Event Notification Report for June 22, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/21/2002 - 06/22/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39010
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER SERATA
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER SERATA
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 06/22/2002
Notification Time: 18:27 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2002
Event Time: 14:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2002
Notification Time: 18:27 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2002
Event Time: 14:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC SCRAM AT HOPE CREEK DUE TO TURBINE TRIP
"Immediately following the RPS actuation, the success of the SCRAM was evaluated. Initially, the Rod Worth Minimizer indicated that some control rods were not fully inserted and control rod 22-31 indicated full out on the Full Core Display. Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) was initiated as per established operating procedures. The STA observed all Control Rods except 22-31 to be fully inserted on the Core Monitoring System before ARI was initiated, indicating the reactor was shutdown without ARI. The indicated position of CR 22-31 did not change immediately following the SCRAM, but changed over time consistent with a known problem with its position-indicating probe.
"Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped as expected from the turbine trip above 30% power (End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip function), and remain out of service. The Reactor is presently shutdown. Reactor pressure is 700 psig and slowly lowering and reactor level is 32 and stable (normal band 30-39). Efforts are underway to stabilize and normalize reactor coolant and metal temperatures to allow the restarting of a Reactor Recirculation Pump."
The NRC resident inspector was notified by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 6/26/02 @ 1530 BY REG 1 TO GOULD * * *
This update is to clarify the above event report by including the first paragraph which was originally inadvertently omitted from the NRC write-up. The paragraph is included below.
"This 4 hour report s being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for actuation of the Hope Creek Reactor Protection System (RPS) with the plant critical. At 14:16 hours the Hope Creek Reactor RPS actuated, resulting in a Reactor SCRAM. Preliminarily the RPS actuation appears to have been caused by a Main Turbine trip from high moisture separator level that was caused by a trip of the B Secondary Condensate Pump and automatic intermediate runback of the Reactor Recirculation Pumps. Follow-up investigation will be performed to validate this information."
"Immediately following the RPS actuation, the success of the SCRAM was evaluated. Initially, the Rod Worth Minimizer indicated that some control rods were not fully inserted and control rod 22-31 indicated full out on the Full Core Display. Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) was initiated as per established operating procedures. The STA observed all Control Rods except 22-31 to be fully inserted on the Core Monitoring System before ARI was initiated, indicating the reactor was shutdown without ARI. The indicated position of CR 22-31 did not change immediately following the SCRAM, but changed over time consistent with a known problem with its position-indicating probe.
"Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped as expected from the turbine trip above 30% power (End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip function), and remain out of service. The Reactor is presently shutdown. Reactor pressure is 700 psig and slowly lowering and reactor level is 32 and stable (normal band 30-39). Efforts are underway to stabilize and normalize reactor coolant and metal temperatures to allow the restarting of a Reactor Recirculation Pump."
The NRC resident inspector was notified by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 6/26/02 @ 1530 BY REG 1 TO GOULD * * *
This update is to clarify the above event report by including the first paragraph which was originally inadvertently omitted from the NRC write-up. The paragraph is included below.
"This 4 hour report s being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for actuation of the Hope Creek Reactor Protection System (RPS) with the plant critical. At 14:16 hours the Hope Creek Reactor RPS actuated, resulting in a Reactor SCRAM. Preliminarily the RPS actuation appears to have been caused by a Main Turbine trip from high moisture separator level that was caused by a trip of the B Secondary Condensate Pump and automatic intermediate runback of the Reactor Recirculation Pumps. Follow-up investigation will be performed to validate this information."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39012
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BRINKMAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BRINKMAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/23/2002
Notification Time: 02:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2002
Event Time: 22:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2002
Notification Time: 02:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2002
Event Time: 22:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING SERVICE TRANSFORMER LOCKOUT FOR REASONS UNKNOWN
"At 2217 CDT on 6/22/02, GGNS scrammed from 100% CTP. The scram was the results of a lockout trip on service transformer 21 (ST21). Exact cause of [the] scram has not been determined yet.. [The] Plant is stable and all parameters are being controlled. [The] scram is suspected to be due to loss of feedwater (i.e., Rx Low Level) when ST21 tripped. Div 2 and 3 buses did deenergize and [their] respective Diesel Generators started and carried [the] buses."
All control rods fully inserted. RWCU is currently in-service removing decay heat. ST21 remains out-of-service. Electrical loads have been shifted to ST11 (500KV feed) and the ESF transformer (115KV feed). The unit is not in any TS A/S for offsite power since 2 of the 3 sources are available. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 0404 EDT ON 6/23/02 FROM ROBERT BRINKMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
"This is an update to Event Notification #39012. This call in is to report the 8 hr non-emergency call in under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). As reported earlier, Division 2 and 3 electrical buses deenergized when service transformer 21 tripped. Division 2 and 3 Diesel Generators started and energized these buses. The actuation of Division 2 and 3 Diesel Generators is the 'Specified System Actuation' reported by this notification. Also, Div. 2 Control Room A/C failed to automatically restart following Div. 2 bus being re-energized. [The] breaker was closed manually and Control Room A/C (Div. 2) restarted."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO(Marschall).
* * * UPDATE 0555 EDT ON 6/23/02 FROM ROBERT BRINKMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
"This notification is to report an 8 hr non-emergency call in under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0425 CDT, on 6/23/02, the GGNS Control Room was notified that the EOF had no electrical power. The site power loop was deenergized when service transformer 21 tripped, which caused the EOF to become de-energized (see EN #39012). The EOF backup generator did not start as required, therefore the EOF (Emergency Operations Facility) did not have any electrical power. Normal electrical power was restored to [the] EOF at 0415 hrs CDT on 6/23/02. [The] backup EOF was available at all times."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO(Marschall).
"At 2217 CDT on 6/22/02, GGNS scrammed from 100% CTP. The scram was the results of a lockout trip on service transformer 21 (ST21). Exact cause of [the] scram has not been determined yet.. [The] Plant is stable and all parameters are being controlled. [The] scram is suspected to be due to loss of feedwater (i.e., Rx Low Level) when ST21 tripped. Div 2 and 3 buses did deenergize and [their] respective Diesel Generators started and carried [the] buses."
All control rods fully inserted. RWCU is currently in-service removing decay heat. ST21 remains out-of-service. Electrical loads have been shifted to ST11 (500KV feed) and the ESF transformer (115KV feed). The unit is not in any TS A/S for offsite power since 2 of the 3 sources are available. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 0404 EDT ON 6/23/02 FROM ROBERT BRINKMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
"This is an update to Event Notification #39012. This call in is to report the 8 hr non-emergency call in under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). As reported earlier, Division 2 and 3 electrical buses deenergized when service transformer 21 tripped. Division 2 and 3 Diesel Generators started and energized these buses. The actuation of Division 2 and 3 Diesel Generators is the 'Specified System Actuation' reported by this notification. Also, Div. 2 Control Room A/C failed to automatically restart following Div. 2 bus being re-energized. [The] breaker was closed manually and Control Room A/C (Div. 2) restarted."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO(Marschall).
* * * UPDATE 0555 EDT ON 6/23/02 FROM ROBERT BRINKMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
"This notification is to report an 8 hr non-emergency call in under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0425 CDT, on 6/23/02, the GGNS Control Room was notified that the EOF had no electrical power. The site power loop was deenergized when service transformer 21 tripped, which caused the EOF to become de-energized (see EN #39012). The EOF backup generator did not start as required, therefore the EOF (Emergency Operations Facility) did not have any electrical power. Normal electrical power was restored to [the] EOF at 0415 hrs CDT on 6/23/02. [The] backup EOF was available at all times."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO(Marschall).