Event Notification Report for March 19, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/18/2002 - 03/19/2002
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38785
Rep Org: U.S. ARMY
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 2
City: FORT KNOX State: KY
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF HAVENNER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 2
City: FORT KNOX State: KY
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF HAVENNER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 03/20/2002
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2002
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
LOST/MISSING ARMY TANK SIGHT DEVICE
The licensee reported a missing sighting device (ie., beam splitter) for the main gun on an Abrams tank. It is believed that the beam splitter vibrated out on the Yano live firing range located on the Fort Knox Army Base. The beam splitter contains 10 curies of tritium inside a container that is approximately 1.5 inches long and 1 inch in diameter. The licensee is conducting a search to locate the missing beam splitter.
The licensee reported a missing sighting device (ie., beam splitter) for the main gun on an Abrams tank. It is believed that the beam splitter vibrated out on the Yano live firing range located on the Fort Knox Army Base. The beam splitter contains 10 curies of tritium inside a container that is approximately 1.5 inches long and 1 inch in diameter. The licensee is conducting a search to locate the missing beam splitter.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38782
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MEYER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MEYER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 03/19/2002
Notification Time: 14:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2002
Event Time: 10:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2002
Notification Time: 14:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2002
Event Time: 10:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SPDS DEGRADES COMMUNICATION/ASSESSMENT/RESPONSE CAPABILITY
"During the performance of a software update to the Primary Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) the Unit 2 PPCS servers failed rendering Reactor Thermal Output and Safety Parameter Display functions for Unit 2 inoperable. At the time of the failure the software update was only being performed on Unit 2. Unit 1 PPCS was verified operable and was not affected because the software update was only being applied to the Unit 2 Servers.
"Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-21, PPCS Malfunction was entered and Reactor Power was reduced approximately 2% and is currently being controlled by Control Board Delta-T. The Safety Parameter Display System was also rendered inoperable and is the bases for making this Notification.
"Presently the Unit 2 PPCS servers are being re-booted, and it is expected that PPCS will be available in about 2 hours. It is not known what the exact failure mechanisms for Unit 2, only that it is either the software or the procedure that caused the PPCS failure to unit 2."
The licensee also notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/19/02 @1732 BY HARRSCH TO GOULD * * *
As of 1534 CST, the PPCS system was returned to service for Unit 2. All required functions were verified operable, including Reactor Thermal Output (RTO) and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The initial failure was related to the installation of a software upgrade and the problem has been corrected. With the RTO function now Operable, Unit 2 will be returning to full power from 98%.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Reg 3 RDO(Phillips) was informed
"During the performance of a software update to the Primary Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) the Unit 2 PPCS servers failed rendering Reactor Thermal Output and Safety Parameter Display functions for Unit 2 inoperable. At the time of the failure the software update was only being performed on Unit 2. Unit 1 PPCS was verified operable and was not affected because the software update was only being applied to the Unit 2 Servers.
"Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-21, PPCS Malfunction was entered and Reactor Power was reduced approximately 2% and is currently being controlled by Control Board Delta-T. The Safety Parameter Display System was also rendered inoperable and is the bases for making this Notification.
"Presently the Unit 2 PPCS servers are being re-booted, and it is expected that PPCS will be available in about 2 hours. It is not known what the exact failure mechanisms for Unit 2, only that it is either the software or the procedure that caused the PPCS failure to unit 2."
The licensee also notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/19/02 @1732 BY HARRSCH TO GOULD * * *
As of 1534 CST, the PPCS system was returned to service for Unit 2. All required functions were verified operable, including Reactor Thermal Output (RTO) and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The initial failure was related to the installation of a software upgrade and the problem has been corrected. With the RTO function now Operable, Unit 2 will be returning to full power from 98%.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Reg 3 RDO(Phillips) was informed