Event Notification Report for December 19, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/18/2001 - 12/19/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
385843858538586385873858838581
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38584
Rep Org: US ARMY
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 1
City: ABERDEEN State: MD
County:
License #: 19-30563-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOYCE KUYKENDALL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 1
City: ABERDEEN State: MD
County:
License #: 19-30563-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOYCE KUYKENDALL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/19/2001
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2001
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
CHEMICAL AGENT MONITOR FAILED ANNUAL LEAK TEST
A Chemical Agent Monitor containing a 15 millicurie Ni-63 source failed the annual leak test. The swipe analyzed at the laboratory in Maryland measured .006 microcuries which exceeds the .005 microcurie limit. The device was manufactured by Environmental Technology Group, serial number 316-C-Q-2205, and is currently in Pirmasens, Germany. Corrective action will be to double bag and dispose of it as radwaste.
A Chemical Agent Monitor containing a 15 millicurie Ni-63 source failed the annual leak test. The swipe analyzed at the laboratory in Maryland measured .006 microcuries which exceeds the .005 microcurie limit. The device was manufactured by Environmental Technology Group, serial number 316-C-Q-2205, and is currently in Pirmasens, Germany. Corrective action will be to double bag and dispose of it as radwaste.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38585
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SCHOENBACH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SCHOENBACH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/19/2001
Notification Time: 19:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2002
Notification Time: 19:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EVENT OR CONDITION THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED FULFILLMENT OF A SAFETY FUNCTION
"The Callaway Plant Final Safety Analysis-Site Addenda, Chapter 2.4 specifies controls to ensure site drainage paths are maintained to prevent flooding of the safety related facilities during postulated design basis precipitation events. Controls are specifically established to ensure modifications to site grading and roadway elevations are evaluated to ensure the Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) design basis is not adversely affected and the safety-related structures are protected from flooding.
"During installation of highway barriers at the site perimeter on December 19, 2001, it was determined that the barrier installation had not been properly evaluated to ensure the PMP design basis was not adversely impacted.
"It was concluded this event was reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) because the barrier configuration, in conjunction with PMP conditions could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems due to flooding.
"Immediate actions have been initiated to remove the barriers, thus restoring site grading and road elevations. These actions are targeted for completion within the next twelve-hour shift. In addition, current weather conditions are clear, with no precipitation forecast for the next 24 hours.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee."
*** RETRACTION FROM PATRICK McKENNA TO LEIGH TROCINE RECEIVED AT 1650 EST ON 02/15/02 ***
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On December 19, 2001, Callaway Plant filed Event Notification 33585 to report that concrete security barriers had been installed along the Plant North perimeter and this installation had the potential to violate the Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) design basis analysis. Calculations have since been performed to verify current drainage areas and slopes and the potential water surface elevations due to the concrete security barriers. These calculations verify that the potential water surface elevations do not exceed the power block weir and, therefore, do not impact the Operability of the power block buildings."
"The Operability Determination is based on the FSAR-SA pg. 2.5-15, which states that the ponding elevation during the site PMP rainfall must be maintained less than elevation 840.5 MSL. As shown in Calculation SPA-18, Addenda 4, the maximum water surface elevation is calculated at 839.4 MSL, an increase of 0.3 feet, and the plant was Operable with the security barriers installed. Since these calculations prove that there was no Operability concern, Callaway Plant is retracting Event Notification 38585."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Linda Smith).
"The Callaway Plant Final Safety Analysis-Site Addenda, Chapter 2.4 specifies controls to ensure site drainage paths are maintained to prevent flooding of the safety related facilities during postulated design basis precipitation events. Controls are specifically established to ensure modifications to site grading and roadway elevations are evaluated to ensure the Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) design basis is not adversely affected and the safety-related structures are protected from flooding.
"During installation of highway barriers at the site perimeter on December 19, 2001, it was determined that the barrier installation had not been properly evaluated to ensure the PMP design basis was not adversely impacted.
"It was concluded this event was reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) because the barrier configuration, in conjunction with PMP conditions could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems due to flooding.
