Event Notification Report for January 27, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/26/2002 - 01/27/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
38656
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38656
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/28/2002
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/27/2002
Event Time: 21:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2002
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/27/2002
Event Time: 21:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
SON NINH (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
SON NINH (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE
Reason for Notification
At the time of the event, the Team Leader of the Burnable Absorber Expansion System called the cognizant Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer to inform him that 113.5 kg of uranium oxide powder had spilled from process equipment into the granulator hood.
Summary of Process
Dry UO2 powder blended with U3O6 and erbium oxide is processed in a favorable geometry, gravity fed, vertical pipe from a roll compactor down to a granulator. Inside a hood, the granulator feeds down through a flexible tube into a polypak.
As Found Condition
A summary of the as found conditions is as follows:
It had been determined that the granulator screen needed to be replaced, and operations were stopped.
When the granulator screen was removed, material in the vertical pipe spilled down onto the bottom of the hood, remaining contained within the hood.
The spill was immediately placed into polypaks and telephone notification was made to Nuclear Criticality Safety.
Double Contingency Protection
Double contingency protection for this situation, which is classified as a spill, is based on control of mass and moderation, and assumes a hemispherical configuration. The mass limit is 50.3 kgU or 57.1 kg UO2; the moderator limit is 32.1 liters of water. It was determined that double contingency protection was lost because the amount of material spilled exceeded the mass limit.
Moderation controls remained intact. Double contingency protection was restored in approximately 30 minutes. Therefore the incident requires notification in accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5), in which greater than safe mass is involved, but controls are restored within four hours.
Summary of Activity
Nuclear Criticality Safety gave permission to resume operations because double contingency protection had been restored.
On January 28, 2002, written instructions were issued to erbia operations personnel and training conducted reinforcing that before removal of the screen from the granulator, the material in the vertical process pipe is to be processed into polypaks.
Long term corrective actions to prevent the possibility of recurrence will be evaluated as part of apparent cause analysis.
Conclusions
Loss of double contingency protection did occur, but was restored within approximately 30 minutes.
At no time was criticality possible because there was no moderator present.
At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
It has been determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. An apparent cause analysis will be performed.
Reason for Notification
At the time of the event, the Team Leader of the Burnable Absorber Expansion System called the cognizant Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer to inform him that 113.5 kg of uranium oxide powder had spilled from process equipment into the granulator hood.
Summary of Process
Dry UO2 powder blended with U3O6 and erbium oxide is processed in a favorable geometry, gravity fed, vertical pipe from a roll compactor down to a granulator. Inside a hood, the granulator feeds down through a flexible tube into a polypak.
As Found Condition
A summary of the as found conditions is as follows:
It had been determined that the granulator screen needed to be replaced, and operations were stopped.
When the granulator screen was removed, material in the vertical pipe spilled down onto the bottom of the hood, remaining contained within the hood.
The spill was immediately placed into polypaks and telephone notification was made to Nuclear Criticality Safety.
Double Contingency Protection
Double contingency protection for this situation, which is classified as a spill, is based on control of mass and moderation, and assumes a hemispherical configuration. The mass limit is 50.3 kgU or 57.1 kg UO2; the moderator limit is 32.1 liters of water. It was determined that double contingency protection was lost because the amount of material spilled exceeded the mass limit.
Moderation controls remained intact. Double contingency protection was restored in approximately 30 minutes. Therefore the incident requires notification in accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5), in which greater than safe mass is involved, but controls are restored within four hours.
Summary of Activity
Nuclear Criticality Safety gave permission to resume operations because double contingency protection had been restored.
On January 28, 2002, written instructions were issued to erbia operations personnel and training conducted reinforcing that before removal of the screen from the granulator, the material in the vertical process pipe is to be processed into polypaks.
Long term corrective actions to prevent the possibility of recurrence will be evaluated as part of apparent cause analysis.
Conclusions
Loss of double contingency protection did occur, but was restored within approximately 30 minutes.
At no time was criticality possible because there was no moderator present.
At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
It has been determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. An apparent cause analysis will be performed.