Event Notification Report for April 19, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/18/2002 - 04/19/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38864
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN KOSHMERAL
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN KOSHMERAL
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 04/19/2002
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2002
Event Time: 14:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2002
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2002
Event Time: 14:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
CHRIS GRIMES (NRR)
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
CHRIS GRIMES (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP AT MILLSTONE UNIT 2
The licensee reported that all control rods inserted properly and all systems functioned as designed. The reactor trip was initiated from a main turbine protective trip which may be related to a stator cooling malfunction. The plant is currently stable in Hot Standby. The licensee has begun investigating the cause of the event.
The Resident Inspector has been notified. Additionally, the licensee notified the State and Local officials.
The licensee reported that all control rods inserted properly and all systems functioned as designed. The reactor trip was initiated from a main turbine protective trip which may be related to a stator cooling malfunction. The plant is currently stable in Hot Standby. The licensee has begun investigating the cause of the event.
The Resident Inspector has been notified. Additionally, the licensee notified the State and Local officials.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38865
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWIN URQUHART
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWIN URQUHART
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 04/19/2002
Notification Time: 18:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2002
Event Time: 16:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2002
Notification Time: 18:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2002
Event Time: 16:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
SINGH BAJWA (NRR)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
SINGH BAJWA (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 19 | Power Operation | 9 | Power Operation |
PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ON UNIDENTIFIED DRYWELL FLOOR LEAKAGE
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(z); 50.72(a) (1) (ii) and 50.72(b) (i) the initiation of a nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. Plant E. I. Hatch, unit one has commenced a plant shutdown as required by Technical Specifications 3.4.4 A (RCS Operational Leakage). The Reactor Coolant System unidentified leakage has been calculated to be greater than the Technical Specification limit of 5 GPM. The leakage has been calculated to be 6.85 GPM at 1647 Hrs. Eastern Time, The plant was operating at 19% rated thermal power (RTP) and commenced a power reduction at 1650 Hrs. Eastern Time. The current power is 9% RTP and shutdown is in progress."
The licensee notified the Resident Inspector.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(z); 50.72(a) (1) (ii) and 50.72(b) (i) the initiation of a nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. Plant E. I. Hatch, unit one has commenced a plant shutdown as required by Technical Specifications 3.4.4 A (RCS Operational Leakage). The Reactor Coolant System unidentified leakage has been calculated to be greater than the Technical Specification limit of 5 GPM. The leakage has been calculated to be 6.85 GPM at 1647 Hrs. Eastern Time, The plant was operating at 19% rated thermal power (RTP) and commenced a power reduction at 1650 Hrs. Eastern Time. The current power is 9% RTP and shutdown is in progress."
The licensee notified the Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38866
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: T. E. WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: T. E. WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 04/20/2002
Notification Time: 01:27 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2002
Event Time: 07:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2002
Notification Time: 01:27 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2002
Event Time: 07:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-Hour Report)
"At 0700, on 04-19-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified errors were found in historical data associated with three 30 gallon drums. Research to support remediation activities associated with NCS-INC-01-025 revealed that information used to characterize waste drums had been incorrectly entered onto the Request For Waste Classification (RWC) sheets for these three 30 gallon waste drums of NCS Spacing Exempt classified waste, violating requirements of NCSA WM-03 and WMO.001. This violated the Double Contingency principal. These drums were transitioned to storage under WMO.001 upon deletion of WM-03. The purpose of the requirement is to ensure the correct Information is available on the RWC for classification.
"This Is a legacy issue; upon review of the correct data associated with these drums, the classification status of NCS Spacing-Exempt is correct. The drums are currently being properly controlled.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"Although the calculations were incorrectly performed and the independent verification failed to catch the error, the correct data associated with these drums was reviewed and the drums are still NCS Spacing-Exempt and controlled properly. However, the paperwork needs to be updated to assure downstream problems are avoided.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR
In order for a criticality to be possible, the mass in multiple adjacent waste drums stored as NCS Spacing Exempt would each have to be greater than the safe mass determined for that container size and these waste drums would have to be stored together or recontainerized into unfavorable geometry containers.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC)
"The controlled parameter is mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
"The correct data indicated that the mass of the drums was less than the always safe mass of 120 grams of U-235.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
"Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls to ensure the uranium mass used for classification is correctly listed on the RWC.
"The first leg of double contingency is based on correctly calculating and transcribing the mass result onto the RWC. The wrong analytical result was used for the calculation. This wrong calculational result was transcribed onto the RWC. The control was violated. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained,
"The second leg of double contingency is based on independently verifying the mass was correctly calculated and transcribed onto the RWC. The incorrect calculation and transcription was not discovered during the independent verification. The control was violated. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double Contingency was not maintained.
"Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"Correct the RWCs."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"At 0700, on 04-19-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified errors were found in historical data associated with three 30 gallon drums. Research to support remediation activities associated with NCS-INC-01-025 revealed that information used to characterize waste drums had been incorrectly entered onto the Request For Waste Classification (RWC) sheets for these three 30 gallon waste drums of NCS Spacing Exempt classified waste, violating requirements of NCSA WM-03 and WMO.001. This violated the Double Contingency principal. These drums were transitioned to storage under WMO.001 upon deletion of WM-03. The purpose of the requirement is to ensure the correct Information is available on the RWC for classification.
"This Is a legacy issue; upon review of the correct data associated with these drums, the classification status of NCS Spacing-Exempt is correct. The drums are currently being properly controlled.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"Although the calculations were incorrectly performed and the independent verification failed to catch the error, the correct data associated with these drums was reviewed and the drums are still NCS Spacing-Exempt and controlled properly. However, the paperwork needs to be updated to assure downstream problems are avoided.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR
In order for a criticality to be possible, the mass in multiple adjacent waste drums stored as NCS Spacing Exempt would each have to be greater than the safe mass determined for that container size and these waste drums would have to be stored together or recontainerized into unfavorable geometry containers.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC)
"The controlled parameter is mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
"The correct data indicated that the mass of the drums was less than the always safe mass of 120 grams of U-235.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
"Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls to ensure the uranium mass used for classification is correctly listed on the RWC.
"The first leg of double contingency is based on correctly calculating and transcribing the mass result onto the RWC. The wrong analytical result was used for the calculation. This wrong calculational result was transcribed onto the RWC. The control was violated. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained,
"The second leg of double contingency is based on independently verifying the mass was correctly calculated and transcribed onto the RWC. The incorrect calculation and transcription was not discovered during the independent verification. The control was violated. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double Contingency was not maintained.
"Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"Correct the RWCs."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.