Event Notification Report for March 12, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/11/2002 - 03/12/2002
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38761
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CECIL WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CECIL WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 03/12/2002
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2002
Event Time: 08:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2002
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2002
Event Time: 08:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
MARK LESSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNANALYZED CONDITION - SI MINIFLOW LINE VALVE INTERLOCK MIS-WIRED
"In the analysis for certain design bases accidents, credit is taken for a recirculation mode of operation that ensures continued cooling to the reactor core following an injection mode. During the current Unit 1 refueling outage, it was found that a safety injection (SI) miniflow line valve (1HV-8813) interlock was mis-wired. The interlock wiring should have allowed a second valve (1HV-8804B) to be opened during switchover from injection mode to recirculation mode once 1HV-8813 has been closed but would not. This wiring error was subsequently corrected. 1HV-8804B is opened to provide a suction source from the discharge of the Train B residual heat removal (RHR) pump to the suction of the SI pumps. 1HV-8804B must open for recirculation to begin if the opposite train is unavailable. A review has found that this mis-wiring has existed since at least 1996.
"Based on preliminary evaluation, on 3-12-2002, at 0830 EST, we concluded that this may represent an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B). Further evaluation is being performed to determine the significance of the mis-wiring."
The NRC Resident was notified by the licensee.
***** RETRACTION FROM JOHN WILLIAMS TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1047 EDT ON 04/25/02 *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"RETRACTION - Further review of the event reported on 03/12/02 via Notification #38761, and described [above], has concluded that it is not a condition that significantly degrades plant safety. It is hereby retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to make a 60-day report. The NRC operations officer notified the R2DO (Ann Boland).
"In the analysis for certain design bases accidents, credit is taken for a recirculation mode of operation that ensures continued cooling to the reactor core following an injection mode. During the current Unit 1 refueling outage, it was found that a safety injection (SI) miniflow line valve (1HV-8813) interlock was mis-wired. The interlock wiring should have allowed a second valve (1HV-8804B) to be opened during switchover from injection mode to recirculation mode once 1HV-8813 has been closed but would not. This wiring error was subsequently corrected. 1HV-8804B is opened to provide a suction source from the discharge of the Train B residual heat removal (RHR) pump to the suction of the SI pumps. 1HV-8804B must open for recirculation to begin if the opposite train is unavailable. A review has found that this mis-wiring has existed since at least 1996.
"Based on preliminary evaluation, on 3-12-2002, at 0830 EST, we concluded that this may represent an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B). Further evaluation is being performed to determine the significance of the mis-wiring."
The NRC Resident was notified by the licensee.
***** RETRACTION FROM JOHN WILLIAMS TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1047 EDT ON 04/25/02 *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"RETRACTION - Further review of the event reported on 03/12/02 via Notification #38761, and described [above], has concluded that it is not a condition that significantly degrades plant safety. It is hereby retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to make a 60-day report. The NRC operations officer notified the R2DO (Ann Boland).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38762
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS JESSESSKY
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS JESSESSKY
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 03/12/2002
Notification Time: 20:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2002
Event Time: 14:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2002
Notification Time: 20:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2002
Event Time: 14:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION, APPENDIX R VALVE UNABLE TO SATISFY DESIGN FUNCTION
"At 1430 on 3/12/02, an Appendix R credited valve was determined to be unable to satisfy its design function of providing a flow path from the Charging System to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The credited flow path is necessary to control RCS inventory and maintain the plant in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) during an Appendix R fire. The flow path is also utilized procedurally in controlling RCS inventory while the RCS is cooled down and depressurized from Mode 3 (Hot Standby) to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).
"This issue places the plant in an unanalyzed condition and thus is reportable under 50.73 (a)(2)(ii).
"The specific valve is 1/2CV-1296 Auxiliary Charging Line Isolation valve. The valve's design function is to open on a differential pressure of 200 psid (with or without instrument air) between the discharge of the charging pumps and the RCS. This line is not utilized during normal operations but is an available charging path to the RCS and utilized during plant shutdown in the event of an Appendix R fire. The valve is an air operated valve that is assumed to have failed close due to a loss of instrument air. It has been found that the valve will not open until a much higher differential pressure is reached. If the RCS is at normal operating pressure (2235 psig), and the actual lift pressure of the valve is greater than 500 psid, charging flow will be unavailable to the RCS. A relief on the discharge of the outlet of the charging pump will lift at 2735 and prevent flow to the RCS. The charging pump maximum discharge pressure is 3000 psig.
"Compensatory actions have been undertaken that establish plantwide fire rounds. Fire rounds will be continued until the condition is corrected or a suitable evaluation is completed that establishes other actions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident.
