Event Notification Report for March 08, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/07/2002 - 03/08/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38756
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETER ORPHANOS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETER ORPHANOS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 03/08/2002
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2002
Event Time: 11:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2002
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2002
Event Time: 11:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY OFFSITE SIRENS INOPERABLE
"On March 8, 2002 at 1110 hours it was determined that all 165 of Limerick Generating Station's Emergency Offsite Sirens were inoperable. The sirens were rendered inoperable due to loss of electrical power to the siren controller located at Limerick Generating Station. Power was restored at 1140 hours.
The Emergency Offsite Sirens were tested satisfactorily and are currently operable."
The NRC Resident was notified by the licensee.
"On March 8, 2002 at 1110 hours it was determined that all 165 of Limerick Generating Station's Emergency Offsite Sirens were inoperable. The sirens were rendered inoperable due to loss of electrical power to the siren controller located at Limerick Generating Station. Power was restored at 1140 hours.
The Emergency Offsite Sirens were tested satisfactorily and are currently operable."
The NRC Resident was notified by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38757
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: DALE MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: DALE MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 03/08/2002
Notification Time: 17:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2002
Event Time: 13:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2002
Notification Time: 17:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2002
Event Time: 13:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
PRINCIPLE SAFETY BARRIER IN DEGRADED CONDITION
Background
"On February 27, 2002, a notification (Event number 38732) was made to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a) to report a pressure boundary leakage path found by ultrasonic testing (UT) of a Control Rod Nozzle penetration number 3. The leakage path was found to be through the J -groove weld.
During the initial stages of repair for Control Rod nozzle #3, it was determined that there was apparent material degradation of the reactor vessel head material adjacent to the nozzle penetration. After removal of the nozzle itself, and cleaning of the area, the condition was further investigated by performing ultrasonic thickness measurements of the reactor vessel head material. These measurements showed that the carbon steel material next to the nozzle was degraded as described below."
Event
"Ultrasonic thickness measurements indicate wastage of the carbon steel material adjacent to the nozzle that extends out from the nozzle penetration bored hole approximately 5 inches, at an approximate width of 4 to 5 inches at the widest part. The wastage of material is such that the remaining thickness of the reactor vessel head inner surface is approximately 3/8 inch thick including the reactor vessel cladding material."
This condition is different than originally reported in Event Report 38732. As a result, this is being reported as a new non-emergency, 8-hour report in accordance with I0CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a), a condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded."
The NRC Resident was notified by the licensee.
Notified R3DO (John Madera)
Background
"On February 27, 2002, a notification (Event number 38732) was made to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a) to report a pressure boundary leakage path found by ultrasonic testing (UT) of a Control Rod Nozzle penetration number 3. The leakage path was found to be through the J -groove weld.
During the initial stages of repair for Control Rod nozzle #3, it was determined that there was apparent material degradation of the reactor vessel head material adjacent to the nozzle penetration. After removal of the nozzle itself, and cleaning of the area, the condition was further investigated by performing ultrasonic thickness measurements of the reactor vessel head material. These measurements showed that the carbon steel material next to the nozzle was degraded as described below."
Event
"Ultrasonic thickness measurements indicate wastage of the carbon steel material adjacent to the nozzle that extends out from the nozzle penetration bored hole approximately 5 inches, at an approximate width of 4 to 5 inches at the widest part. The wastage of material is such that the remaining thickness of the reactor vessel head inner surface is approximately 3/8 inch thick including the reactor vessel cladding material."
This condition is different than originally reported in Event Report 38732. As a result, this is being reported as a new non-emergency, 8-hour report in accordance with I0CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a), a condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded."
The NRC Resident was notified by the licensee.
Notified R3DO (John Madera)
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38786
Rep Org: U.S. ARMY
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 2
City: Fort Knox State: KY
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF HAVENNER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 2
City: Fort Knox State: KY
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF HAVENNER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 03/20/2002
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2002
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION EVENT AT FORT KNOX
The licensee reported an unplanned contamination event that occurred on March 8, 2002 in a Storage Room at Fort Knox Army Base located in Kentucky. Two army tank muzzle reference sensors were removed from tanks and wrapped in plastic bags. The bags were stored in a Storage Room on the base. Contamination levels were found to be 8000 DPM to 118,000 DPM. Radiological surveys were performed on the ventilation system which was found to be clean. Subsequently, the two damaged sensors were properly bagged and the two individuals involved received bioassay tests. The results from the bio assay test were not yet available.
The licensee reported an unplanned contamination event that occurred on March 8, 2002 in a Storage Room at Fort Knox Army Base located in Kentucky. Two army tank muzzle reference sensors were removed from tanks and wrapped in plastic bags. The bags were stored in a Storage Room on the base. Contamination levels were found to be 8000 DPM to 118,000 DPM. Radiological surveys were performed on the ventilation system which was found to be clean. Subsequently, the two damaged sensors were properly bagged and the two individuals involved received bioassay tests. The results from the bio assay test were not yet available.