Event Notification Report for December 05, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/04/2001 - 12/05/2001
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38543
Rep Org: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES
Licensee: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES
Region: 4
City: CRAWFORD State: NE
County: DAWES
License #: SUA-1534
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES
Region: 4
City: CRAWFORD State: NE
County: DAWES
License #: SUA-1534
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/06/2001
Notification Time: 09:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2001
Event Time: 14:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2001
Notification Time: 09:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2001
Event Time: 14:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
MIKE LAYTON (MINING) (NMSS)
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
MIKE LAYTON (MINING) (NMSS)
DISCOVERY OF A SHALLOW MONITOR WELL IN EXCURSION FOR SULFATE
At approximately 1430 CST on 12/05/01, the licensee received second confirmation of well #SM723 being in excursion for sulfate. Sulfate was discovered to be at a concentration of 68 mg/l which exceeded the upper control limit of 65 mg/l. This excursion is believed to be naturally occurring, and the licensee has submitted a license amendment request to change the upper control limit. The licensee also plans to maintain an increased monitoring frequency. The licensee stated that well #SM723 is located within a controlled well field with a shallow aquifer and that there was no adverse impact expected on individuals or the environment.
(Call the NRC operations officer for licensee contact information.)
At approximately 1430 CST on 12/05/01, the licensee received second confirmation of well #SM723 being in excursion for sulfate. Sulfate was discovered to be at a concentration of 68 mg/l which exceeded the upper control limit of 65 mg/l. This excursion is believed to be naturally occurring, and the licensee has submitted a license amendment request to change the upper control limit. The licensee also plans to maintain an increased monitoring frequency. The licensee stated that well #SM723 is located within a controlled well field with a shallow aquifer and that there was no adverse impact expected on individuals or the environment.
(Call the NRC operations officer for licensee contact information.)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38540
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB KIDWELL
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB KIDWELL
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/05/2001
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2001
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2001
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2001
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM FOUND INOPERABLE
The licensee was conducting their quarterly functional test of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and found it to be inoperable. The problem with ERDS is being investigated at this time.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee was conducting their quarterly functional test of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and found it to be inoperable. The problem with ERDS is being investigated at this time.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38541
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ROB HARRSCH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ROB HARRSCH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/05/2001
Notification Time: 20:26 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2001
Event Time: 18:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2001
Notification Time: 20:26 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2001
Event Time: 18:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
APPENDIX R REVIEW REVEALED A POTENTIAL FAILURE OF THE MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS
The licensee was conducting an Appendix R review and made the following discovery.
"Review of the Motor Driven Aux. Feed Pump (MDAFP) response to an Appendix R fire with a coincident loss of off-site power and instrument air indicates an Appendix R concern in Fire Areas A01-B, A02, A23N and A23S, which are the Central Area of the 26' PAB, SI/CS Pump Room, North Aux. Feed Pump Room and South Aux. Feed Pump Room, respectively. In each of these areas, a MDAFP is relied upon as the means of getting Aux Feedwater to at least one Steam Generator for at least one of the Units and both Units for Fire Area A01-B, to support heat removal from the RCS. The review performed, revealed that an Appendix R fire in these fire areas could potentially result in an auto-start of the credited MDAFP, due to fire damage initiating the start signal or trip of the Main Feedwater Pumps. This auto-start signal also opens the mini-recirc. valve for the MDAFP and motor driven discharge valve(s) for the steam generator to be supplied Aux. Feedwater. Due to fire damage, the motor driven discharge valve may fail to open and the mini-recirc valve may fail closed due to a loss of instrument air supply. This could potentially result in dead heading the pump and subsequent damage to the pump.
"In response to the discovery of this issue, hourly fire rounds have been initiated in the fire areas affected. With the establishment of this compensatory measure in conjunction with existing guidance contained in operations procedures, the MDAFPs are considered operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
(Refer to event #38618 for additional information.)
The licensee was conducting an Appendix R review and made the following discovery.
"Review of the Motor Driven Aux. Feed Pump (MDAFP) response to an Appendix R fire with a coincident loss of off-site power and instrument air indicates an Appendix R concern in Fire Areas A01-B, A02, A23N and A23S, which are the Central Area of the 26' PAB, SI/CS Pump Room, North Aux. Feed Pump Room and South Aux. Feed Pump Room, respectively. In each of these areas, a MDAFP is relied upon as the means of getting Aux Feedwater to at least one Steam Generator for at least one of the Units and both Units for Fire Area A01-B, to support heat removal from the RCS. The review performed, revealed that an Appendix R fire in these fire areas could potentially result in an auto-start of the credited MDAFP, due to fire damage initiating the start signal or trip of the Main Feedwater Pumps. This auto-start signal also opens the mini-recirc. valve for the MDAFP and motor driven discharge valve(s) for the steam generator to be supplied Aux. Feedwater. Due to fire damage, the motor driven discharge valve may fail to open and the mini-recirc valve may fail closed due to a loss of instrument air supply. This could potentially result in dead heading the pump and subsequent damage to the pump.
"In response to the discovery of this issue, hourly fire rounds have been initiated in the fire areas affected. With the establishment of this compensatory measure in conjunction with existing guidance contained in operations procedures, the MDAFPs are considered operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
(Refer to event #38618 for additional information.)