Event Notification Report for June 03, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/02/2002 - 06/03/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38960
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PRUSSMAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PRUSSMAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/03/2002
Notification Time: 11:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2002
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2002
Notification Time: 11:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2002
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
WILLIAM BECKNER (NRR)
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
WILLIAM BECKNER (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REMOVAL OF EMERGENCY SIRENS FROM SERVICE DUE TO MAINTENANCE
Planned maintenance of the offsite siren system will result in each of the sirens in Putnam County being removed from service. There are 10 sirens in Putnam County and Indian Point Energy Center considers a loss of 10% of the sirens in a county to be a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The removal of sirens from service in Putnam County will continue on an intermittent basis from June 3, 2002 until June 21, 2002. The first siren was removed from service at 8 a.m. on June 3, 2002.
The planned maintenance is intended to replace the siren actuation/verification system in order to improve reliability and maintainability. The replacement process will install the new actuation/verification system, connect the actuation/verification system, and terminate the connection of the old controls. This work is currently scheduled on one siren per day. Testing of the new actuation/verification system will not occur until the next day at the request of Putnam County. If this plan is followed, a 10% loss of the offsite communications occurs when the old controls are terminated until the new actuation/verification system is tested. This increases to 20% if the testing does not occur prior to the next siren being taken out of service.
Putnam County will use route alerting to notify the public in lieu of the non-operational sirens. County officials are aware of the scheduled activities, and newspaper ads have been placed regarding testing.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Planned maintenance of the offsite siren system will result in each of the sirens in Putnam County being removed from service. There are 10 sirens in Putnam County and Indian Point Energy Center considers a loss of 10% of the sirens in a county to be a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The removal of sirens from service in Putnam County will continue on an intermittent basis from June 3, 2002 until June 21, 2002. The first siren was removed from service at 8 a.m. on June 3, 2002.
The planned maintenance is intended to replace the siren actuation/verification system in order to improve reliability and maintainability. The replacement process will install the new actuation/verification system, connect the actuation/verification system, and terminate the connection of the old controls. This work is currently scheduled on one siren per day. Testing of the new actuation/verification system will not occur until the next day at the request of Putnam County. If this plan is followed, a 10% loss of the offsite communications occurs when the old controls are terminated until the new actuation/verification system is tested. This increases to 20% if the testing does not occur prior to the next siren being taken out of service.
Putnam County will use route alerting to notify the public in lieu of the non-operational sirens. County officials are aware of the scheduled activities, and newspaper ads have been placed regarding testing.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38961
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN A. DAVID
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN A. DAVID
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 06/03/2002
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2002
Event Time: 13:02 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2002
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2002
Event Time: 13:02 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
JOHN PELLET (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 86 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL BECAUSE A MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE FAILED CLOSED
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The unit was at approximately 86% power, ramping to 92% power following [the eleventh Unit 1 refueling outage (1R11)]. The main feedwater regulating valve for steam generator 1 failed closed. Attempts to open the valve manually failed. The [Shift Foreman] ordered a manual reactor trip, but an automatic trip occurred before operators could trip the reactor. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3."
The licensee stated that the automatic reactor trip signal was two out of three steam generator 1-1 low level. All control rods fully inserted, and auxiliary feedwater automatically initiated as designed. There were no emergency core cooling system (ECCS) injections or engineered safety feature (ESF) actuations, and none were required. Other than the cause of the main feedwater regulating valve failure, there was nothing unusual or misunderstood, and all systems functioned as required. There were no related maintenance or surveillance activities ongoing at the time of the automatic reactor trip.
The licensee also stated that normal charging and letdown, pressurizer heaters and sprays, and the reactor coolant pumps are currently being utilized for primary system level, pressure, and transport control. Auxiliary feedwater being utilized to supply water to the steam generators, and secondary steam is being dumped to the condenser. Containment parameters are normal, and all ECCS and ESF systems are available if needed. The unit is currently on offsite power, and the emergency diesel generators are available if needed.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector, who is currently in the control room, and may issue a press release.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The unit was at approximately 86% power, ramping to 92% power following [the eleventh Unit 1 refueling outage (1R11)]. The main feedwater regulating valve for steam generator 1 failed closed. Attempts to open the valve manually failed. The [Shift Foreman] ordered a manual reactor trip, but an automatic trip occurred before operators could trip the reactor. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3."
