Event Notification Report for July 07, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/06/2002 - 07/07/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39043
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN MACDONALD
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN MACDONALD
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 07/07/2002
Notification Time: 04:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2002
Event Time: 00:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2002
Notification Time: 04:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2002
Event Time: 00:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI BECAME INOPERABLE WHILE REPLACING AN INDICATING LIGHT BULB AT PILGRIM
"On 07 July 2002, at 0015 hrs, HPCI was declared inoperable when it was discovered that the control power fuses for the HPCI pump discharge valve, MO-2301-8 had blown. The MO-2301-8 is a normally closed direct current (DC) motor operated valve. At the time of the event, control room operators were attempting to replace a burned out main control room light bulb for the closed indication for the valve. The operators reported that the light socket was loose. The newly installed bulb failed to illuminate. A field operator was dispatched to the alternate shutdown panel (ASP) for HPCI and reported that there was no light indication for the MO-2301-8 at the ASP as well. Qualified personnel then inspected the control power fuses within the DC breaker for the valve. It was determined that an instantaneous short circuit occurred due to the loose light socket when the light bulb was replaced, causing the control power fuses to blow. The light socket was tightened, the control power fuses were replaced, proper MO-2301-8 position indication was verified, and HPCI was declared operable at 0045 hrs."
The USNRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On 07 July 2002, at 0015 hrs, HPCI was declared inoperable when it was discovered that the control power fuses for the HPCI pump discharge valve, MO-2301-8 had blown. The MO-2301-8 is a normally closed direct current (DC) motor operated valve. At the time of the event, control room operators were attempting to replace a burned out main control room light bulb for the closed indication for the valve. The operators reported that the light socket was loose. The newly installed bulb failed to illuminate. A field operator was dispatched to the alternate shutdown panel (ASP) for HPCI and reported that there was no light indication for the MO-2301-8 at the ASP as well. Qualified personnel then inspected the control power fuses within the DC breaker for the valve. It was determined that an instantaneous short circuit occurred due to the loose light socket when the light bulb was replaced, causing the control power fuses to blow. The light socket was tightened, the control power fuses were replaced, proper MO-2301-8 position indication was verified, and HPCI was declared operable at 0045 hrs."
The USNRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39045
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN KASPER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN KASPER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 07/08/2002
Notification Time: 02:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2002
Event Time: 23:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2002
Notification Time: 02:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2002
Event Time: 23:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
"At 2312 on 07/07/2002 Unit 2 Reactor automatically tripped from full power due to a high high Steam Generator Level In the 2B Steam Generator. Prior to the trip Vital distribution panel 1202 lost power when it's normal power supply inverter failed. All of the controlling channels of Steam Generator level were powered from this distribution panel and failed low on the loss of power. Operators were in the process of taking manual control of all Feed Water Regulating valves when the Main Turbine trip was actuated due to the high high level in Steam Generator 28. A Reactor Trip occurred due to Turbine Trip above 50% power. The unit is stable in Mode 3 with RCS temperature at 567 degrees Fahrenheit, and RCS pressure of 2235 pslg.
"We also make the following report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv): Following the Reactor Trip the Auxiliary Feed Water System automatically actuated on low Steam Generator level. This is normal for a trip in Unit 2 from full power with the Model E Steam Generators.
"The following information is also provided:
"Did the control rods fully insert? Yes
"Did steam bypass to the condenser or to atmosphere? The Steam Dump system automatically operated to maintain temperature. No steam bypass to atmosphere occurred.
"Did any primary/secondary relief valve lift? NO
"Any significant TS LCOs entered? TS 3.8.3.1 Action b. was entered due to vital DP 1202 not being powered from its normal power supply inverter. We must reenergize the AC distribution panel from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. bus within 24 hours or be in at least HOT Standby within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours.
"Item not understood: Channel 1 of P-13 Reactor Trip System interlock status light is currently blinking. This condition must be understood and corrected prior to restart."
The NRC resident inspector was notified.
"At 2312 on 07/07/2002 Unit 2 Reactor automatically tripped from full power due to a high high Steam Generator Level In the 2B Steam Generator. Prior to the trip Vital distribution panel 1202 lost power when it's normal power supply inverter failed. All of the controlling channels of Steam Generator level were powered from this distribution panel and failed low on the loss of power. Operators were in the process of taking manual control of all Feed Water Regulating valves when the Main Turbine trip was actuated due to the high high level in Steam Generator 28. A Reactor Trip occurred due to Turbine Trip above 50% power. The unit is stable in Mode 3 with RCS temperature at 567 degrees Fahrenheit, and RCS pressure of 2235 pslg.
"We also make the following report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv): Following the Reactor Trip the Auxiliary Feed Water System automatically actuated on low Steam Generator level. This is normal for a trip in Unit 2 from full power with the Model E Steam Generators.
"The following information is also provided:
"Did the control rods fully insert? Yes
"Did steam bypass to the condenser or to atmosphere? The Steam Dump system automatically operated to maintain temperature. No steam bypass to atmosphere occurred.
"Did any primary/secondary relief valve lift? NO
"Any significant TS LCOs entered? TS 3.8.3.1 Action b. was entered due to vital DP 1202 not being powered from its normal power supply inverter. We must reenergize the AC distribution panel from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. bus within 24 hours or be in at least HOT Standby within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours.
"Item not understood: Channel 1 of P-13 Reactor Trip System interlock status light is currently blinking. This condition must be understood and corrected prior to restart."
The NRC resident inspector was notified.