Event Notification Report for May 23, 2002

10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE SALE OF CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY MIDLAND UNIT 2 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD FOR USE AT DAVIS BESSE
(Call the NRC operations officer for Consumers Energy Company contact information.)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Consumers Energy Company:

"Consumers Energy Company (Consumers) has entered into an agreement with Framatome ANP, Inc. (FRA-ANP) and First Energy Services Company, for itself and as agent for First Energy Nuclear Operating Company, The Illuminating Company, and Toledo Edison Company (collectively 'First Energy'), to sell the Midland Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head to FRA-ANP for use at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Upon consummation of that agreement which applied 10 CFR Part 21 to the transaction, Consumers determined that a conservative reading of 10 CFR Part 21 indicated that there could have been 'failure to comply' within the meaning of 10 CFR Part 21, e.g., because since 1986 when Midland Unit 2 was cancelled, the RPV head has not been maintained in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, 'Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants.' Consumers is not in a position to make a definitive finding as to whether a substantial safety hazard was created. [...] This [information is] submitted by Consumers to fulfill the requirement for a written report to provide the information requested by 10 CFR § 21.21(d)(4)."

"Also, in an abundance of caution, in accordance with 10 CFR § 21.21(b), Consumers has informed FRA-ANP and First Energy that Consumers does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine whether any deviation relating to the Midland Unit 2 RPV head exists."

"Consumers understands that FRA-ANP and First Energy, as the purchasers, will conduct any evaluation required pursuant to 10 CFR § 21.21(b) and undertake any needed corrective action."

"REPORT MADE PURSUANT TO 10 CFR § 21.21 BY CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY [on] May 23, 2002"

"[...] (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect. [...] Consumers Power Company (now Consumers Energy Company) ('Consumers') was the holder of Construction Permits CPPR-81 and CPPR-82 for the Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2 ('Midland'), Docket Nos. 50-329 and 50-330. The units were cancelled on July 1, 1986, and the construction permits were revoked on December 18, 1986. Prior to that time, Consumers had procured a number of components for that facility in accordance with a quality assurance program meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Among such components was a reactor vessel head for Midland Unit 2. As Consumers did not intend to operate the Midland units, it abandoned a number of components in-place, terminated its quality assurance program for Midland, ceased applying the requirements of Appendix B to components it had procured for Midland, and did not systematically retain records associated with the vessel head, including its procurement, any nonconformances or any corrective actions. Since that time, the vessel head has not been maintained in accordance with a Quality Assurance Program."

"In May 2002, Framatome ANP, Inc. on behalf of First Energy Nuclear Operating Company agreed to purchase the Midland vessel head for possible use at the Davis-Besse facility. Inasmuch as the vessel head meets the definition of 'basic component' contained in 10 CFR § 21.3 as it is a component that affects a nuclear power plant's safety function necessary to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the procurement document specified that the provisions of Part 21 apply."

"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or
contains a defect. [...] Consumers is supplying the basic component which fails to comply and which may contain a defect."

"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such
defect or failure to comply. [...] Consumers did not maintain the vessel head under a Quality Assurance Program and does not have records regarding the serviceability and suitability of the vessel head at another nuclear facility, e.g., the suitability of design, the quality assurance program under which it was designed, constructed, handled, shipped and stored, procurement document control, whether the components met their procurement documents, whether appropriate inspections were conducted and the results, whether materials were controlled, and the adequacy of any corrective action. Consumers presently does not have the expertise necessary to assess the consequences of this condition and whether the reactor vessel head has any defect and does not know the circumstances of its intended use at the buyer's facility."

"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. [...] This situation arose on May 22, 2002, the date which the procurement document specified the applicability of Part 21."

"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part. [...] The report only applies to the reactor vessel head being procured for possible use at the Davis-Besse facility."

