Event Notification Report for March 13, 2002

TWO TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS MISSING FROM MOUNTING BRACKETS

During a review and inventory of tritium exit signs to be replaced with non-tritium signs, two exit sign brackets, without signs, were identified. Both missing signs were from the Arts and Architecture building and were 11.5 curies each. The signs were manufactured by Isolite, model #880. The licensee intends to contact the contractor who originally installed the signs, students, faculty, and the building supervisor for information to locate the missing signs.

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"During the performance of a surveillance (E22-T2004) for high pressure core spray system (HPCS), the condensate storage tank suction check valve (1E22F0002) failed to seat properly. The operability determination for the check valve determined that there was significant potential that the check valve springs had broken resulting in foreign material in the HPCS system. Since the long-term operation of the system was potentially impacted, the system was declared inoperable at 1830. HPCS is a single train safety system." The licensee verified the operability of RCIC within one hour.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident.


***THIS EVENT WAS RETRACTED 1641 EST 3/21/02 KEN RUSSELL TO MIKE NORRIS***

"On 3/1 3/02. a notification was made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a potential Loss of Safety Function of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system, a single train safety system. The reason for this determination was the potential that foreign material may nave been introduced to the HPCS system.

"During the regularly scheduled performance of a surveillance (1E22-T2004) for the HPCS system, the condensate storage tank suction check valve ( E22F0002) failed to seat properly. The operability determination for the check valve concluded that the valve did not directly impact system operability, but there was significant potential that the likely failure mode of the check valve was a broken spring, resulting in foreign material in the HPCS system. Since the long-term operation of the system was potentially impacted, the system was conservatively declared inoperable at 1830 on 3/13/02, although the system remained available and aligned for injection, had its operation been required.

"The valve was subsequently disassembled and inspected. The inspection identified that the valve springs were still intact, but had weakened to the point that the check valve failed the closure verification test. Therefore, it was determined that the check valve failure had not introduced foreign material to the HPCS pump or piping and therefore the HPCS system would not have been prevented from performing its safety function. Since the HPCS system remained capable of performing its safety function this event is not reportable."

The Licensee notified the NRC Resident. Notified R3DO (Phillips)

24 HOUR NRC 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING OIL CONTAMINATION ON ADU BULK CONTAINER


"Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, low enriched (less than or equal to 5.0 wt.% U-235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors, License: SNM-1107.

"Time and Date of Event: Approxirnatcly 12:30 hours, Wednesday, March 13, 2002.

"Reason for Notification: When an empty bulk container was returned to the bulk blending room after having been emptied on the erbia production line, an operator noticed a film of oil on the outside of the container and its feeder valve, and on an horizontal structural plate of the container.

"Summary of Process: UO2 powder is blended in 1750 kg bulk containers in the bulk blending room (a moderation control (Modcon) area) prior to being used on a pellet line. After blending, the bulk containers are taken to a production line, and placed into a second Modcon area for processing. After processing, the empty containers are returned to the bulk blending room.

"As Found Condition; a summary of the as found conditions is as follows: The Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) function was immediately notified, and an NCS engineer went immediately to the floor to evaluate the situation. The bulk container was empty. A film of oil was found on the side of the container and its feeder valve, and on a horizontal structural plate of the container. The total quantity of oil is estimated to be no more than a few ounces. The container was inspected, and found to apparently be intact, that is, the integrity intact and the gaskets in place and firmly secured.

"Double Contingency Protection: Double contingency protection for the ADU bulk container(s) is based on moderation control, that is, (1) prevent greater than 20.48 liters of water equivalent from becoming available to a bulk container, and (2) prevent greater than 20.48 liters of water equivalent entering a container. It was determined double contingency protection was lost because of the failure of controls to prevent moderating material from coming in contact with a bulk Container without prior written authorization, It is also noted that at no time was greater than the safety limit of moderator involved. Therefore the incident requires 24-hour notification in accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5).

"Summary of Activity: The NCS engineer made the preliminary determination that the incident was significant because moderator had come into contact with a bulk container. The container was removed from service. No additional immediate corrective action was required for the affected container because it was empty. The feeder valve was removed, and the gasket and interior of the container and feeder valve were inspected for oil contamination. None was found.

"Conclusion: There was a loss of double contingency protection. At no time was greater than a safe limit of moderator involved. At no time was criticality possible. At no rime was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed."