Event Notification Report for February 27, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/26/2002 - 02/27/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
3873438735387293873038732
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38734
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT FRANSSEN
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT FRANSSEN
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 02/28/2002
Notification Time: 10:48 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2002
Event Time: 16:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2002
Notification Time: 10:48 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2002
Event Time: 16:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JAMES LINVILLE (R1)
JAMES LINVILLE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
"On 02/27/02 at approximately 1630, confirmed results from an unannounced follow-up Fitness for Duty (FFD) test of a non-licensed supervisory individual, who performs duties with in the scope of 10CFR26, indicated positive for controlled substances." The individual's site access has been suspended and the licensee is conducting a review of the individual's recent work. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
"On 02/27/02 at approximately 1630, confirmed results from an unannounced follow-up Fitness for Duty (FFD) test of a non-licensed supervisory individual, who performs duties with in the scope of 10CFR26, indicated positive for controlled substances." The individual's site access has been suspended and the licensee is conducting a review of the individual's recent work. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38735
Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: McWANE CAST IRON PIPE
Region: 2
City: BIRMINGHAM State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES L. McNEES
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Licensee: McWANE CAST IRON PIPE
Region: 2
City: BIRMINGHAM State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES L. McNEES
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 02/28/2002
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2002
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2002
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2002
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING DAMAGE TO A FIXED GAUGE
"On the afternoon of February 27, 2002, the Alabama Office of Radiation Control was advised by McWane Cast Iron Pipe of Birmingham, Alabama, Alabama License No. 507 that at approximately 10:00 am that morning that a recently installed Ohmart Vega Model SHLG device containing 4.5 Ci of Cs-137, had been exposed to excessive heat causing part of the device's internal lead shielding to melt. A consultant, Don Hamner, Alabama License No. 695 was contacted by McWane. Mr. Hamner surveyed the device and wiped the device finding no removable contamination and reading of 0.8 mR/hr on the top, 2.0 mR/hr on the front, and 30 mR/hr on the bottom, confirming that the shielding had been compromised on the bottom. The maximum level at one foot from the device was 5 mR/hr. No one was overexposed or injured.
"This device was installed on 2/15/02 to replace the device that was damaged by heat two weeks earlier 2/13/02. See Alabama Incident 02-09 and NRC PNO-ll-02-007.
"The State of Alabama has advised McWane Cast Iron Pipe not to place another radioactive gauge of this type in this same location until a method to prevent future overheating at the location or a device designed to withstand the heat has been agreed to by the state.
"Alabama is conducting an on site investigation today. Additional details will be available Friday afternoon 3/1/02 or Monday morning 3/4/02."
HOO note: Refer to event number 38699
"On the afternoon of February 27, 2002, the Alabama Office of Radiation Control was advised by McWane Cast Iron Pipe of Birmingham, Alabama, Alabama License No. 507 that at approximately 10:00 am that morning that a recently installed Ohmart Vega Model SHLG device containing 4.5 Ci of Cs-137, had been exposed to excessive heat causing part of the device's internal lead shielding to melt. A consultant, Don Hamner, Alabama License No. 695 was contacted by McWane. Mr. Hamner surveyed the device and wiped the device finding no removable contamination and reading of 0.8 mR/hr on the top, 2.0 mR/hr on the front, and 30 mR/hr on the bottom, confirming that the shielding had been compromised on the bottom. The maximum level at one foot from the device was 5 mR/hr. No one was overexposed or injured.
"This device was installed on 2/15/02 to replace the device that was damaged by heat two weeks earlier 2/13/02. See Alabama Incident 02-09 and NRC PNO-ll-02-007.
"The State of Alabama has advised McWane Cast Iron Pipe not to place another radioactive gauge of this type in this same location until a method to prevent future overheating at the location or a device designed to withstand the heat has been agreed to by the state.
"Alabama is conducting an on site investigation today. Additional details will be available Friday afternoon 3/1/02 or Monday morning 3/4/02."
