Event Notification Report for January 06, 2002

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE

At 1347 on 1/4/2002, the "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) was declared inoperable due to tube degradation identified in the lube oil, intercooler and jacket water heat exchangers. Technical Specification 3.8.1 was entered, the affected heat exchanger tubes were plugged and the "A" EDG was restored to operable status at 1134 on 1/5/2002.

At 1301 on 1/5/2002, the "B" EDG was taken out of service to perform inspections of its lube oil, intercooler, and jacket water heat exchangers. Inspection of the heat exchanger tubes and analysis of the inspection data found similar results, subsequently resulting in the need to plug heat exchanger tubes to restore the "B" EDG to operable status.

Based upon the similarity and extent of the tube degradation in both the "A" and "B" EDG heat exchangers, prior to implanting the tube plugging corrective action, the possibility exists that the degradation of the EDG heat exchangers' tubes could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the onsite standby class 1E power source following a design basis earthquake.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 01/06/02 AT 1927 EST BY HUBBARD TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *

"B" EDG was restored to operable status. R4DO (B. Spitzberg) notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

* * * RETRACTED AT 1826 EST ON 3/5/02 BY STEVE HENRY TO FANGIE JONES * * *

Subsequent evaluation of the heat exchangers by the licensee determined that the degradation was not severe enough to interfere with the proper operation of the EDGs. The licensee is retracting the event notification, as the EDGs were operational and fully available.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R4DO (Linda Smith) was notified.

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

During the performance of the quarterly valve surveillance test for the HPCI system, a testable check valve, 1FD-V032, related to the HPCI Barometric Condenser Discharge Line, failed. This failure rendered the HPCI system inoperable at 1410 EST on 01/06/02. The licensee entered an active 14 day Limiting Condition of Operation that expires on 01/20/02 at 1410 EST. All other safety systems are operable. Current plans to return plant to normal configuration include the development of corrective maintenance work package.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.

***3/1/02 0952 Event was retracted by Licensee; Jim Priest to Mike Norris.***

"PSEG Nuclear retracts the event notification made on 1/6/02 (event number 38611).

"Barometric condenser condensate pump discharge check valve 1 FD-V032 was opened and inspected. The valve internals were cleaned and the valve was reassembled and retested satisfactorily.

"Subsequent evaluation determined that failure of 1 FD-V032 to close would not have prevented the HPCI system from performing its safety function. Reverse flow through 1 FD-V032 would not degrade the flow that HPCI supplies the reactor vessel during a postulated accident.

"Since the HPCI system remained capable of performing its safety function, this event is not reportable.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event by the licensee."

Notified R1DO (Linville)

24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT (VOLUNTARY)

"Water Leak in Burnable Absorber Expansion System Modcon Area January 6, 2002

"Reason for Notification
At the time of the event, the Team Leader of the Burnable Absorber Expansion System called the cognizant Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer to inform that the roofs over the moderation control (Modcon) area in the erbia blending area had developed a small water leak.


"As Found Condition
A summary of the as found conditions is as follows:
* No operations were being performed in the erbia blending area.
* The leak was small trickle of water that ran down a structural I-beam and puddled onto the floor.
* The water was not dripping onto any process equipment.
* The erbia blender was empty (contained no SNM), and the blender and all bulk containers were tightly closed.
* The leak stopped by approx. 17:00 hours.
* The total amount of leakage was approx. 2 gallons (7.6 liters)of water over approx. 5 hours.

"Double Contingency Protection
Double contingency protection for the erbia blender and bulk containers is based on moderation control (prevent greater than 20.48 liters of water equivalent from entering blender/container). It was determined that double contingency protection remained for the system. It is also noted that at no time was greater than the safety limit of moderator involved. Therefore the incident does not technically require notification in accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3. However, the decision was made to provide this notification since it was considered to be a serious 'near miss'.

"Summary of Activity
* The incident was discussed thoroughly between the Team Manager and thc NCS engineer by phone as soon as the leak was discovered.
* The NCS engineer made the preliminary determination that double contingency protection remained.
* The NCS engineer then came to the plant, inspected the area of the leak with Operations, applied the incident to the previously documented fault tree analysis of the system, and confirmed that double contingency remained.

"Conclusions
* Loss of double contingency protection did not occur.
* Partial degradation of the controls did occur.
* Detection and corrective actions were effective in preventing ~y water from becoming available to the blender or bulk containers.
* At no time was greater than a safe limit of moderator involved.
* At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
* The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. An apparent cause analysis will be performed."