Event Notification Report for June 05, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/04/2002 - 06/05/2002
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38965
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: B. W. WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: B. W. WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 06/05/2002
Notification Time: 13:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2002
Event Time: 10:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2002
Notification Time: 13:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2002
Event Time: 10:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE -- FAILURE TO MAINTAIN A DOUBLE CONTINGENCY INVOLVING MATERIAL TRANSFER INTO THE ERBIA MODCON AREA WITHOUT MOISTURE RESULTS (24-Hour Report)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Facility
Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, low enriched ([<=]5.0 wt. % U-235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors.
License: SNM-1107."
"Time and Date of Event
Approximately 10:45 hours, Wednesday, June 5, 2002."
"Reason for Notification
Thirteen packs of oxidized U3O8 were improperly transferred into the Erbia Modcon area without proper moisture analysis results."
"Summary of Process
UO2 powder is oxidized to U3O8 to be used as addback in powder blends. After staying in an oven at a high temperature for over one hour, the material is screened and put into polypaks. Each pack is sampled for moisture and stored pending results of the moisture analysis. Then the material is bar code scanned and transferred into the Modcon area using a polypak elevator interlocked with the moisture analysis results."
"As-Found Condition
A summary of the as-found conditions is as follows:
* Thirteen packs of material were found to have been taken into the Modcon area via a freight elevator, bypassing the bar code scanning interlock. The packs did not have moisture analysis results completed and posted.
* The packs were immediately removed from the area, and the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) function was immediately notified.
* The material in question was oxidized U3O8, visually dry."
"Double Contingency Protection
Double contingency protection for the erbia blender and bulk containers is based on moderation control, that is, (1) prevent greater than 20.48 liters of water equivalent from becoming available to the mixer or container, and (2) prevent 20.48 liters of water equivalent from entering the mixer or container. It was determined that double contingency protection was bypassed because, for the 13 packs involved, there were no effective controls to prevent material with undocumented moisture from being brought into the Modcon area. It is also noted that at no time was greater than the safety limit of moderator involved. Therefore, the incident requires 24-hour notification in accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM- 1107), paragraph 3.7.3(c.5)."
"Summary of Activity
* The packs were immediately removed from the area, and the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) function was immediately notified.
* The Erbia Process Engineer stopped all erbia powder blending operations."
"Conclusions
* There was a loss of double contingency protection.
* At no time was greater than a safe limit of moderator involved.
* At no time was criticality possible.
* At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
* The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed."
The licensee reported that the information provided via facsimile (and quoted above) does NOT contain sensitive information.
The licensee notified an onsite NRC Region 2 inspector (Bill Gloersen) and plans to notify the NRC Region 2 office (Manuel Crespo) and NMSS (Dennis Morey).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Facility
Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, low enriched ([<=]5.0 wt. % U-235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors.
License: SNM-1107."
"Time and Date of Event
Approximately 10:45 hours, Wednesday, June 5, 2002."
"Reason for Notification
Thirteen packs of oxidized U3O8 were improperly transferred into the Erbia Modcon area without proper moisture analysis results."
"Summary of Process
UO2 powder is oxidized to U3O8 to be used as addback in powder blends. After staying in an oven at a high temperature for over one hour, the material is screened and put into polypaks. Each pack is sampled for moisture and stored pending results of the moisture analysis. Then the material is bar code scanned and transferred into the Modcon area using a polypak elevator interlocked with the moisture analysis results."
"As-Found Condition
A summary of the as-found conditions is as follows:
* Thirteen packs of material were found to have been taken into the Modcon area via a freight elevator, bypassing the bar code scanning interlock. The packs did not have moisture analysis results completed and posted.
* The packs were immediately removed from the area, and the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) function was immediately notified.
* The material in question was oxidized U3O8, visually dry."
"Double Contingency Protection
Double contingency protection for the erbia blender and bulk containers is based on moderation control, that is, (1) prevent greater than 20.48 liters of water equivalent from becoming available to the mixer or container, and (2) prevent 20.48 liters of water equivalent from entering the mixer or container. It was determined that double contingency protection was bypassed because, for the 13 packs involved, there were no effective controls to prevent material with undocumented moisture from being brought into the Modcon area. It is also noted that at no time was greater than the safety limit of moderator involved. Therefore, the incident requires 24-hour notification in accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM- 1107), paragraph 3.7.3(c.5)."
"Summary of Activity
* The packs were immediately removed from the area, and the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) function was immediately notified.
* The Erbia Process Engineer stopped all erbia powder blending operations."
"Conclusions
* There was a loss of double contingency protection.
* At no time was greater than a safe limit of moderator involved.
* At no time was criticality possible.
* At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
* The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed."
The licensee reported that the information provided via facsimile (and quoted above) does NOT contain sensitive information.
The licensee notified an onsite NRC Region 2 inspector (Bill Gloersen) and plans to notify the NRC Region 2 office (Manuel Crespo) and NMSS (Dennis Morey).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38967
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DUANE COBB
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DUANE COBB
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/06/2002
Notification Time: 02:51 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2002
Event Time: 23:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/06/2002
Notification Time: 02:51 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2002
Event Time: 23:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/06/2002
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (IRO)
DEPUY (FEMA)
JAMES CREED (R3)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (IRO)
DEPUY (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNIT 1 DECLARED AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO RCS LEAKAGE > 25 GPM DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"D.C. Cook Unit One declares entry and exit of an Unusual Event due to Reactor Coolant System leakage of greater than 25 gallons per minute. On June 5 @ 23:00 while performing an 18 month surveillance [1-IHP-4030-102-017 'Pressurizer PORV/Actuation Channel Calibration with Valve Operation'] on the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) an unblocked PORV lifted and discharged to the Pressure Relief Tank (PRT) for approximately 15 seconds. This lifting discharged approximately 100 gallons to the PRT. The Initiating Condition for this Unusual Event is Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than 25 gallons per minute.
"The plant is and was in Mode 4. Conditions remain stable after manual isolation of the PORV with the Control Switch of the Block Valve by the assisting Reactor Operator."
The licensee attributed this occurrence to the recently revised procedure identified above which did not address blocking the other PORVs during testing. The licensee informed state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"D.C. Cook Unit One declares entry and exit of an Unusual Event due to Reactor Coolant System leakage of greater than 25 gallons per minute. On June 5 @ 23:00 while performing an 18 month surveillance [1-IHP-4030-102-017 'Pressurizer PORV/Actuation Channel Calibration with Valve Operation'] on the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) an unblocked PORV lifted and discharged to the Pressure Relief Tank (PRT) for approximately 15 seconds. This lifting discharged approximately 100 gallons to the PRT. The Initiating Condition for this Unusual Event is Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than 25 gallons per minute.
"The plant is and was in Mode 4. Conditions remain stable after manual isolation of the PORV with the Control Switch of the Block Valve by the assisting Reactor Operator."
The licensee attributed this occurrence to the recently revised procedure identified above which did not address blocking the other PORVs during testing. The licensee informed state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.