Event Notification Report for January 30, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/29/2002 - 01/30/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
38661386623866338659
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38661
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SENA
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SENA
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/30/2002
Notification Time: 13:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2002
Event Time: 10:54 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2002
Notification Time: 13:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2002
Event Time: 10:54 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANT MADE AN OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF AN OIL SPILL
On 1/30/02, at 1054, the Beaver Valley Control Room received notification of a fuel oil spill from a tractor trailer truck outside the owner controlled protected area, at the basin of the Unit 2 cooling tower. At 1056, the control room staff entered abnormal operating procedure 1/2AOP-75.6, "Oil Spill Response." Assessment by the Beaver Valley response personnel determined that the fuel oil side saddle tank of the tractor trailer had ruptured. Approximately 100 gallons of diesel fuel oil was released down a storm sewer. An unknown quantity of oil entered the Ohio River. The remaining oil is being contained and removed from the "Peggs Run" area. Offsite notifications have been made to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, and downstream Public Water Authorities. Weavertown Environmental Services has been contacted and is assisting in clean-up activities.
The NRC resident has been notified.
On 1/30/02, at 1054, the Beaver Valley Control Room received notification of a fuel oil spill from a tractor trailer truck outside the owner controlled protected area, at the basin of the Unit 2 cooling tower. At 1056, the control room staff entered abnormal operating procedure 1/2AOP-75.6, "Oil Spill Response." Assessment by the Beaver Valley response personnel determined that the fuel oil side saddle tank of the tractor trailer had ruptured. Approximately 100 gallons of diesel fuel oil was released down a storm sewer. An unknown quantity of oil entered the Ohio River. The remaining oil is being contained and removed from the "Peggs Run" area. Offsite notifications have been made to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, and downstream Public Water Authorities. Weavertown Environmental Services has been contacted and is assisting in clean-up activities.
The NRC resident has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38662
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: FREEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: FREEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/30/2002
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2002
Event Time: 12:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2002
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2002
Event Time: 12:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
TIM MCGINTY (IRO)
BENNETT (DOT)
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
TIM MCGINTY (IRO)
BENNETT (DOT)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO STATE POLICE OF ACCIDENT INVOLVING A RADIOACTIVE SHIPMENT.
At 12:30 on 1/30/02, the NC State Police Department was notified that a radioactive shipment (OC-9004-02) was involved in an accident. The shipment enroute from Oyster Creek to Oak, Ridge TN for disposal, was involved in a vehicular accident in North Carolina on Route 40. The shipment was an empty office trailer which contained some fixed contamination on the inside. The trailer struck a bridge on Route 40 at approximate mile marker 116. The roof of the trailer peeled back about 15' to 30'. There was no spread of contamination and the trailer was taken to the side of the road. Additional vehicles have been dispatched for assistance. The trailer will be torn down a bit, covered with tarps and the continue to TN.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
At 12:30 on 1/30/02, the NC State Police Department was notified that a radioactive shipment (OC-9004-02) was involved in an accident. The shipment enroute from Oyster Creek to Oak, Ridge TN for disposal, was involved in a vehicular accident in North Carolina on Route 40. The shipment was an empty office trailer which contained some fixed contamination on the inside. The trailer struck a bridge on Route 40 at approximate mile marker 116. The roof of the trailer peeled back about 15' to 30'. There was no spread of contamination and the trailer was taken to the side of the road. Additional vehicles have been dispatched for assistance. The trailer will be torn down a bit, covered with tarps and the continue to TN.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38663
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: M. C. PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: M. C. PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/31/2002
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2002
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2002
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2002
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
LEGACY ISSUE
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
"AT 1313 CST, on 1-30-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of uncharacterized legacy process equipment which was not stored in accordance with an approved Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA). The mass of fissile material was less than a safe mass and at an assay of less than 2.0 Wt. %. This is in violation of the NCS program requirements of SAR, Section 5.2 which requires fissile material operations to be controlled by approved NCSA's.
"The PSS determined that this event is a 24 Hour Event Report due to the failure to maintain double contingency controls.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"This material is in a stable condition and double contingency has been established using approved procedures. Once the material was characterized, it was determined that proper spacing had been maintained.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"In order for criticality to be possible more than a critical mass would need to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry. The storage containers are safe by geometry and the fissile material is less than a safe mass. Therefore, it is not possible for this barrier material to result in a criticality accident.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"Mass
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
"Less than 10 pounds at an enrichment of less than 2.0 Wt. %
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"Since no NCS controls were applied to the material, double contingency cannot be demonstrated.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The material is controlled in accordance with procedure CP-2-TS-TS2030. The material has been characterized."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 1845EST ON 2/21/02 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information is provided as an update:
"After discovery, further characterization of the material was performed. Independent assay smears and direct surveys by health physics personnel confirmed that several pieces of the material were <1% assay and not fissile. The remaining material was weighed, on a NMC&A balance, and found to have a total mass of <15 grams U-235. Therefore, this material stored in this room of C-710 does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Further analysis revealed this material does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation; therefore, no further actions are required.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): Further analysis revealed that less than 15 grams of total mass of U-235 were involved.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Further analysis revealed this material does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Further analysis revealed this material does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation; therefore, no further actions are required."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. Notified R3DO(Jorgensen) and NMSS(Brach).
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
"AT 1313 CST, on 1-30-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of uncharacterized legacy process equipment which was not stored in accordance with an approved Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA). The mass of fissile material was less than a safe mass and at an assay of less than 2.0 Wt. %. This is in violation of the NCS program requirements of SAR, Section 5.2 which requires fissile material operations to be controlled by approved NCSA's.
"The PSS determined that this event is a 24 Hour Event Report due to the failure to maintain double contingency controls.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"This material is in a stable condition and double contingency has been established using approved procedures. Once the material was characterized, it was determined that proper spacing had been maintained.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"In order for criticality to be possible more than a critical mass would need to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry. The storage containers are safe by geometry and the fissile material is less than a safe mass. Therefore, it is not possible for this barrier material to result in a criticality accident.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"Mass
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
"Less than 10 pounds at an enrichment of less than 2.0 Wt. %
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"Since no NCS controls were applied to the material, double contingency cannot be demonstrated.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The material is controlled in accordance with procedure CP-2-TS-TS2030. The material has been characterized."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 1845EST ON 2/21/02 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information is provided as an update:
"After discovery, further characterization of the material was performed. Independent assay smears and direct surveys by health physics personnel confirmed that several pieces of the material were <1% assay and not fissile. The remaining material was weighed, on a NMC&A balance, and found to have a total mass of <15 grams U-235. Therefore, this material stored in this room of C-710 does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Further analysis revealed this material does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation; therefore, no further actions are required.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): Further analysis revealed that less than 15 grams of total mass of U-235 were involved.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Further analysis revealed this material does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Further analysis revealed this material does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation; therefore, no further actions are required."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. Notified R3DO(Jorgensen) and NMSS(Brach).
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38659
Rep Org: EARTH ENGINEERING
Licensee: EARTH ENGINEERING
Region: 1
City: PHILADEPHIA State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EUGENE SZYMANSKY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: EARTH ENGINEERING
Region: 1
City: PHILADEPHIA State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EUGENE SZYMANSKY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 01/30/2002
Notification Time: 07:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2002
Notification Time: 07:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
STOLEN TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE
A Troxler density gauge was stolen from the technician's car. A report has been made to the Philadelphia Police Department. More information to follow from the company.
A Troxler density gauge was stolen from the technician's car. A report has been made to the Philadelphia Police Department. More information to follow from the company.