Event Notification Report for November 08, 2001

INVALID RPS ACTUATION DURING STARTUP DUE TO A BLOWN FUSE

"Beaver Valley Power Station is retracting its previous 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) notification from 11/9/2001, EN# 38486. The automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation that occurred on 11/8/2001 was initiated by a blown fuse in the N36 intermediate range nuclear flux instrument causing a high intermediate range reactor trip signal to be generated. The blown fuse was not in response to actual plant conditions and is not a parameter satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the system. Hence this RPS actuation was not a valid actuation since there was no actual high flux condition within the reactor. Therefore, this event is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) since the automatic trip was not generated by a valid actuation.

"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since this event involved an automatic actuation of the Reactor Protection System which was not part of a pre-planned sequence, did not occur with the RPS properly removed from service, and did not occur after the safety function of dropping the control rods had already been completed.

"However, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification instead of submitting a written LER since the automatic reactor trip occurred with the reactor subcritical, and was not generated by a valid actuation. On 11/8/2001, all control rods inserted due to the blown fuse initiating a reactor trip on a one out of two high intermediate range high power. All required safety systems operated as designed and the plant was stabilized in Mode 3."


The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE STATE THAT TWO DEAD SEA TURTLES WERE DISCOVERED IN THE INTAKE CANAL

At approximately 0800 on 11/8/01 two dead sea turtles(one green and one loggerhead) were recovered from the licensee's intake canal. Pursuant to the sea turtle permit, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection(FDEP) was notified at approximately 0845. Both turtles apparently drowned below the surface of the 5" mesh barrier net. The carcasses will be turned over to the FWCC.

The NRC Resident Inspector and the FDEP were notified.

THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE STATE OF A DEAD SEA TURTLE DISCOVERED IN THE INTAKE CANAL

"At approximately 1230, one dead sea turtle was recovered from the St. Lucie Intake Canal. Pursuant to the sea turtle permit the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) was notified at 1305. The notification of FDEP necessitates a four (4) hour non-emergency notification of [the] NRC per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."

The licensee informed the State of Florida and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

HOO Note: See previous event #38479.

THE LICENSEE REPORTED A MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION OCCURRED DURING THERAPEUTIC TREATMENT

At approximately 2:45 pm on November 7, 2001, a physician, an authorized user in Nuclear Medicine, began administration of a Y-90 therapeutic radiopharmaceutical dose in accordance with the written directive for the treatment.

The administration system used a saline flush followed by an air flush to administer the radiopharmaceutical. During the air flush at approximately 3:15 pm, fluid was observed on the top of the second dose vial. To avoid infusing a potentially non-sterile dose, the doctor stopped the dose administration before the entire dose was infused. Based on post infusion measurements of the dose vials, the patient received approximately 80 mCi instead of the prescribed 120 mCi.

The administrating physician informed the patient on November 7, 2001 that because of the administration problem, the total prescribed dose was not administered. The referring physician will be notified.

There are no expected harmful effects as a result of this treatment. The treatment protocol requires the subject to receive three separate 120 mCi doses of the Y-90 radiopharmaceutical. This was the patient's second treatment.

INFORMATION REPORT INVOLVING A CONTROLLED PLANT SHUTDOWN FOR REPAIRS

"A controlled plant shutdown was performed due to a small (1 inch or less) steam leak on 'B' main steam header. The leak originated from a 1 inch drain line located upstream of the 'B' MSIV. The Unit was shutdown in accordance with plant procedures. A plant cooldown to mode 5 is in progress to affect repairs."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

THE CONAM COMPANY REPORTED THAT ONE OF THEIR RADIOGRAPH CAMERAS HAD A SOURCE THAT BECAME STUCK

An Iridium - 192 AEA model 660B radiography camera in use at the Sunoco refinery at Gerard Pt. Philadelphia, Pa. had the source get stuck while the licensee was retracting it into the camera. The source was moved in and out of the camera a few times before it finally was fully retracted into the camera. No one was overexposed and the camera will be returned to the manufacturer for inspection and repair. They believe the cause was due to a locking problem in the camera.

SAFETY SYSTEM DISCOVERED INOPERABLE DURING SURVEILLANCE TEST

"At 1045 hours maintenance personnel identified the failure of the safety system component in the X-760 building. During the scheduled TSR surveillance, maintenance on the X-760 Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS), maintenance personnel identified that the associated nitrogen horns would not have functioned as designed. Post maintenance testing of the associated nitrogen horn identified that the horns would not sound as required due to a gross leak at the block manifold. Repairs and a successful post maintenance test were completed under the direction of the System Engineer. The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) has directed a random check of the site CAAS facilities be conducted to ensure this condition does not exist elsewhere. The X-760 CAAS remains inoperable pending the completion of the requested engineering evaluation to address the gross leak condition causing the safety system failure."

Operations informed both the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Site Representative.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DURING UNIT STARTUP

"During a reactor start up, BVPS Unit One Reactor tripped prior to reaching criticality. The apparent cause of the trip is a blown control power fuse on Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument channel N36. The blown fuse caused actuation of the Intermediate Range high level trip. All control rods fully inserted. All equipment properly functioned. Unit One is presently in mode three at normal temperature and pressure. Decay heat removal is through the steam bypass valves to the main condenser as it was throughout the event. A main feed pump is supplying feedwater through the bypass feedwater regulating valves."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE 1237 EST ON 11/12/01 FROM MIKE KOGELSCHATZ TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"Beaver Valley Power Station is retracting its previous 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) notification from 11/9/2001, EN #38486. The automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation that occurred on 11/8/2001 was initiated by a blown fuse in the N36 intermediate range nuclear flux instrument causing a high intermediate range reactor trip signal to be generated. The blown fuse was not in response to actual plant conditions and is not a parameter satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the system. Hence this RPS actuation was not a valid actuation since there was no actual high flux condition within the reactor. Therefore, this event is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) since the automatic trip was not generated by a valid actuation.

"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since this event involved an automatic actuation of the Reactor Protection System which was not part of a pre-planned sequence, did not occur with the RPS properly removed from service, and did not occur after the safety function of dropping the control rods had already been completed.

"However, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification instead of submitting a written LER since the automatic reactor trip occurred with the reactor subcritical, and was not generated by a valid actuation. On 11/8/2001, all control rods inserted due to the blown fuse initiating a reactor trip on a one out of two high intermediate range high power. All required safety systems operated as designed and the plant was stabilized in Mode 3."

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1 IRC.

HOO Note: See EN #38496.

STATE OF NC REPORTED THAT ONE OF THEIR LICENSEES MISPLACED/LOST A BETA THICKNESS GAUGE

The Guilford Mills textile plant is in the process of being decommissioned and disposing of 4 gauges when it was discovered that one gauge could not be located. The gauge that is missing is a Mahlo America model FMIR-7AK-6271-12-1400 beta thickness gauge. It contained 100 millicuries of Krypton-85 source serial # 1603BX and was last inventoried in 1997. The licensee is continuing to look for the device.