"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. [...] Consumers has notified the purchaser pursuant to 10 CFR § 21.21(b) that it does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists. The purchaser has agreed to evaluate this condition and make a determination on the suitability of the reactor vessel head for its potential intended use and any required corrective or other necessary actions, including its reportability."

"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. [...] None."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING A REPORTED MISADMINISTRATION

At approximately 1030 CDT, the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) received a call from a consultant , and the consultant reported that a cardiologist had called him. Apparently, a radioactive isotope (technetium-99m) had been injected by a Nuclear Medicine Technician to image a breast. However, according to the consultant, the license that the cardiologist was on did not authorize breast imaging. According to the consultant, the technician was out for knee surgery and would not be back until 05/28/02.

The consultant gave a very vague hospital name which could not be identified in the license files. However, the State searched under the doctor's name in the Board of Medical Licensure, and the doctor is affiliated with the Heart Clinic in Edmond, Oklahoma. The State DEQ stated that although the doctor's practicing privileges are at the Heart Clinic, the Heart Clinic does not have a license. The State DEQ plans to perform an investigation at the Heart Clinic tomorrow (05/24/02).

The consultant estimated that this event involved an administration of 4 to 6 millicuries of technetium-99m. The consultant stated that the physician learned about this on Monday (05/20/02) and that the injection happened some time prior to that date.

(Call the NRC operations officer for a state contact telephone number and the cardiologist's name.)

***** UPDATE AT 1528 EDT ON 05/24/02 FROM MIKE BRODERICK TO LEIGH TROCINE *****

The state performed an investigation today and called to provide additional clarifying information.

The license (OK-27669-01) is written to the cardiologist, and the cardiologist/physician is doing business as the Heart Clinic. The cardiologist is also the owner of the clinic. The physician was only licensed for cardiac treatments, and the treatment in question involved a breast scan. The facility was not licensed to perform the breast scan, and the breast scan was not prescribed by a physician. Apparently, a patient did not show up for a cardiac treatment, and the Nuclear Medicine Technician (a certified Emergency Medical Technician) took the initiative to give the dose to another individual for a breast scan rather than waste the technetium-99m dose. The individual that received the breast scan has since taken the scan results to the women's clinic of the hospital. It was reported that the cardiologist informed the consultant who in turn notified the State.

The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Linda Smith), NMSS EOs (Fred Brown and Tom Essig), and DIRO (Nader Mamish).

DISCOVERY THAT A 1.7-CURIE CESIUM-137 LOGGING SOURCE HAD BEEN UNSHIELDED ON A RIG FLOOR IN EASTERN MONTANA FOR APPROXIMATELY 48 HOURS RESULTING IN EXPOSURE TO RIG, CASING, AND CEMENT CREW MEMBERS

At approximately 1615 CDT, the Schlumberger Radiation Safety Officer was notified by a field location in Williston, North Dakota (an agreement state), of an incident at a job location in Eastern Montana (not an agreement state) involving a 10-year-old, 1.7-curie (nominal), cesium-137, logging source. It was reported that the source had been outside of its source shield for a period of approximately 48 hours. There is a number of members of the public that have been exposed to this source.

It appears that the logging engineer failed to properly make the transfer of the source from the logging tools into the shield, and it is believed that the source was left on the rig floor. After the licensee's crew left, it is suspected that rig crew members and possible casing and cementing crew members may have wandered in and out of the applicable area for various amounts of time. These individuals were not badged, and are being considered by the licensee to be members of the public. When the logging job (well) was finished, the rig was moved about 5 miles to the next lease (which is where the source is presently located). The rig has been sitting at the new lease site unoccupied for 12 to 15 hours.

The source, which is approximately 3/4 of an inch long and approximately 3/4 to 1 inch in diameter, was discovered to be missing today at approximately 1300 CDT when licensee representatives were preparing for another job. The source has since been located, and licensee representatives are currently in the process of getting it back into the proper shield and proper storage. The licensee also plans to contact Pan Canadian (the client) to identify rig crew members in order to conduct interviews with all of the individuals on the rig from the time that the Schlumberger crew left until the time the rig was parked at the new lease location (unmanned).