****RETRACTION 4/19/02 at 1821 from Mike Holzmann to Rich Laura****
"RETRACTION OF EVENT NOTIFICATION #38762
"At 2051 EST on March 12, 2002, ENS Event Notification # 38762 was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for identification of an unanalyzed condition that had the potential to significantly degrade plant safety involving the Appendix R safe shutdown fire analysis. PBNP Unit 1 and 2 valve CV-1296, 'Auxiliary Charging Line Isolation Valve,' are air-operated valves. These valves, one in each unit, are credited with opening at 200 psid to provide a charging system flow path to control RCS inventory and to maintain the plant in Mode 3 (hot standby) during the Appendix R safe shutdown fire with loss of instrument air. The notification was made when we identified that the CV-1296 valves will not open until a much higher differential pressure is reached and; therefore, the flow path through the valve may not be capable of providing the Appendix R function of controlling RCS inventory. At the time of this notification an evaluation of the consequences of this Condition had not been assessed, and the report was made because of the potential for the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"We have subsequently completed an engineering evaluation which identified the differential pressure necessary to permit charging flow through the CV-1296 valve. This evaluation is based on the measured lifting force of the valve stem with zero differential pressure across the valve. We have further determined, based on engineering analysis supported by MAAP4 computer runs, and using a more conservative RCS injection pressure then identified above, that the RCS pressure would drop low enough to permit charging flow into the RCS, before the RCS pressurizer level is lost. We have thus concluded that the condition identified in our event notification would not result in a significant degradation of plant safety. Therefore, this condition is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73, and we are hereby retracting this event notification."
The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. The R3DO (J. Madera) has been notified.
"At 1430 on 3/12/02, an Appendix R credited valve was determined to be unable to satisfy its design function of providing a flow path from the Charging System to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The credited flow path is necessary to control RCS inventory and maintain the plant in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) during an Appendix R fire. The flow path is also utilized procedurally in controlling RCS inventory while the RCS is cooled down and depressurized from Mode 3 (Hot Standby) to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).
"This issue places the plant in an unanalyzed condition and thus is reportable under 50.73 (a)(2)(ii).
"The specific valve is 1/2CV-1296 Auxiliary Charging Line Isolation valve. The valve's design function is to open on a differential pressure of 200 psid (with or without instrument air) between the discharge of the charging pumps and the RCS. This line is not utilized during normal operations but is an available charging path to the RCS and utilized during plant shutdown in the event of an Appendix R fire. The valve is an air operated valve that is assumed to have failed close due to a loss of instrument air. It has been found that the valve will not open until a much higher differential pressure is reached. If the RCS is at normal operating pressure (2235 psig), and the actual lift pressure of the valve is greater than 500 psid, charging flow will be unavailable to the RCS. A relief on the discharge of the outlet of the charging pump will lift at 2735 and prevent flow to the RCS. The charging pump maximum discharge pressure is 3000 psig.
"Compensatory actions have been undertaken that establish plantwide fire rounds. Fire rounds will be continued until the condition is corrected or a suitable evaluation is completed that establishes other actions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident.
****RETRACTION 4/19/02 at 1821 from Mike Holzmann to Rich Laura****
"RETRACTION OF EVENT NOTIFICATION #38762
"At 2051 EST on March 12, 2002, ENS Event Notification # 38762 was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for identification of an unanalyzed condition that had the potential to significantly degrade plant safety involving the Appendix R safe shutdown fire analysis. PBNP Unit 1 and 2 valve CV-1296, 'Auxiliary Charging Line Isolation Valve,' are air-operated valves. These valves, one in each unit, are credited with opening at 200 psid to provide a charging system flow path to control RCS inventory and to maintain the plant in Mode 3 (hot standby) during the Appendix R safe shutdown fire with loss of instrument air. The notification was made when we identified that the CV-1296 valves will not open until a much higher differential pressure is reached and; therefore, the flow path through the valve may not be capable of providing the Appendix R function of controlling RCS inventory. At the time of this notification an evaluation of the consequences of this Condition had not been assessed, and the report was made because of the potential for the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"We have subsequently completed an engineering evaluation which identified the differential pressure necessary to permit charging flow through the CV-1296 valve. This evaluation is based on the measured lifting force of the valve stem with zero differential pressure across the valve. We have further determined, based on engineering analysis supported by MAAP4 computer runs, and using a more conservative RCS injection pressure then identified above, that the RCS pressure would drop low enough to permit charging flow into the RCS, before the RCS pressurizer level is lost. We have thus concluded that the condition identified in our event notification would not result in a significant degradation of plant safety. Therefore, this condition is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73, and we are hereby retracting this event notification."
The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. The R3DO (J. Madera) has been notified.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38763
Rep Org: WHEELING PITTSBURG STEEL CORP.
Licensee: WHEELING PITTSBURG STEEL CORP
Region: 2
City: FOLLANSBEE State: WV
County: BROOKE
License #: 47-16875-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA BOOKER
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Licensee: WHEELING PITTSBURG STEEL CORP
Region: 2
City: FOLLANSBEE State: WV
County: BROOKE
License #: 47-16875-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA BOOKER
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 03/13/2002
Notification Time: 13:43 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2002
Notification Time: 13:43 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
MARK LESSER (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
SOURCE SHIELD SHUTTER WOULD NOT CLOSE
A Cs-137, 2 curie source (1978), shield shutter would not close to secure source in the shield on the coke line. Licensee took compensatory measures to secure source by manually closing and blocking the shutter in the closed position. Additionally, a cable and counter-weight have been utilized to maintain the shutter in the secure condition. No personnel exposures were received as a result of this event. The licensee plans to remove the defective unit on 3/15/02 and ship it to a vendor (Texas Nuclear) for repair.
A Cs-137, 2 curie source (1978), shield shutter would not close to secure source in the shield on the coke line. Licensee took compensatory measures to secure source by manually closing and blocking the shutter in the closed position. Additionally, a cable and counter-weight have been utilized to maintain the shutter in the secure condition. No personnel exposures were received as a result of this event. The licensee plans to remove the defective unit on 3/15/02 and ship it to a vendor (Texas Nuclear) for repair.