Event Notification Report for November 25, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/24/2001 - 11/25/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
38516
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38516
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM McCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM McCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 11/26/2001
Notification Time: 06:24 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2001
Event Time: 16:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2001
Notification Time: 06:24 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2001
Event Time: 16:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT
"During an NCS annual assessment by operations personnel, two cardboard boxes with unfavorable geometry were found inside an area controlled by NCSA-326_014 A02. This Is a violation of control #17 of the NCSA that requires unfavorable items capable of holding solution shall have holes to provide drainage such that no more than one inch of solution can accumulate in them.
"This resulted in a violation of the double contingency principle where control was reestablished and is reportable under NRC BL 91-01.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"The safety significance of this event is low. The open cardboard box was not under any overflow line or seal exhaust lines and the seal exhaust station is not operating.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"During operation of the seal exhaust station the contents of the seal exhaust lines could have sprayed in to the box to cause a criticality.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"The first control was the requirement to have drainage holes in unfavorable geometry containers. The second control was that it was unlikely an unfavorable geometry container would be positioned in a location that seal exhaust oil would spray into the container.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT. ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"The licensed material would be UF4 in oil with a maximum enrichment of 20% U-235
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"Control #17 of the NCSA that requires unfavorable items capable of holding solution shall have holes to provide drainage such that no more than one inch of solution can accumulate in them.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The cardboard boxes were removed from the area controlled by NCSA-326_014.A.02"
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
"During an NCS annual assessment by operations personnel, two cardboard boxes with unfavorable geometry were found inside an area controlled by NCSA-326_014 A02. This Is a violation of control #17 of the NCSA that requires unfavorable items capable of holding solution shall have holes to provide drainage such that no more than one inch of solution can accumulate in them.
"This resulted in a violation of the double contingency principle where control was reestablished and is reportable under NRC BL 91-01.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"The safety significance of this event is low. The open cardboard box was not under any overflow line or seal exhaust lines and the seal exhaust station is not operating.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"During operation of the seal exhaust station the contents of the seal exhaust lines could have sprayed in to the box to cause a criticality.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"The first control was the requirement to have drainage holes in unfavorable geometry containers. The second control was that it was unlikely an unfavorable geometry container would be positioned in a location that seal exhaust oil would spray into the container.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT. ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"The licensed material would be UF4 in oil with a maximum enrichment of 20% U-235
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"Control #17 of the NCSA that requires unfavorable items capable of holding solution shall have holes to provide drainage such that no more than one inch of solution can accumulate in them.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The cardboard boxes were removed from the area controlled by NCSA-326_014.A.02"
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.