"Immediate actions have been initiated to remove the barriers, thus restoring site grading and road elevations. These actions are targeted for completion within the next twelve-hour shift. In addition, current weather conditions are clear, with no precipitation forecast for the next 24 hours.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee."
*** RETRACTION FROM PATRICK McKENNA TO LEIGH TROCINE RECEIVED AT 1650 EST ON 02/15/02 ***
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On December 19, 2001, Callaway Plant filed Event Notification 33585 to report that concrete security barriers had been installed along the Plant North perimeter and this installation had the potential to violate the Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) design basis analysis. Calculations have since been performed to verify current drainage areas and slopes and the potential water surface elevations due to the concrete security barriers. These calculations verify that the potential water surface elevations do not exceed the power block weir and, therefore, do not impact the Operability of the power block buildings."
"The Operability Determination is based on the FSAR-SA pg. 2.5-15, which states that the ponding elevation during the site PMP rainfall must be maintained less than elevation 840.5 MSL. As shown in Calculation SPA-18, Addenda 4, the maximum water surface elevation is calculated at 839.4 MSL, an increase of 0.3 feet, and the plant was Operable with the security barriers installed. Since these calculations prove that there was no Operability concern, Callaway Plant is retracting Event Notification 38585."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Linda Smith).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38586
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HUNT
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HUNT
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 12/20/2001
Notification Time: 02:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 23:19 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2001
Notification Time: 02:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 23:19 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LEONARD WERT (R2)
LEONARD WERT (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR AUTO TRIP FROM 100% POWER ON AMSAC(ATWS MITIGATING SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY) SIGNAL
While operating at 100% power, the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped at 2319 EST on December 19, 2001, due to an AMSAC signal which resulted in a turbine/reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted properly and the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System started, as required, in response to the AMSAC signal and the reactor trip. The steam generator levels were at normal levels prior to the trip. No ECCS actuation occurred and no relief valves lifted. The cause of the AMSAC signal is under investigation.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
While operating at 100% power, the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped at 2319 EST on December 19, 2001, due to an AMSAC signal which resulted in a turbine/reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted properly and the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System started, as required, in response to the AMSAC signal and the reactor trip. The steam generator levels were at normal levels prior to the trip. No ECCS actuation occurred and no relief valves lifted. The cause of the AMSAC signal is under investigation.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Hospital
Event Number: 38587
Rep Org: PARK VIEW HOSPITAL
Licensee: PARK VIEW HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: FT. WAYNE State: IN
County:
License #: 13-01284-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN AGNEW
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: PARK VIEW HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: FT. WAYNE State: IN
County:
License #: 13-01284-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN AGNEW
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 12/20/2001
Notification Time: 11:09 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2001
Notification Time: 11:09 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
POSSIBLE MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATIONS COULD HAVE OCCURRED DURING THERAPEUTIC TREATMENTS IN 1998.
A radiopharmacy (Spectrum Co.) supplied the hospital with incorrectly calibrated doses of samarium-153 which were used in 1998 during three (04/15/98, 06/03/98, and 06/10/98) therapeutic treatments for bone pain. The supplier believes the doses may be 20-30% less than what was calculated. They are currently performing calculations to determine what the doses were and have already reported this problem to the NRC. The hospital was notified on 12/19/01 of this calculation error.
***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1437 EST ON 12/28/01 FROM JOHN AGNEW TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The licensee is updating this event notification to provide the actual doses received during the treatments in question.
The written directive for the 04/15/98 treatment was 90 millicuries of samarium-153, and the radiopharmacy recalculated the actual dose to be 67.18 millicuries. The written directive for the 06/03/98 treatment was 54 millicuries of samarium-153, and the radiopharmacy recalculated the actual dose to be 42.44 millicuries. The written directive for the 06/10/98 treatment was 54 millicuries of samarium-153, and the radiopharmacy recalculated the actual dose to be 41.14 millicuries.
The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Brent Clayton) and NMSS EO (Fred Brown).