(Call the NRC operations officer for licensee contact telephone numbers.)

PLANNED OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING TWO RADIATION MONITOR DETECTORS SOLD AS SURPLUS MATERIAL BUT CONTAINED RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On May 22, 2002, STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) was notified by an individual that two radiation monitor detectors he purchased from South Texas Project as surplus material might contain radioactive material. The detectors had never been installed in the plant but were excess material stored in the site warehouse since their purchase in 1993. STPNOC personnel were sent to investigate the issue and confirmed that the detectors did contain check sources in sealed containers attached to the detectors. These sources, when purchased in 1993, were 8 microcuries of cesium-137 and attached to the detectors in separate sealed housings. The sources were surveyed and found to have a dose rate of 0.18 millirem per hour on contact."

"The sources were removed from the detectors and transported back to the site."

"The resident inspector has been notified of this event and that offsite agency notifications are planned."

"STPNOC will be notifying the Texas Bureau of Radiation Control and the Matagorda County Judge of this event."

HIGH THRUST BEARING TEMPERATURE DURING HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE TESTING

HPCI was declared inoperable due to high thrust bearing temperature during performance of pump operability surveillance. There was nothing unusual or misunderstood other than the cause of the high thrust bearing temperature. As a result, the unit entered a 14-day limiting condition for operation.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.

* * * 1522 EDT 5/31/02 THIS EVENT WAS RETRACTED JOHN TWAROG TO MIKE NORRIS* * *

"On 05/23/02 during a plant start-up with the reactor at approximately 19.5% power, a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) turbine thrust bearing temperature high alarm (SO 12) occurred while performing operational surveillance testing of the HPCI system. The turbine thrust bearing displayed a constant temperature rise until the alarm set point of 200 F was reached. The turbine was secured a few minutes later and the temperature indication on the thrust bearing peaked at approximately 200 F before indication of cool down appeared.

"The Manager of Maintenance Mechanical/Electrical consulted a Kingsberry Thrust bearing Company Engineer who stated that temperature-induced bearing damage will not occur until the bearing temperature exceeds 250 F. The maximum indicated bearing temperature received was less than 210 F. Additionally, an oil sample was taken and visually examined with no indication of gross suspended particulate.

"System Engineering completed an assessment of this condition on 05/24/02 which revealed evidence that provided credible justification using sound engineering judgment that the thrust bearing temperature indication was false and an actual high temperature condition did not exist at any time during the surveillance testing. Insulation had been removed from the turbine casing around the turbine gland seal during the mid-cycle outage. This resulted in an elevated temperature indication of the thrust bearing due to radiant and convective heat transfer to the temperature indicator's thermocouple external to the thrust bearing. Steam leaking past the gland seal may have also contributed to the temperature increase. When the exposed area of the HPCI turbine was reinsulated, indicated temperature began to rapidly decrease. Subsequent HPCI system operation supported these conclusions. The maximum thrust bearing temperature indication received during this surveillance was 158 F. Trend analysis demonstrated that the maximum temperature would have peaked at approximately 175 F."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. R1DO (Rogge) was notified.

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT

A non-licensed contract supervisor was determined to have provided a tainted sample during a random drug test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

Refer to the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

A CONTRACT SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL DURING A RANDOM FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST (24-Hour Report)

A contract supervisor failed a random drug and alcohol fitness-for-duty test. The individual tested positive for alcohol, and the results of the drug portion of the test have not yet been received. The individual's unescorted site access was terminated at 1937 on 05/23/02, and the licensee plans to perform a review of the individual's work for the last 30 calendar days or for the duration of the individual's employment (which ever is shorter). (Call the NRC operations officer for additional details.)

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify the NRC Region 1 office (Greg Smith).