Event Notification Report for February 18, 2002

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO OTHER FEDERAL AGENCY

A member of the licensee's staff received an e-mail from a former contractor requesting a meeting with senior Energy representatives.. The licensee notified the local FBI office. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNIT COMMENCED TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN AFTER DECLARING TWO MSIVs INOPERABLE

"Plant entered Tech spec 3.0.3 at 2020 on 2/18/2002. Two Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) were determined to have operating air pressures outside the required 70 - 80 psig operating range, which rendered the valves inoperable per Tech Spec 3.7.1.5, Main steam line isolation valves. At 2055 commenced power reduction per Tech Spec 3.0.3. At 2102 one of the MSIV valve operating pressures was restored to operable. Terminated power reduction at 99.5% and exited Tech Spec 3.0.3. Tech Spec 3.7.1.5 was still applicable. At 2129 the remaining MSIV operating pressure was restored to the normal tech spec required pressure, exited Tech Spec 3.7.1 .5.

"(An operator making a plant tour found XVM02801C-MS at 82 psig and XVM02801A-MS at 95 psig.)"

Partial MSIV stroke time testing was performed earlier today with MSIV operating pressure verified in the 70-80 psig range. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INADVERTENTLY MADE INOPERABLE

"On 02/18/02, at 1815 hours, the licensee discovered that the Beaver Valley Unit 2 #1 Emergency Diesel Generator had been rendered inoperable inadvertently, by the posting of a clearance at 1408 hours on 2/14/02. The #2 Emergency Diesel Generator had previously been removed from service for maintenance activities. Upon discovery that the #1 Emergency Diesel Generator was inoperable, action was immediately initiated to restore the #1 Emergency Diesel Generator to Operable status. These actions were completed and the #1 Emergency Diesel Generator was restored to Operable status at 1830 hrs on 02/18/02.

"The #1 Diesel Generator was rendered inoperable at 1406 hrs on 02/14/02. During the period of inoperability, the licensee conducted core alterations including core reload during the ongoing ninth refueling outage. During the affected period, there were no challenges to the offsite power sources, and core cooling was maintained. Investigation into this event is ongoing.

"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(v)(A) and 10CFR50.72(v)(B) as a loss of Safe Shutdown Capability, and RHR Capability, respectively. There were no radiological releases associated with this event,"

The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION 1314 4/12/2002 FROM TOM COTTER TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *

"Subsequent review and analysis of the event identified that the Unit 2 #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) retained its capability to fulfil its safety function. During the time that the potential transformer fuses were inadvertently removed from the Unit 2 #1 EDG, the EDG would still have started and accelerated to proper speed and output voltage if a station loss of offsite power had occurred. However, the output breaker would not have automatically closed and the EDG would not have automatically supplied emergency AC power to the Unit 2 A train emergency bus. Control room indications, powered by station DC sources, would have confirmed that the EDG was running at rated speed. Following station procedures, operations personnel would have attempted to locally close the A train EDG output breaker. The EDG output breaker would have closed, the EDG sequencer would have then have been automatically energized, and the required emergency loads would have been automatically sequenced on to the A train emergency bus. It is conservatively estimated that this action would have been completed within approximately 20-30 minutes. Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps are not automatically loaded onto an emergency bus for any postulated station loss of offsite power and would have to be manually loaded onto an emergency bus after a EDG is started. The estimated time frame to close the EDG output breaker and to load the RHR pump onto the EDG in this condition for a postulated loss of offsite power showed no significant adverse Unit results. Therefore, the EDG retained its capability to fulfill its safety function.

"This event will be reported as a Licensee Event Report pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)."