Event Notification Report for March 29, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/28/2002 - 03/29/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
38817
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38817
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BEOSCH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BEOSCH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 03/30/2002
Notification Time: 03:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2002
Event Time: 23:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2002
Notification Time: 03:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2002
Event Time: 23:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM RULAND (R1)
WILLIAM RULAND (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 24 | Power Operation | 24 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 ENTRY DUE TO LOW SERVICE WATER SUCTION PRESSURE AND THE SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF CHILLERS FOR THE CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) AND CONTROL ROOM FLOOR COOLING
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Unit 1 was in Mode 5, day 28 of a refuel and inspection outage. Unit 2 was in Mode 1, 24% power for scheduled maintenance work requiring River Water Makeup to both units' cooling towers [to be] out of service."
"At 2340 hours, Unit 1 began to experience low suction pressure to the 'C' Service Water pump, the only pump in service at the time. Service Water takes suction from the Unit 1 Cooling Tower, and this condition resulted in low system discharge pressure and flow. Service Water is the normal cooling source for Units 1 [and] 2 Control Structure [Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)]. The 'A' Control Structure chiller tripped, and the 'B' Control Structure chiller failed to start due to the low flow condition on service water. With both chillers tripped and unavailable for CREOAS and Control Room Floor Cooling, [the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification] 3.0.3 was entered on Unit 2. This represented a Loss of Safety Function for Accident Mitigation and requires an [8-hour] ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)."
"The Control Structure chillers were realigned to Emergency Service Water (ESW), its backup emergency cooling source. The 'A' Chiller failed to re-start, but the 'B' Chiller was successfully placed in service. LCO 3.0.3 was able to be exited on Unit 2 at 0012 hours on 3/30/02."
"An investigation is ongoing into why the 'A' Control Structure failed to re-start and the cause of the low suction pressure on Service Water."
The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Unit 1 was in Mode 5, day 28 of a refuel and inspection outage. Unit 2 was in Mode 1, 24% power for scheduled maintenance work requiring River Water Makeup to both units' cooling towers [to be] out of service."
"At 2340 hours, Unit 1 began to experience low suction pressure to the 'C' Service Water pump, the only pump in service at the time. Service Water takes suction from the Unit 1 Cooling Tower, and this condition resulted in low system discharge pressure and flow. Service Water is the normal cooling source for Units 1 [and] 2 Control Structure [Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)]. The 'A' Control Structure chiller tripped, and the 'B' Control Structure chiller failed to start due to the low flow condition on service water. With both chillers tripped and unavailable for CREOAS and Control Room Floor Cooling, [the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification] 3.0.3 was entered on Unit 2. This represented a Loss of Safety Function for Accident Mitigation and requires an [8-hour] ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)."
"The Control Structure chillers were realigned to Emergency Service Water (ESW), its backup emergency cooling source. The 'A' Chiller failed to re-start, but the 'B' Chiller was successfully placed in service. LCO 3.0.3 was able to be exited on Unit 2 at 0012 hours on 3/30/02."
"An investigation is ongoing into why the 'A' Control Structure failed to re-start and the cause of the low suction pressure on Service Water."
The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.