(Call the NRC operations officer to obtain contact telephone numbers for John Agnew and for Spectrum.)
A radiopharmacy (Spectrum Co.) supplied the hospital with incorrectly calibrated doses of samarium-153 which were used in 1998 during three (04/15/98, 06/03/98, and 06/10/98) therapeutic treatments for bone pain. The supplier believes the doses may be 20-30% less than what was calculated. They are currently performing calculations to determine what the doses were and have already reported this problem to the NRC. The hospital was notified on 12/19/01 of this calculation error.
***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1437 EST ON 12/28/01 FROM JOHN AGNEW TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The licensee is updating this event notification to provide the actual doses received during the treatments in question.
The written directive for the 04/15/98 treatment was 90 millicuries of samarium-153, and the radiopharmacy recalculated the actual dose to be 67.18 millicuries. The written directive for the 06/03/98 treatment was 54 millicuries of samarium-153, and the radiopharmacy recalculated the actual dose to be 42.44 millicuries. The written directive for the 06/10/98 treatment was 54 millicuries of samarium-153, and the radiopharmacy recalculated the actual dose to be 41.14 millicuries.
The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Brent Clayton) and NMSS EO (Fred Brown).
(Call the NRC operations officer to obtain contact telephone numbers for John Agnew and for Spectrum.)
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38588
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: ANGELO IAFRATE CONSTRUCTION, LLC
Region: 4
City: NEW ORLEANS State: LA
County:
License #: LA-7159-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: ANGELO IAFRATE CONSTRUCTION, LLC
Region: 4
City: NEW ORLEANS State: LA
County:
License #: LA-7159-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/20/2001
Notification Time: 11:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2001
Notification Time: 11:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE
"Angelo Iafrate was using a Troxler Nuclear Density Gauge to measure the density of back fill dirt on a construction site on Napoleon Avenue in New Orleans, LA. Between 12:00PM and 2:00PM the Density gauge was discovered missing. The Density gauge was a Troxler Model 3450 and the serial number is 180. It has a 8.0 mCi source of Cs-137 and a 40.0 mCi source of Am-241Be. The last leak test was performed on July 17, 2001. The facility called the New Orleans Police Department on December 19. 2001, after discovering the gauge was missing.
"Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Event Report ID No.: LA010018"
"Angelo Iafrate was using a Troxler Nuclear Density Gauge to measure the density of back fill dirt on a construction site on Napoleon Avenue in New Orleans, LA. Between 12:00PM and 2:00PM the Density gauge was discovered missing. The Density gauge was a Troxler Model 3450 and the serial number is 180. It has a 8.0 mCi source of Cs-137 and a 40.0 mCi source of Am-241Be. The last leak test was performed on July 17, 2001. The facility called the New Orleans Police Department on December 19. 2001, after discovering the gauge was missing.
"Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Event Report ID No.: LA010018"
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38581
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 12/19/2001
Notification Time: 04:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 02:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2001
Notification Time: 04:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2001
Event Time: 02:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT NOTIFIED OF A FIRE ONSITE
A fire alarm was received @ 0248 CST on 12/19/01 for room-22 safety injection pump room. An inspection showed heavy smoke at entrance to room. The plant fire brigade was manned and personnel entered the room. The fire source was an extension cord, connected to some heaters, which started some anti-contamination clothing on fire. The fire was identified @ 0306 CST and declared out @ 0308 CST. The Blair Fire Department was notified @ 0250 CST and responded to the site. No entry was made to the Protected Area, as the fire was out upon their arrival. The licensee is still investigating the cause.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
A fire alarm was received @ 0248 CST on 12/19/01 for room-22 safety injection pump room. An inspection showed heavy smoke at entrance to room. The plant fire brigade was manned and personnel entered the room. The fire source was an extension cord, connected to some heaters, which started some anti-contamination clothing on fire. The fire was identified @ 0306 CST and declared out @ 0308 CST. The Blair Fire Department was notified @ 0250 CST and responded to the site. No entry was made to the Protected Area, as the fire was out upon their arrival. The licensee is still investigating the cause.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.