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Event Notification Report for November 29, 2001

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/28/2001 - 11/29/2001

EVENT NUMBERS
3852438525385263852938530

General Information or Other
Event Number: 38524
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: COMPUTALOG WIRELINE PRODUCTS INC
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON   State: TX
County:
License #: L00747
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 11/29/2001
Notification Time: 16:48 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2001
Event Time: 06:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
Event Text
TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT INVOLVING A TEXAS STATE LICENSEE

Ice on bridge caused car in left lane to loose control. Car following swerved into right lane in front of wireline truck traveling approximately 30 mph. Truck could have hit car or move to edge of road, which it did and ended up in the ditch. The truck laid over on it's right side with minor damage to right side of the vehicle - mirror and glass. No damage to sources which were secured in Pigs welded to the floor and wall of the vehicle. The vehicle is to be up-righted and towed to Houston for repairs. RSO for Licensee is on-site and has assessed sources as un-damaged and secure in their storage Pigs. The sources carried by the truck are a Well logging calibration stick(Ra-226), calibration bar(Am-241/Be/Cs-137), a Cs-137 well logging source and a Am-241/Be well logging source. Only minor injuries were received by the two occupants of the truck. Activity readings were normal for the truck.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 38525
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3     State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MEYER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 11/29/2001
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2001
Event Time: 15:38 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
A LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR MAY CAUSE A POTENTIAL COMMON MODE FAILURE FOR ALL AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS.

Instrument Air (IA) can be lost primarily by two failure mechanisms. The first, and most likely, is a loss of off-site power where the IA and Service Air (SA) compressors are stripped from the bus and not automatically re-loaded. The second less likely scenario is a random loss of the instrument air system due to equipment failure without potential for short term recovery. When IA is lost, the minimum flow recirculation valves for AFW fail closed.

During these two transients, the AFW pumps will start injecting into the steam generators. Early in the EOP's, the operator is directed to control flow to the steam generators to maintain desired level. This may include shutting off flow to one or both steam generators if level is above the desired band. If flow from any auxiliary feed pump is reduced too low (as would occur if the auxiliary feed regulating valves are closed) without functional recirculation valves, the pump will fail in a very short period of time. This common mode of failure (common loss of instrument air and common response to high steam generator level) could result in simultaneous failure of all AFW pumps.

The Auxiliary Feedwater system has passed all required testing and is currently fully operable and capable of performing its safety function. It is only under the specific circumstances outlined above that a failure of Auxiliary Feedwater may occur. The licensee is taking interim corrective actions in the form of Operating Crew briefs to ensure Auxiliary Feedwater is not damaged under Loss of Air conditions and is evaluating procedural and equipment design changes to provide a permanent correction to Aux. Feedwater.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.


* * * UPDATE ON 11/30/01 @ 1849 BY RAASCH TO GOULD * * *

The purpose of this supplement is to clarify the discussion of the potential failure of one or more Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps as described in Event Notification #38525. The potential failure is limited to only the minimum recirculation flow control valves for the AFW pumps. These recirculation valves function automatically to provide recirculation flow during periods of low Steam Generator (SG) demand from the AFW pumps. This potential failure mode would manifest itself during a loss of offsite power, with an attendant loss of instrument air, if the operator, while reducing AFW flow to a SG after satisfactory initial filling, fails to recognize that the recirculation valves do not open while reducing AFW flow to the steam generators. This action would have to be done individually to each of the running AFW pumps for multiple failures to occur.

The air operated valves for controlling AFW pump output flowrate are safety-related and are not susceptible to this condition since the instrument air supply to these valves is backed up by a safety-related Nitrogen backup system. These valves would continue to be capable of supplying and controlling the required AFW flow to the steam generators.

As an interim corrective action, operating personnel were provided a briefing on this potential failure mechanism to ensure the AFW pumps are not damaged under a Loss of Instrument Air condition. Additionally, temporary information tags have been hung to ensure continued awareness until an evaluation of potential procedural and equipment design changes can be completed.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

The Reg 3 RDO(Jorgensen) was informed.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 38526
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4     State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/30/2001
Notification Time: 10:37 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2001
Event Time: 13:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE'S USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE

A non-licensed employee (supervisor) was determined to be under the influence of a controlled substance. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.


Hospital
Event Number: 38529
Rep Org: WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL
Licensee: WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: ROYAL OAKS   State: MI
County:
License #: 210133301
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 11/30/2001
Notification Time: 14:28 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2001
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
Event Text
MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION AT THE WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL

A patient was prescribed a total dose of 2,800 centigrays of Ir - 192 given in seven fractions for treatment of recurring cancer. However, the standard fraction dose for 7 fractions @ 500 centigrays/fractions was administered resulting in a total dose of 3,500 centigrays. This misadministration resulted when the authorizing physician initially prescribed seven standard fraction doses(500 centigrays/fraction), but then changed his mind and prescribed seven fractions @ 400 centigrays/fraction which would have resulted in the total prescribed dose of 2,800 centigrays. These treatments took place between 09/27/01 and 11/02/09, but the mistake was not discovered until 11/20/01 @ 1700 during an audit. The error was made when the authorizing physicist did not transcribe from the treatment plan onto the worksheet the correct information used to program the HDR device and put in the 500 centigrays instead of the 400 centigrays. The patient and the referring physician were notified. No adverse affects to the patient are expected.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 38530
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: WEYERHAEUSER TECHNOLOGY CENTER
Region: 4
City: FEDERAL WAY   State: WA
County:
License #: WN-L083-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRAZEE (FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 11/30/2001
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
Event Text
LEAKING PROMETHIUM SOURCE AT WEYERHAEUSER TECH CENTER

The licensee provided notification to the State of Washington that leakage was discovered when a 3 millicurie Promethium-147 source was about to be re-installed in an AMBERTEC Oy model BET- 1 formation tester. At this time it appears that the radioactive source was removed from the formation tester by licensee personnel in mid 1999. The source was placed into a storage container kept under the licensee's control. The un-sourced device was subsequently shipped to the manufacturer in Finland for repair. The device was recently returned to the licensee facility. A Finnish technician accompanying the device tested the source prior to installation and discovered contamination on the source and in the storage container. No contamination was detected on the outside of the container, in the storage location or at the work bench where the device is presumed to have been disassembled two years ago. Other details are unclear at this time and a Division of Radiation Protection staff will be on-site today to investigate.