Event Notification Report for June 12, 2002

24 HOUR BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT AT PADUCAH

"At 0820 CDT, on 6-12-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of an NCS violation that had occurred in the C-335 process building. The calibrated AQ-NCS pressure chart recorders for C and E surge drum banks had previously failed. As a result of this failure the shiftly pressure checks were performed using non AQ-NCS pressure instrumentation and therefore were not valid. The purpose of the pressure check is to identify if wet air inleakage has begun on surge drum bank. An alternate AQ-NCS pressure instrument has now been connected to the system and follow-up pressure readings have been taken. The pressure readings indicate there has been no wet air inleakage. The required checks have been restarted. Double contingency has been restored.

"This is an event is which a violation of the double contingency principle occurred and where double contingency was re-established within four hours of the initial observation of the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Although pressure readings were taken on a shiftly basis, these readings were not valid because the instrumentation used was not AQ-NCS. Therefore double contingency was not maintained.

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for a criticality to be possible a surge drum would have to contain a critical mass of UO2F2 in an unfavorable geometry, wet air inleakage would need to occur, and the uranium mass would have to be sufficiently moderated.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on moderation.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY Y SAFETY CONTROL(S): The first leg of double contingency is based on maintaining the integrity of the surge drum system against wet air inleakage. This integrity is assured by an SRI for the unlikely breach of the surge drum system. Structural integrity of the drum is intact, therefore this SRI is maintained. The second leg of double contingency is based on the performance of the shiftly pressure checks of an AQ-NCS instrument as an indication of wet air inleakage. The required checks were performed using an uncalibrated instrument. Since an uncalibrated instrument was used, the shiftly checks were invalid resulting in a loss of this control. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) Isolate the affected surge drum banks until the original pressure indication equipment is repaired. The drums were isolated at 1025 CDT on 6-12-02. 2) Connect AQ-NCS pressure indication equipment and monitor in accordance with procedure CP4-CO-CN6069 until the original pressure indication equipment is repaired. An alternate AQ-NCS approved instrument was connected, and readings were taken at 1040 CDT on 6-12-02."

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A RELEASE OF RAW SEWAGE TO THE CHESAPEAKE BAY

The licensee reported that an air leak caused a level detector in a large inlet pumping well to fail low. As a result, the sump pumps stopped and did not restart when actual level reached the high level setpoint. The inlet sump of the onsite sewage treatment plant subsequently overflowed, and raw sewage was released to the Chesapeake Bay.

The licensee estimates that the quantity of raw sewage involved was between 2,500 and 7,200 gallons. Additional calculations are currently being performed. The level detector malfunctioned has since been repaired.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and local county and plans to notify the Maryland Department of Environmental Protection.

LOSS OF FOUR DETECTORS AT FORT HOOD, TEXAS

Four detectors each containing 15 millicuries of nickel-63 were lost at Fort Hood, Texas. On 05/29/02, Fort Hood received the report that the detectors might be missing. Apparently, they were misplaced during preparations to send them to a maintenance shop for wipe testing. The detectors were verified to be missing on 06/05/02, and Fort Hood notified Aberdeen on 06/11/02.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION AT DUANE ARNOLD DUE TO A SMALL OIL SPILL

"Notified Iowa DNR, Linn County Sheriff, and the US National Coast Guard National Response Center of a reportable spill of petroleum oil into the Cedar River (sheen on the river) per applicable reporting procedures. While performing river water supply pit cleaning, the cleaning pump leaked about 1 pint of oil into the Cedar River. The pump has been removed from the river."

ALERT DECLARED AT DC COOK DUE TO FIRE IN SWITCHYARD

The licensee reported an explosion and subsequent fire that occurred in the station's 345-kV electrical switchyard. Neither reactor plant was directly affected by the event and both remained at power. The licensee declared an Alert at 1405 based on the switchyard fire potentially affecting safety related equipment such as the reserve power to safety-related electrical buses. Several switchyard breakers tripped open at 1345 placing the units in TS 3.0.5. One injury was reported. Planned maintenance was in progress in the switchyard at the time of the event.

The NRC entered the Monitoring Phase of Normal Mode at 1447 EDT on 06/12/02.

Notified the Chairman's office (Mike Tschiltz), USDA (K. Barrett), EPA NRC (Ms. Edwards), EPA EOC (T. Tanner), DOE (T. Yates), FEMA (C. Cleveland), HHS (Carol Cleveland), and OHS (D. Edwards).

***** UPDATE AT 1730 EDT ON 06/12/02 *****

A Commissioners' assistants briefing was held at 1730 EDT. Participants included: NRR (J. Johnson, S. Collins), DIRO (R. Wessman), EDO (H. Nieh), HQ PAO (W. Beecher), OSATP (P. Lohaus), IP (J. Dunn-Lee), CA (L. Gerke), SECY (A. Bates), Comm. Meserve (M. Tschiltz), Comm. Dicus (Kerri Kavanaugh), Comm. Merrifield (J. Thoma), Comm. McGaffigan (J. Sharkey) and Comm. Diaz (D. Simpkins).

***** UPDATE FROM JIM KOBYRA TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 2354 EDT ON 06/12/02 *****

At 2157, the licensee declared the Unit 2 east essential service water pump operable, and Unit 2 exited Technical Specification 3.0.5 at that time. Unit 1 exited Technical Specification 3.0.5 approximately 5 minutes earlier. At 2347, both units exited Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 when the licensee restored transformer 4 to serve the Unit 2 reserve auxiliary transformers and isolated it from Unit 1 (which is being fed by transformer 5). As a result, the licensee terminated the Alert and exited the Emergency Plan at 2354 EDT on 06/12/02.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspectors, State of Michigan, and Berrien County.

The NRC exited the Monitoring Phase of Normal Mode at 2355 on 06/12/02.

The NRC operations center notified the R3DO (Jim Creed), NRR EO (Bill Bateman), DIRO (Tim McGinty), PAO (Bill Beecher), EDO (Ho Nieh), Chairman's office (Mike Tschiltz), USDA (Lori Thomas and Kathleen Barrett), EPA via the National Response Center (Ms. Arsenault), DOE (Odell Bartlett), FEMA (Al Austin), HHS (Karen Cleveland), and OHS (Ron Brahm).

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO OIL SPILL

Licensee notified the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality of a spill of greater than 5 gallons of oil due to a switchyard breaker explosion and fire.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

"A technician was transporting a gauge that was chained, locked, and secured on the back of a pickup truck. He stopped at a restaurant for a take out lunch. Upon returning to the truck, he noticed the gauge was missing. The chain was cut.
Some other items, including test equipment and a sand cone, were taken. Gauge: Troxler Model 3430, ser#26992 Sources: 8 mCi Cs-137 ser#750-171 [and] 40 mCi Am-241 ser#47-23560."

The local police, Troxler Electronics and the TXDOT were informed. Texas Incident No.: I-7907