Event Notification Report for June 07, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/06/2002 - 06/07/2002
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38973
Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: ISOMEDIX CORPORATIONS
Region: 2
City: SPARTANBURG State: SC
County:
License #: 267
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: ISOMEDIX CORPORATIONS
Region: 2
City: SPARTANBURG State: SC
County:
License #: 267
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 06/08/2002
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2002
Event Time: 21:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2002
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2002
Event Time: 21:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EMPLOYEE DEATH DUE TO NONNUCLEAR ACCIDENT
With the source in the stored position, an employee of Isomedix Operations, entered the sterilization chamber of the irradiator to try freeing some jammed product carriers. The employee was killed when his head was caught between the carriers as they moved together.
This report is made as a conservative measure as this was not nuclear related, but occurred at a licensee's facility.
With the source in the stored position, an employee of Isomedix Operations, entered the sterilization chamber of the irradiator to try freeing some jammed product carriers. The employee was killed when his head was caught between the carriers as they moved together.
This report is made as a conservative measure as this was not nuclear related, but occurred at a licensee's facility.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38970
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF ISCH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF ISCH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 06/07/2002
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2002
Event Time: 08:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2002
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2002
Event Time: 08:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
JOHN PELLET (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONDITION EXISTS THAT COULD LEAD TO DRAINING THE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK
The licensee was performing a fire area inspection as part of a post fire safe shutdown study and discovered a condition existing that could lead to draining the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to the containment recirculation sump due to a fire. It was discovered that control cables for 2 redundant motor operated valves are routed in the same electrical raceway. The 2 valves are on the same electrical separation group, but are redundant in their function of conserving water inventory in the RWST. Further investigation determined that the other electrical separation group has the same configuration.
The licensee has implemented a continuous fire watch and is working on procedure changes to insure compensatory actions are in place. Further changes will be made after engineering analysis including rerouting the cables for the affected valve operators.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also informed the Callaway plant which is the same series of plant and could have the same condition.
The licensee was performing a fire area inspection as part of a post fire safe shutdown study and discovered a condition existing that could lead to draining the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to the containment recirculation sump due to a fire. It was discovered that control cables for 2 redundant motor operated valves are routed in the same electrical raceway. The 2 valves are on the same electrical separation group, but are redundant in their function of conserving water inventory in the RWST. Further investigation determined that the other electrical separation group has the same configuration.
The licensee has implemented a continuous fire watch and is working on procedure changes to insure compensatory actions are in place. Further changes will be made after engineering analysis including rerouting the cables for the affected valve operators.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also informed the Callaway plant which is the same series of plant and could have the same condition.