Event Notification Report for December 03, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/02/2001 - 12/03/2001
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38792
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: BAYOU INSPECTION SERVICES
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: LA-7112-LA1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Licensee: BAYOU INSPECTION SERVICES
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: LA-7112-LA1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 03/21/2002
Notification Time: 10:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2002
Notification Time: 10:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DOUGLAS BROADDUS (NMSS)
DALE POWERS (R4)
DOUGLAS BROADDUS (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FOR EQUIPMENT FAILURE THAT OCCURRED OFFSHORE
"This incident occurred on December 3, 2001. This was an equipment failure involving a INC IR- 100 radiography camera with serial number 4473 and the source was an AEA Model 37703 Source Assembly with serial number 00519B. This piece of equipment was returned to Source Production Equipment Company because the source would not crank out. Upon removal, the source was found to have been fabricated from a length of steel drive cable. The source assembly was found to be broken, at the capsule side of the locking ball, into two separate pieces. The failure of the cable material was due to severe corrosion having taken place. The material was so corroded, it would not flex to allow proper insertion of the pigtail into the C-1."
The state of Louisiana logged this event as Event Report ID No.: LA020005
"This incident occurred on December 3, 2001. This was an equipment failure involving a INC IR- 100 radiography camera with serial number 4473 and the source was an AEA Model 37703 Source Assembly with serial number 00519B. This piece of equipment was returned to Source Production Equipment Company because the source would not crank out. Upon removal, the source was found to have been fabricated from a length of steel drive cable. The source assembly was found to be broken, at the capsule side of the locking ball, into two separate pieces. The failure of the cable material was due to severe corrosion having taken place. The material was so corroded, it would not flex to allow proper insertion of the pigtail into the C-1."
The state of Louisiana logged this event as Event Report ID No.: LA020005
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38533
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/03/2001
Notification Time: 23:13 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2001
Event Time: 17:34 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2001
Notification Time: 23:13 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2001
Event Time: 17:34 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
"At 1734 CST, on 12/3/2001, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that the C-337 High Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) Sprinkler System 8-14 had been inspected and 4 sprinkler heads had visible corrosion on them. The system configuration and building configuration were evaluated using EN-C-822-99-047. Effects of impaired Sprinkler Heads on System Operability, and determined that with these heads impaired, a portion of the building would not have sprinkler coverage. The sprinkler system is required to be operable according to TSR LCO 2.4.4.5. HPFW Sprinkler System B-14 was declared inoperable and TSR LCO 2.4.4.5 Required Action B was implemented for the area without sprinkler coverage.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"At 1734 CST, on 12/3/2001, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that the C-337 High Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) Sprinkler System 8-14 had been inspected and 4 sprinkler heads had visible corrosion on them. The system configuration and building configuration were evaluated using EN-C-822-99-047. Effects of impaired Sprinkler Heads on System Operability, and determined that with these heads impaired, a portion of the building would not have sprinkler coverage. The sprinkler system is required to be operable according to TSR LCO 2.4.4.5. HPFW Sprinkler System B-14 was declared inoperable and TSR LCO 2.4.4.5 Required Action B was implemented for the area without sprinkler coverage.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38534
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: OLMSTEAD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: OLMSTEAD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/04/2001
Notification Time: 04:58 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2001
Event Time: 22:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2001
Notification Time: 04:58 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2001
Event Time: 22:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 12 | Power Operation | 1 | Startup |
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION
During a controlled plant shutdown, a vibration problem occurred on the Main Turbine that required breaking condenser vacuum. Since breaking condenser vacuum would cause a loss of the operating Main Feedwater pump and generate an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation signal, both "A" and "B" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were manually started prior to breaking condenser vacuum. "A" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump failed to develop proper flow, so the Turbine Driven Feedwater pump was placed in service. The "A" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump was subsequently secured and declared inoperable. A plan of action is being developed to troubleshoot and repair the inoperable "A" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump.
Initially, Steam Generator Atmospheric Power Operated Relief Valves were being used to control Reactor Coolant System temperature. Condenser vacuum has been restored and currently, Steam Generator water levels are being maintained using the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump with condenser steam dumps maintaining Reactor Coolant System temperature.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
During a controlled plant shutdown, a vibration problem occurred on the Main Turbine that required breaking condenser vacuum. Since breaking condenser vacuum would cause a loss of the operating Main Feedwater pump and generate an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation signal, both "A" and "B" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were manually started prior to breaking condenser vacuum. "A" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump failed to develop proper flow, so the Turbine Driven Feedwater pump was placed in service. The "A" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump was subsequently secured and declared inoperable. A plan of action is being developed to troubleshoot and repair the inoperable "A" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump.
Initially, Steam Generator Atmospheric Power Operated Relief Valves were being used to control Reactor Coolant System temperature. Condenser vacuum has been restored and currently, Steam Generator water levels are being maintained using the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump with condenser steam dumps maintaining Reactor Coolant System temperature.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.