HOO note: Refer to event number 38699
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38729
Rep Org: UNIV OF MICHIGAN
Licensee: UNIV OF MICHIGAN
Region: 3
City: ANN ARBOR State: MI
County: WASHTENAW
License #: 21-00215-04
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK DRISCOLL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: UNIV OF MICHIGAN
Region: 3
City: ANN ARBOR State: MI
County: WASHTENAW
License #: 21-00215-04
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK DRISCOLL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 02/27/2002
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2002
Event Time: 08:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2002
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2002
Event Time: 08:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
ALEXANDER ADAMS/PM (NRR)
DON COOL (NMSS)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (IRO)
IMOB Office via fax (NMSS)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
ALEXANDER ADAMS/PM (NRR)
DON COOL (NMSS)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (IRO)
IMOB Office via fax (NMSS)
10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING FAILURE OF A J.L. SHEPHERD & ASSOCIATES, MARK-1, MODEL-25, IRRADIATOR, DOOR INTERLOCK
During the performance of a pre-operations inspection, an operator discovered that an irradiator door interlock could be defeated and that the door could be raised and expose the source. The irradiator involved is a J.L. Shepherd & Associates, Mark 1, Model 25, irradiator which contains 780 curies of cesium-137, and it is used for irradiating biological specimens.
The university has been contacted. The licensee notified the NRC Region 3 office (Darryl Weideman), and the licensee plans to notify the vendor.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)
* * * RETRACTED AT 1530 EST ON 2/28/02 BY MARK DRISCOLL TO GERALD WAIG * * *
After discussion with NRC Region 3 (George Parker) MSU Rad Safety Officer (Mark Driscoll) called to retract the event as it should not have been reported under 10CFR21. Mr. Driscoll stated that the event will be reported to NRC Region 3 under Paragraph 5 of a NRC Order dated July 3, 1984.
Notified R3DO (Lipa) and NMSS (Hickey).
During the performance of a pre-operations inspection, an operator discovered that an irradiator door interlock could be defeated and that the door could be raised and expose the source. The irradiator involved is a J.L. Shepherd & Associates, Mark 1, Model 25, irradiator which contains 780 curies of cesium-137, and it is used for irradiating biological specimens.
The university has been contacted. The licensee notified the NRC Region 3 office (Darryl Weideman), and the licensee plans to notify the vendor.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)
* * * RETRACTED AT 1530 EST ON 2/28/02 BY MARK DRISCOLL TO GERALD WAIG * * *
After discussion with NRC Region 3 (George Parker) MSU Rad Safety Officer (Mark Driscoll) called to retract the event as it should not have been reported under 10CFR21. Mr. Driscoll stated that the event will be reported to NRC Region 3 under Paragraph 5 of a NRC Order dated July 3, 1984.
Notified R3DO (Lipa) and NMSS (Hickey).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38730
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DOUG KNUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DOUG KNUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 02/27/2002
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2002
Event Time: 10:43 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2002
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2002
Event Time: 10:43 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
TOM KOSHY (NRR)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (IRO)
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
TOM KOSHY (NRR)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ON UNIT 3 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF SWITCHYARD MAINTENANCE
Prior to this transient, the 220-kV, switchyard, section-B, west bus was de-energized to facilitate the performance of maintenance activities. During the performance of local breaker failure backup testing on the switchyard, section-B, west bus; the switchyard section-B east bus tripped at 1043 PST resulting in a loss of offsite power on Unit 3. The loss of offsite power in turn caused a turbine trip/reactor trip signal to be generated. All rods fully inserted. An emergency feedwater actuation signal (EFAS) initiated as expected on steam generator shrinkage, and a containment cooling actuation signal (CCAS) was manually initiated. The loss of offsite power also resulted in a loss of all non-1E power. The reactor coolant pumps remained running because their power supply automatically transferred to Unit 2, and the Unit 3, 1E, 4-kV buses remained energized from Unit 2. The emergency diesel generators automatically started but did not load due to the automatic power supply transfers to Unit 2. Preliminary indications revealed that the primary safety valves remained closed. The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required and that there was no impact on Unit 2.
Unit 3 is currently stable in Hot Standby with emergency feedwater supplying water to the steam generators and secondary steam being dumped to atmosphere via the atmospheric dump valves (due to a loss of condenser vacuum). The licensee reported that there was no steam generator tube leakage. Containment parameters remain normal.
The Unit 3 east and west switchyard buses have been re-energized, and all non-1E power was restored to the 4-kV buses at 1120 PST. The emergency diesel generators have been secured. The licensee currently plans to perform secondary equipment inspections, and the event evaluation is ongoing.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and may make a press release.
Prior to this transient, the 220-kV, switchyard, section-B, west bus was de-energized to facilitate the performance of maintenance activities. During the performance of local breaker failure backup testing on the switchyard, section-B, west bus; the switchyard section-B east bus tripped at 1043 PST resulting in a loss of offsite power on Unit 3. The loss of offsite power in turn caused a turbine trip/reactor trip signal to be generated. All rods fully inserted. An emergency feedwater actuation signal (EFAS) initiated as expected on steam generator shrinkage, and a containment cooling actuation signal (CCAS) was manually initiated. The loss of offsite power also resulted in a loss of all non-1E power. The reactor coolant pumps remained running because their power supply automatically transferred to Unit 2, and the Unit 3, 1E, 4-kV buses remained energized from Unit 2. The emergency diesel generators automatically started but did not load due to the automatic power supply transfers to Unit 2. Preliminary indications revealed that the primary safety valves remained closed. The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required and that there was no impact on Unit 2.