The licensee stated that the automatic reactor trip signal was two out of three steam generator 1-1 low level. All control rods fully inserted, and auxiliary feedwater automatically initiated as designed. There were no emergency core cooling system (ECCS) injections or engineered safety feature (ESF) actuations, and none were required. Other than the cause of the main feedwater regulating valve failure, there was nothing unusual or misunderstood, and all systems functioned as required. There were no related maintenance or surveillance activities ongoing at the time of the automatic reactor trip.
The licensee also stated that normal charging and letdown, pressurizer heaters and sprays, and the reactor coolant pumps are currently being utilized for primary system level, pressure, and transport control. Auxiliary feedwater being utilized to supply water to the steam generators, and secondary steam is being dumped to the condenser. Containment parameters are normal, and all ECCS and ESF systems are available if needed. The unit is currently on offsite power, and the emergency diesel generators are available if needed.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector, who is currently in the control room, and may issue a press release.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38962
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID PITSLEY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID PITSLEY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 06/03/2002
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2002
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2002
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2002
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF AN OPEN MANUALLY-OPERATED HEADER VENT VALVE RESULTING IN INOPERABILITY OF THE ISOLATION VALVE SEAL WATER SYSTEM
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Indian Point Unit 3 is making an [8-hour] non-emergency notification that the Isolation Valve Seal Water System (IVSWS) was found in an inoperable condition on June 2, 2002. A manually operated header vent valve (IV-1428) was found mispositioned in an open position. [The] IVSWS is designed to provide a water seal for certain containment isolation valves by injecting water between the seats and stem packing of globe and double disc type isolations valves and piping between other closed containment isolation valves. Water under pressure is supplied from a single seal water tank to five IVSWS headers for valve sealing. IVSWS is designed to provide the water seal for 24 hours, without operator action, after a postulated loss of coolant accident, in order to mitigate bypass leakage. The open vent valve could have prevented pressurization and drained the seal water in the IVSWS tank, requiring operator action to refill it, in less than 2 hours. The inoperable IVSWS is not expected to result in any significant effect on public health and safety since the containment isolation valves remain operable. The containment Isolation valves are not pneumatically 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix J, Type C tested because they are supplied with seal water but they have been leak tested with water. The inoperable IVSWS is required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.6.9."
"On discovery, the operator closed the vent valve and restored the IVSWS to operability. The condition report issued at that time called for a past operability report. The inoperable IVSWS was identified while performing this evaluation. The duration of the mispositioned valve is still under investigation."
The licensee stated that this event was determined to be reportable at approximately 1500 EDT today (06/03/02).
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Indian Point Unit 3 is making an [8-hour] non-emergency notification that the Isolation Valve Seal Water System (IVSWS) was found in an inoperable condition on June 2, 2002. A manually operated header vent valve (IV-1428) was found mispositioned in an open position. [The] IVSWS is designed to provide a water seal for certain containment isolation valves by injecting water between the seats and stem packing of globe and double disc type isolations valves and piping between other closed containment isolation valves. Water under pressure is supplied from a single seal water tank to five IVSWS headers for valve sealing. IVSWS is designed to provide the water seal for 24 hours, without operator action, after a postulated loss of coolant accident, in order to mitigate bypass leakage. The open vent valve could have prevented pressurization and drained the seal water in the IVSWS tank, requiring operator action to refill it, in less than 2 hours. The inoperable IVSWS is not expected to result in any significant effect on public health and safety since the containment isolation valves remain operable. The containment Isolation valves are not pneumatically 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix J, Type C tested because they are supplied with seal water but they have been leak tested with water. The inoperable IVSWS is required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.6.9."
"On discovery, the operator closed the vent valve and restored the IVSWS to operability. The condition report issued at that time called for a past operability report. The inoperable IVSWS was identified while performing this evaluation. The duration of the mispositioned valve is still under investigation."
The licensee stated that this event was determined to be reportable at approximately 1500 EDT today (06/03/02).
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.