Event Notification Report for February 25, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/24/2002 - 02/25/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
38722387233872438725
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38722
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STONE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STONE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 02/25/2002
Notification Time: 04:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2002
Event Time: 04:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2002
Notification Time: 04:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2002
Event Time: 04:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
LEONARD WERT (R2)
LEONARD WERT (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) OUT OF SERVICE
The SPDS was removed from service for the purpose of implementing a modification to replace the system. The primary means of monitoring the critical parameters remains available to the operating crew and they will continue to be able to perform the necessary actions regarding emergency assessment.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
* * * UPDATE 0942EST ON 3/8/02 FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is updating this report to include the following information:
"This report is being made to communicate the repair and return to service of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). All systems have been verified to be operating properly. This system was reported Out of Service on NRC event # 38722 on 02-25-2002."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Henson).
The SPDS was removed from service for the purpose of implementing a modification to replace the system. The primary means of monitoring the critical parameters remains available to the operating crew and they will continue to be able to perform the necessary actions regarding emergency assessment.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
* * * UPDATE 0942EST ON 3/8/02 FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is updating this report to include the following information:
"This report is being made to communicate the repair and return to service of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). All systems have been verified to be operating properly. This system was reported Out of Service on NRC event # 38722 on 02-25-2002."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Henson).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38723
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BOESCH
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BOESCH
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 02/25/2002
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2002
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2002
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2002
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES LINVILLE (R1)
JAMES LINVILLE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 81 | Power Operation | 81 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TEMPERATURES IN RELAY AND SWITCHGEAR ROOMS DUE TO CONTROL STRUCTURE HVAC SYSTEM INOPERABILITY
The following is a portion of the facsimile from the Licensee:
"During review of the station deficiency report the following reportable condition was identified [at approximately 1400]. At 1855 on 2/22/02 while placing the 'B' Control Structure Chiller handswitch from "auto" to "start", the chiller tripped due to a trip of the Ventilation Supply Fan breaker. The breaker was able to be reset and the Chiller was restored after 6 minutes. The 'A' Control Structure Chiller was already inoperable with post maintenance testing in progress. With the loss of Control Structure HVAC System the ability to maintain temperatures in various spaces including Relay rooms and Emergency Switchgear rooms was lost. The failure requires an 8 hr ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)."
The Resident Inspector was notified.
The following is a portion of the facsimile from the Licensee:
"During review of the station deficiency report the following reportable condition was identified [at approximately 1400]. At 1855 on 2/22/02 while placing the 'B' Control Structure Chiller handswitch from "auto" to "start", the chiller tripped due to a trip of the Ventilation Supply Fan breaker. The breaker was able to be reset and the Chiller was restored after 6 minutes. The 'A' Control Structure Chiller was already inoperable with post maintenance testing in progress. With the loss of Control Structure HVAC System the ability to maintain temperatures in various spaces including Relay rooms and Emergency Switchgear rooms was lost. The failure requires an 8 hr ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)."
The Resident Inspector was notified.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38724
Rep Org: VA NATIONAL HP PROGRAM
Licensee: VETERANS ADMIN MEDICAL CTR
Region: 2
City: BIRMINGHAM State: AL
County: JEFFERSON
License #: 01-00643-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Licensee: VETERANS ADMIN MEDICAL CTR
Region: 2
City: BIRMINGHAM State: AL
County: JEFFERSON
License #: 01-00643-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 02/25/2002
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2002
Event Time: 14:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2002
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2002
Event Time: 14:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
LEONARD WERT (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
TIM MCGINTY (IRO)
LEONARD WERT (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
TIM MCGINTY (IRO)
RECEIPT OF A PACKAGE WITH A CONTAMINATED LABEL
A thallium 201 transport container (metal "ammo" box) was found to be contaminated with Technetium-99m upon arrival at the VA Medical Center in Birmingham, AL from a vendor in Birmingham, AL. The removable contamination was 969 DPM/cm² (limit =222 DPM/cm²) and identified as coming from a magnetic sticker affixed to the box. The vendor, a commercial radiopharmacy, was notified, and the licensee planned to notify the State of Alabama. The licensee indicated that a similar event occurred at this hospital about 2 years ago.
A thallium 201 transport container (metal "ammo" box) was found to be contaminated with Technetium-99m upon arrival at the VA Medical Center in Birmingham, AL from a vendor in Birmingham, AL. The removable contamination was 969 DPM/cm² (limit =222 DPM/cm²) and identified as coming from a magnetic sticker affixed to the box. The vendor, a commercial radiopharmacy, was notified, and the licensee planned to notify the State of Alabama. The licensee indicated that a similar event occurred at this hospital about 2 years ago.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38725
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM E. WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM E. WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 02/25/2002
Notification Time: 23:30 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2002
Event Time: 15:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2002
Notification Time: 23:30 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2002
Event Time: 15:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-Hour Report)
"At 1530 [CDT], on 02-25-32, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the adjacent system post-removal NDA or visual inspection was not performed as required by GEN-10 for the accumulator in C-310. The post-removal NDA for the adjacent system is required to be performed within 24 hours of the equipment being removed. The post-removal NDA measurement is used to independently verify the mass of any potential adjacent system deposit is less than an always-safe mass and can be characterized as Uncomplicated Handling (UH), The pre-removal NDA indicated a UH deposit in the adjacent system."
"The post-removal NDA measurement was subsequently performed which confirmed the adjacent system to be UH."
"In summary, actions required by the NCSA were not completed within the time frame specified."
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-02-1040; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2002-009, Event Worksheet [38725]."
"Responsible Division: Operations"
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:"
"Double contingency was not maintained because the independent verification of mass In the adjacent system was not performed within 24 hours of equipment removal. The control relied upon for independent verification of less than an always-safe mass was violated. However, a second independent post-removal NDA result confirmed an always-safe mass."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:"
"In order for a criticality to be possible, the pre-removal NDA would have to be in error and a uranium deposit would have to exceed the always-safe mass of approximately 30 pounds at 5.5 wt. %235 U. The deposit within the adjacent system would then need to become moderated through wet air in-leakage or introduction of moderator from a sprinkler activation, RCW leak, etc."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.:"
"The controlled parameter is mass."
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):"
"The adjacent equipment post-removal NDA indicated <15 pounds of U with an assay of 5.27% with <325 grams of U235."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:"
"Double contingency for the adjacent system of the equipment removed relies on the control of mass by two independent verifications. The mass process condition is controlled by two independent verification of an always-safe mass using NDA or visual inspections."
"The first leg of double contingency is established by the requirement to perform a pre-removal NDA measurement to ensure the adjacent system contains lass than an always-safe mass prior to making the first cut. The pre-removal NDA was performed and showed less than an always-safe mass. This control was maintained."
"The second leg of double contingency is established by the independent verification of less than an always-safe mass by a post-removal NDA measurement or visual inspection performed on the adjacent system within 24 hours of equipment removal. The post-removal NDA or visual inspection was not performed within the required time frame. Therefore, neither the control nor the process condition was maintained."
"The post-removal NDA measurement or visual inspection on the adjacent system was not performed within the required 24-hour time limit. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:"
"Post-removal NDA has been completed with the results indicating the adjacent piping is Uncomplicated Handling (UH)."
"At 1530 [CDT], on 02-25-32, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the adjacent system post-removal NDA or visual inspection was not performed as required by GEN-10 for the accumulator in C-310. The post-removal NDA for the adjacent system is required to be performed within 24 hours of the equipment being removed. The post-removal NDA measurement is used to independently verify the mass of any potential adjacent system deposit is less than an always-safe mass and can be characterized as Uncomplicated Handling (UH), The pre-removal NDA indicated a UH deposit in the adjacent system."
"The post-removal NDA measurement was subsequently performed which confirmed the adjacent system to be UH."
"In summary, actions required by the NCSA were not completed within the time frame specified."
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-02-1040; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2002-009, Event Worksheet [38725]."
"Responsible Division: Operations"
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:"
"Double contingency was not maintained because the independent verification of mass In the adjacent system was not performed within 24 hours of equipment removal. The control relied upon for independent verification of less than an always-safe mass was violated. However, a second independent post-removal NDA result confirmed an always-safe mass."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:"
"In order for a criticality to be possible, the pre-removal NDA would have to be in error and a uranium deposit would have to exceed the always-safe mass of approximately 30 pounds at 5.5 wt. %235 U. The deposit within the adjacent system would then need to become moderated through wet air in-leakage or introduction of moderator from a sprinkler activation, RCW leak, etc."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.:"
"The controlled parameter is mass."
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):"
"The adjacent equipment post-removal NDA indicated <15 pounds of U with an assay of 5.27% with <325 grams of U235."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:"
"Double contingency for the adjacent system of the equipment removed relies on the control of mass by two independent verifications. The mass process condition is controlled by two independent verification of an always-safe mass using NDA or visual inspections."
"The first leg of double contingency is established by the requirement to perform a pre-removal NDA measurement to ensure the adjacent system contains lass than an always-safe mass prior to making the first cut. The pre-removal NDA was performed and showed less than an always-safe mass. This control was maintained."
"The second leg of double contingency is established by the independent verification of less than an always-safe mass by a post-removal NDA measurement or visual inspection performed on the adjacent system within 24 hours of equipment removal. The post-removal NDA or visual inspection was not performed within the required time frame. Therefore, neither the control nor the process condition was maintained."
"The post-removal NDA measurement or visual inspection on the adjacent system was not performed within the required 24-hour time limit. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:"
"Post-removal NDA has been completed with the results indicating the adjacent piping is Uncomplicated Handling (UH)."