Unit 3 is currently stable in Hot Standby with emergency feedwater supplying water to the steam generators and secondary steam being dumped to atmosphere via the atmospheric dump valves (due to a loss of condenser vacuum). The licensee reported that there was no steam generator tube leakage. Containment parameters remain normal.
The Unit 3 east and west switchyard buses have been re-energized, and all non-1E power was restored to the 4-kV buses at 1120 PST. The emergency diesel generators have been secured. The licensee currently plans to perform secondary equipment inspections, and the event evaluation is ongoing.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and may make a press release.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38732
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: DALE MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: DALE MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 02/27/2002
Notification Time: 15:42 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2002
Event Time: 13:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2002
Notification Time: 15:42 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2002
Event Time: 13:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
TOM KOSHY (NRR)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (IRO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
TOM KOSHY (NRR)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
IDENTIFICATION OF AXIAL THROUGH-WELD INDICATIONS (REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE) ON ONE CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM NOZZLE
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On February 26, 2002, following shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station performed a qualified visual examination of the Reactor Vessel head per NRC Bulletin 2001-01. This examination revealed evidence of boric acid build up around Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzles but was inconclusive due to the previous known boric acid deposits. At approximately 1330 hours on February 27, 2002, Ultrasonic Testing (UT) data identified axial through weld indications on one CRDM. Engineering evaluation of this data confirmed Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary leakage exists. Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.a states that Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to no pressure boundary leakage. As a result this is being reported as a non-emergency, 8-hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a), a condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded."
The licensee stated that UT inspections are continuing on other nozzles.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 1921 EST ON 3/5/02 BY TERRY PLOEGER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"All inspections have been completed at this time. UT data for CRDM nozzles 1 and 2 (locations H-8 and G-7, respectively) has been evaluated to exhibit axial indications that represent pressure boundary leakage. This completes evaluation of the extent of the condition for the report communicated on February 27."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (John Madera), NRR EO (David Matthews), and IRO (Tim McGinty) have been informed.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/9/02 @ 1258 BY WOLF TO GOULD * * *
Clarification to Event Number 38732:
The Control Rod Drive Mechanism nozzle reported on February 27, 2002, as having pressure boundary leakage due to an axial through-weld indication was CRDM nozzle 3 (location G-9). The completed inspections revealed a total of 3 nozzles that exhibited axial indications that represent pressure boundary leakage - nozzles 1, 2, and 3.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
Notified RDO(Madera), EO(Matthews) and IRO(Wessman)
* * * HOO NOTE - SEE EN# 328757 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION * * *
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On February 26, 2002, following shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station performed a qualified visual examination of the Reactor Vessel head per NRC Bulletin 2001-01. This examination revealed evidence of boric acid build up around Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzles but was inconclusive due to the previous known boric acid deposits. At approximately 1330 hours on February 27, 2002, Ultrasonic Testing (UT) data identified axial through weld indications on one CRDM. Engineering evaluation of this data confirmed Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary leakage exists. Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.a states that Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to no pressure boundary leakage. As a result this is being reported as a non-emergency, 8-hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a), a condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded."
The licensee stated that UT inspections are continuing on other nozzles.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 1921 EST ON 3/5/02 BY TERRY PLOEGER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"All inspections have been completed at this time. UT data for CRDM nozzles 1 and 2 (locations H-8 and G-7, respectively) has been evaluated to exhibit axial indications that represent pressure boundary leakage. This completes evaluation of the extent of the condition for the report communicated on February 27."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (John Madera), NRR EO (David Matthews), and IRO (Tim McGinty) have been informed.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/9/02 @ 1258 BY WOLF TO GOULD * * *
Clarification to Event Number 38732:
The Control Rod Drive Mechanism nozzle reported on February 27, 2002, as having pressure boundary leakage due to an axial through-weld indication was CRDM nozzle 3 (location G-9). The completed inspections revealed a total of 3 nozzles that exhibited axial indications that represent pressure boundary leakage - nozzles 1, 2, and 3.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
Notified RDO(Madera), EO(Matthews) and IRO(Wessman)
* * * HOO NOTE - SEE EN# 328757 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION * * *