuries). Subsequent limited inspections have been unsuccessful in locating this capsule. The constrained annulus area between the reactor vessel and adjacent neutron shield tank and storage of radioactive material and bagged asbestos in the reactor vessel sump area continues to limit area for a thorough inspection. Additional inspection of the area is scheduled for January of 2003.
Maine Yankee is reporting the loss of licensed material in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b). The licensed material was lost in a restricted area and the Neptunium 237 material is of a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in appendix C to Part 20. The missing dosimeter capsule surface dose rate is estimated to be around 1000 cpm and therefore of minimal exposure to workers in this radiation control area.
During preparation activities for the removal of the reactor vessel, site personnel detached a vessel external neutron flux dosimeter assembly from the vessel and released the dosimeter assembly to the sump area below the vessel for future recovery and disposal. The neutron flux dosimeter was used during plant operation to measure neutron fluence to the immediate adjacent outside wall of the reactor vessel. Subsequently, site personnel were provided access to the area for retrieval and disposal of the dosimeter capsules. One of the dosimeter capsules apparently had become dislodged from the assembly during the earlier release and personnel were unable to locate the dislodged capsule. The dosimeter contains small quantities of dosimetry material including Neptunium 237 (6.46 microcuries) and Uranium 238 (.009 microcuries). Subsequent limited inspections have been unsuccessful in locating this capsule. The constrained annulus area between the reactor vessel and adjacent neutron shield tank and storage of radioactive material and bagged asbestos in the reactor vessel sump area continues to limit area for a thorough inspection. Additional inspection of the area is scheduled for January of 2003.
Maine Yankee is reporting the loss of licensed material in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b). The licensed material was lost in a restricted area and the Neptunium 237 material is of a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in appendix C to Part 20. The missing dosimeter capsule surface dose rate is estimated to be around 1000 cpm and therefore of minimal exposure to workers in this radiation control area.