Event Notification Report for November 20, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/19/2001 - 11/20/2001
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38511
Rep Org: EDWARDS PIPELINE SERVICES
Licensee: EDWARDS PIPELINE SERVICES
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #: 3523193-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCHILLING
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: EDWARDS PIPELINE SERVICES
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #: 3523193-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCHILLING
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 11/20/2001
Notification Time: 09:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2001
Event Time: 08:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2001
Notification Time: 09:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2001
Event Time: 08:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
JOHN DAVIDSON (IAT)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
ANITA TURNER (NMSS)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
JOHN DAVIDSON (IAT)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
ANITA TURNER (NMSS)
LICENSEE REPORTED A STOLEN RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
A Spec 150 radiography camera serial # 446 was stolen from a mobile darkroom in Mobile, Alabama. The camera contained 58 curies of Iridium-192 serial # HI1815. The individual, however, did not take the controls for the camera. The licensee's technicians chased the thief, but he escaped in a car. The Mobile Police were notified along with the State of Alabama and the licensee will notify the State of Oklahoma. The licensee's Alabama license number is 1333 and the Oklahoma license number is 23193-02.
A Spec 150 radiography camera serial # 446 was stolen from a mobile darkroom in Mobile, Alabama. The camera contained 58 curies of Iridium-192 serial # HI1815. The individual, however, did not take the controls for the camera. The licensee's technicians chased the thief, but he escaped in a car. The Mobile Police were notified along with the State of Alabama and the licensee will notify the State of Oklahoma. The licensee's Alabama license number is 1333 and the Oklahoma license number is 23193-02.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38577
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM TURKETT
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM TURKETT
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/17/2001
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2001
Event Time: 03:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2001
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2001
Event Time: 03:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INADVERTENT START OF A MOTOR-DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP (60-Day Report)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"During the performance of a surveillance test, the 'B' Motor-Driven Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pump was inadvertently started from the Main Control Board when the intended action was to place the control switch in the pull-to-lock position. The plant was preparing to test the function of the solid state output relay K633 as it pertains to sending an open signal to the EFW flow control valves IFV03531, IFV03541, and IFV03551. To prevent actually injecting EFW into the [steam generators (S/G)], the pump for the train whose relay is being tested (in this case 'B') must be placed in pull-to-lock since the same relay which opens the IFVs also starts the pump."
"When the BOP operator attempted to place the pump in P-T-L the pump started. This was immediately recognized as an unexpected response, and the pump was shut off within a second. Due to the start of the EFW pump, S/G blowdown isolated as per design and had to be subsequently realigned. [Data from the] plant computer and alarm printers [was] reviewed by the Shift Supervisor and [Shift Engineer] to determine if any cold EFW actually entered the S/Gs. The alarm printer showed 1 second between pump start and pump stop, which is consistent with the prompt error recognition observed by the crew. The plant computer data showed no increase in EFW flow during the time period in question. It is believed from this investigation that the pump never came up to speed to the point where sufficient pressure was developed to swing open the discharge check valves, thus no EFW injection occurred. The cause of this event is attributed to human performance error."
"This event does not require a telephone notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) because this is being reported as an invalid ECCS actuation of an Emergency Feedwater Pump. However, the plant is making this call under the criteria of 10CFR50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting an LER under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"During the performance of a surveillance test, the 'B' Motor-Driven Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pump was inadvertently started from the Main Control Board when the intended action was to place the control switch in the pull-to-lock position. The plant was preparing to test the function of the solid state output relay K633 as it pertains to sending an open signal to the EFW flow control valves IFV03531, IFV03541, and IFV03551. To prevent actually injecting EFW into the [steam generators (S/G)], the pump for the train whose relay is being tested (in this case 'B') must be placed in pull-to-lock since the same relay which opens the IFVs also starts the pump."
"When the BOP operator attempted to place the pump in P-T-L the pump started. This was immediately recognized as an unexpected response, and the pump was shut off within a second. Due to the start of the EFW pump, S/G blowdown isolated as per design and had to be subsequently realigned. [Data from the] plant computer and alarm printers [was] reviewed by the Shift Supervisor and [Shift Engineer] to determine if any cold EFW actually entered the S/Gs. The alarm printer showed 1 second between pump start and pump stop, which is consistent with the prompt error recognition observed by the crew. The plant computer data showed no increase in EFW flow during the time period in question. It is believed from this investigation that the pump never came up to speed to the point where sufficient pressure was developed to swing open the discharge check valves, thus no EFW injection occurred. The cause of this event is attributed to human performance error."
"This event does not require a telephone notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) because this is being reported as an invalid ECCS actuation of an Emergency Feedwater Pump. However, the plant is making this call under the criteria of 10CFR50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting an LER under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.