Event Notification Report for December 21, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/20/2001 - 12/21/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
38596
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38596
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: VEITCH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: VEITCH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/26/2001
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2001
Event Time: 20:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2002
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2001
Event Time: 20:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
INDETERMINATE IF HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (DG) COULD FULFILL ITS REQUIRED SAFETY FUNCTION.
"On 12/21/01, Condition Report 01-4350 was initiated to document the failure of Div . 3 DG to pass SVI-E22-T1319. Specifically, the DG did not come up to frequency/voltage within the required 13 seconds (TS 3.8.1.7.b.2). The DG was declared inoperable and an immediate investigation was requested. The immediate investigation indicated that the cause of the SVI failure was due to the DG governor control switch not being properly set during shutdown on the DG on 12/16/01. In analyzing the shutdown data from the 12/21/01 DG surveillance testing, it was determined that the situation had been corrected, and that the next DG start, the DG would satisfy the TS SR. The DG was started on 12/22/01 and satisfied the SR. The DG was then declared operable.
"During this time, it is indeterminate if the HPCS DG could fulfill its required safety function. The immediate investigation infers that an operator error occurred when shutting down the DG on 12/16/01. This error, the mis-operation of the DG governor control switch, prevented the DG from properly coming up to the required frequency/voltage within 13 seconds as identified on 12/21/01. Hence, it is conservative to assume that the capability to perform the safety function was not maintained. This condition is an 8-hour report pursuant to 50.72(b)(3)(v) and (vi). It should be noted that HPCS is a single train system and there are no redundant features within the same system to perform the safety function."
The NRC resident inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/17/02 @ 1204 BY RUSSELL TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
On 12/26/01, a report was made per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for the Loss of Safety Function of the High Pressure Core Spray pump, a single train safety system. The cause of the loss of the HPCS pump was the failure of the DIVISION 3 diesel generator to achieve the required frequency. Subsequently, it was determined by further engineering evaluation that the HPCS pump and its supporting systems had sufficient margins available to perform the required safety functions at the reduced frequency. Therefore, no loss of safety function occurred and therefore event notification 38596 is retracted accordingly.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Region 3 RDO (Vegel) was notified.
"On 12/21/01, Condition Report 01-4350 was initiated to document the failure of Div . 3 DG to pass SVI-E22-T1319. Specifically, the DG did not come up to frequency/voltage within the required 13 seconds (TS 3.8.1.7.b.2). The DG was declared inoperable and an immediate investigation was requested. The immediate investigation indicated that the cause of the SVI failure was due to the DG governor control switch not being properly set during shutdown on the DG on 12/16/01. In analyzing the shutdown data from the 12/21/01 DG surveillance testing, it was determined that the situation had been corrected, and that the next DG start, the DG would satisfy the TS SR. The DG was started on 12/22/01 and satisfied the SR. The DG was then declared operable.
"During this time, it is indeterminate if the HPCS DG could fulfill its required safety function. The immediate investigation infers that an operator error occurred when shutting down the DG on 12/16/01. This error, the mis-operation of the DG governor control switch, prevented the DG from properly coming up to the required frequency/voltage within 13 seconds as identified on 12/21/01. Hence, it is conservative to assume that the capability to perform the safety function was not maintained. This condition is an 8-hour report pursuant to 50.72(b)(3)(v) and (vi). It should be noted that HPCS is a single train system and there are no redundant features within the same system to perform the safety function."
The NRC resident inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/17/02 @ 1204 BY RUSSELL TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
On 12/26/01, a report was made per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for the Loss of Safety Function of the High Pressure Core Spray pump, a single train safety system. The cause of the loss of the HPCS pump was the failure of the DIVISION 3 diesel generator to achieve the required frequency. Subsequently, it was determined by further engineering evaluation that the HPCS pump and its supporting systems had sufficient margins available to perform the required safety functions at the reduced frequency. Therefore, no loss of safety function occurred and therefore event notification 38596 is retracted accordingly.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Region 3 RDO (Vegel) was notified.