Event Notification Report for April 15, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/14/2002 - 04/15/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38854
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SIMMONS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SIMMONS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 04/15/2002
Notification Time: 02:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2002
Event Time: 00:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2002
Notification Time: 02:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2002
Event Time: 00:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KEN BARR (R2)
KEN BARR (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
PLANT HAD ESF ACTUATION RESULTING IN AUTOMATIC REPOSITIONING OF AUX FEEDWATER VALVES.
Unit 2 was in mode 3 and stable following the completion of a preplanned shutdown for a refueling outage. The aux feedwater was in service at the time of this actuation. The AFW Level Control Valves had been throttled, the "B" Main Feedwater Pump reset and Feedwater Isolation (FWI) reset to accordance with procedures. The RCS Tavg drifted above 550°F. When the RCS Tavg dropped below 550°F, a FWI signal was generated causing the reset Main Feedwater Pump to trip and the Aux Feedwater valves to reposition open. The Aux Feedwater pumps were already running. An investigation is ongoing.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Unit 2 was in mode 3 and stable following the completion of a preplanned shutdown for a refueling outage. The aux feedwater was in service at the time of this actuation. The AFW Level Control Valves had been throttled, the "B" Main Feedwater Pump reset and Feedwater Isolation (FWI) reset to accordance with procedures. The RCS Tavg drifted above 550°F. When the RCS Tavg dropped below 550°F, a FWI signal was generated causing the reset Main Feedwater Pump to trip and the Aux Feedwater valves to reposition open. The Aux Feedwater pumps were already running. An investigation is ongoing.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38855
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 04/15/2002
Notification Time: 12:04 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2002
Event Time: 07:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2002
Notification Time: 12:04 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2002
Event Time: 07:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
THOMAS KOSHY (NRR)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
THOMAS KOSHY (NRR)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
DEGRADED PRESSURE BOUNDARY AT ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE UNIT 2
"Boron deposits were discovered on five pressurizer heater sleeve penetrations during visual inspection. Two additional heater penetrations are suspected of leaking, but further inspection activities are required to confirm these leaks. Pressurizer heater sleeve penetration leakage is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. Small amounts of boron were discovered at each of the five nozzle penetration interfaces. Prior to shutdown for refueling, RCS unidentified leakage was about 0.22 gpm. Currently, Unit 2 is in reduced inventory with the pressurizer empty."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"Boron deposits were discovered on five pressurizer heater sleeve penetrations during visual inspection. Two additional heater penetrations are suspected of leaking, but further inspection activities are required to confirm these leaks. Pressurizer heater sleeve penetration leakage is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. Small amounts of boron were discovered at each of the five nozzle penetration interfaces. Prior to shutdown for refueling, RCS unidentified leakage was about 0.22 gpm. Currently, Unit 2 is in reduced inventory with the pressurizer empty."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38920
Rep Org: SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS, INC
Licensee: SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS, INC
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: W. G. HAMPTON (FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Licensee: SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS, INC
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: W. G. HAMPTON (FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 05/15/2002
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2002
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
GREG PICK (R4)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
GREG PICK (R4)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
10 CFR 21 NOTIFICATION-POTENTIAL DEFECT INVOLVING FAN ASSEMBLIES FOR UPS SYSTEMS
"The attached 10 CFR Part 21 record, Attachment A, is submitted to report a potential for a defect in fan assemblies used in Uninterruptible Power Systems manufactured under the Solidstate Controls, Inc., 10CFR50 Appendix B Program.
"Nature of the defect:
"PROBLEM SEEN: The above assembly contains a component part - an aluminum, five-wing fan blade, which potentially could separate from the hub. If the blade should come loose there may not be an alarm indication of loss of cooling. Additionally, the loose blade may cause a short circuit if it falls into the equipment and should land across opposing current carrying devices.
"CAUSE: We have determined that one fan blade style from one specific manufacturer of part number 03-470100-00 could, under certain conditions, separate from its hub.
"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: Fan Assembly - THE SEPARATION OF THE BLADE FROM THE HUB COULD CAUSE THE SYSTEM TO DROP POWER TO THE LOAD. If the worst case failure mode described above were to occur, it would result in the motor continuing to operate, thereby, not allowing the internal alarm mechanism to activate. Further, the blade itself could fall into the operating equipment causing a short circuit. It is important to note that the short circuit situation has not been reported.
"US NUCLEAR PLANT IMPACTED BY THIS ACTION: There are approximately 30 plants listed"
"The attached 10 CFR Part 21 record, Attachment A, is submitted to report a potential for a defect in fan assemblies used in Uninterruptible Power Systems manufactured under the Solidstate Controls, Inc., 10CFR50 Appendix B Program.
"Nature of the defect:
"PROBLEM SEEN: The above assembly contains a component part - an aluminum, five-wing fan blade, which potentially could separate from the hub. If the blade should come loose there may not be an alarm indication of loss of cooling. Additionally, the loose blade may cause a short circuit if it falls into the equipment and should land across opposing current carrying devices.
"CAUSE: We have determined that one fan blade style from one specific manufacturer of part number 03-470100-00 could, under certain conditions, separate from its hub.
"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: Fan Assembly - THE SEPARATION OF THE BLADE FROM THE HUB COULD CAUSE THE SYSTEM TO DROP POWER TO THE LOAD. If the worst case failure mode described above were to occur, it would result in the motor continuing to operate, thereby, not allowing the internal alarm mechanism to activate. Further, the blade itself could fall into the operating equipment causing a short circuit. It is important to note that the short circuit situation has not been reported.
"US NUCLEAR PLANT IMPACTED BY THIS ACTION: There are approximately 30 plants listed"