Event Notification Report for October 31, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/30/2001 - 10/31/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
3844838450384513845238453
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38448
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BODIN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BODIN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/31/2001
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2001
Event Time: 14:09 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2001
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2001
Event Time: 14:09 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL TURBINE/REACTOR TRIP
"Unit 2 Turbine Condenser Air Ejector was isolated for a potential steam leak. After the condenser air ejector was isolated, the A/B condenser differential reached 2.5" Hg vacuum. This is a procedural requirement to trip the turbine. Operators initiated a manual reactor/turbine trip at 1409. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed to ensure air ejector isolation. Steam generator (S/G) power operated relief valves (PORVs) are controlling RCS temperature at 547 degrees F.
"Both auxiliary feedwater pumps auto started on low S/G levels. N35 NIS intermediate range detector failed to reach the source range setpoint. Source range detectors were manually reenergized."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. The licensee plans to issue a press release regarding this event.
"Unit 2 Turbine Condenser Air Ejector was isolated for a potential steam leak. After the condenser air ejector was isolated, the A/B condenser differential reached 2.5" Hg vacuum. This is a procedural requirement to trip the turbine. Operators initiated a manual reactor/turbine trip at 1409. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed to ensure air ejector isolation. Steam generator (S/G) power operated relief valves (PORVs) are controlling RCS temperature at 547 degrees F.
"Both auxiliary feedwater pumps auto started on low S/G levels. N35 NIS intermediate range detector failed to reach the source range setpoint. Source range detectors were manually reenergized."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. The licensee plans to issue a press release regarding this event.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38450
Rep Org: GEO ENGINEERING
Licensee: GEO ENGINEERING
Region: 2
City: CAROLINA State: PR
County:
License #: 52-25266-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HEMANES
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: GEO ENGINEERING
Region: 2
City: CAROLINA State: PR
County:
License #: 52-25266-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HEMANES
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/31/2001
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2001
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R2)
R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R2)
DAMAGED MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE
A CPN model MC-1 moisture/density gauge (S/N M15076270) was damaged when it was run over. The source rod was not exposed at the time of the event. The Puerto Rico Health Department responded to the scene and surveyed the gauge, but found no evidence of contamination. The gauge has been secured pending further action by the licensee.
The licensee has contacted an NRC inspector in Puerto Rico, who is going to respond to the scene tomorrow.
A CPN model MC-1 moisture/density gauge (S/N M15076270) was damaged when it was run over. The source rod was not exposed at the time of the event. The Puerto Rico Health Department responded to the scene and surveyed the gauge, but found no evidence of contamination. The gauge has been secured pending further action by the licensee.
The licensee has contacted an NRC inspector in Puerto Rico, who is going to respond to the scene tomorrow.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38451
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RICK LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RICK LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/31/2001
Notification Time: 18:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2001
Event Time: 13:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2001
Notification Time: 18:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2001
Event Time: 13:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
FIRE WATER SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVE FOUND CLOSED
"DURING PERFORMANCE OF PROCEDURE XP4-CU-UG6206 'HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SYSTEM (HPFW) UNDERGROUND DISTRIBUTION LOOP TESTING,' UTILITY OPERATIONS AND FIRE FIGHTING PERSONAL DISCOVERED A SECTIONAL ISOLATION VALVE, THAT WAS EXPECTED TO BE OPEN, WAS RESTRICTING FLOW TO THE PORTION OF THE LOOP BEING TESTED. THIS RESTRICTION IN THE LOOP CAUSED A PORTION OF THE HPFW SPRINKLER SYSTEM FOR THE X-326 BUILDING TO FAIL TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION (FIRE SUPPRESSION). UPON IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM THE FIRE DEPARTMENT NOTIFIED THE PLANT SHIFT SUPERINTENDENT (PSS) WHO IMMEDIATELY DECLARED THE HPFW SPRINKLERS SYSTEMS IN THE X-326 BUILDING INOPERABLE, AND DIRECTED THE REQUIRED TSR ACTIONS TO BE PERFORMED. UTILITY OPERATIONS PERSONNEL SECURED THE TEST AND REOPENED ALL SECTIONAL ISOLATION VALVES THAT WERE SHUT FOR THE TEST. AT 1345 HOURS HPFW WAS RESTORED TO THE ISOLATED PORTION OF THE LOOP.
"ENTIRE EVOLUTION IS UNDER INVESTIGATION AT THIS TIME."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.
"DURING PERFORMANCE OF PROCEDURE XP4-CU-UG6206 'HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SYSTEM (HPFW) UNDERGROUND DISTRIBUTION LOOP TESTING,' UTILITY OPERATIONS AND FIRE FIGHTING PERSONAL DISCOVERED A SECTIONAL ISOLATION VALVE, THAT WAS EXPECTED TO BE OPEN, WAS RESTRICTING FLOW TO THE PORTION OF THE LOOP BEING TESTED. THIS RESTRICTION IN THE LOOP CAUSED A PORTION OF THE HPFW SPRINKLER SYSTEM FOR THE X-326 BUILDING TO FAIL TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION (FIRE SUPPRESSION). UPON IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM THE FIRE DEPARTMENT NOTIFIED THE PLANT SHIFT SUPERINTENDENT (PSS) WHO IMMEDIATELY DECLARED THE HPFW SPRINKLERS SYSTEMS IN THE X-326 BUILDING INOPERABLE, AND DIRECTED THE REQUIRED TSR ACTIONS TO BE PERFORMED. UTILITY OPERATIONS PERSONNEL SECURED THE TEST AND REOPENED ALL SECTIONAL ISOLATION VALVES THAT WERE SHUT FOR THE TEST. AT 1345 HOURS HPFW WAS RESTORED TO THE ISOLATED PORTION OF THE LOOP.
"ENTIRE EVOLUTION IS UNDER INVESTIGATION AT THIS TIME."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38452
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: KEITH TABER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: KEITH TABER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/31/2001
Notification Time: 18:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2001
Event Time: 14:23 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2001
Notification Time: 18:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2001
Event Time: 14:23 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING HYDRAULIC OIL SPILL
"At 1423 hours CST Wednesday October 31, 2001 LaSalle control room received notification of an oil sheen at the Illinois River intake structure for LaSalle County Nuclear Stations Unit 1 and 2. Station procedures and the Spill Prevention Control and Counter Measures Plan was entered and the station Environmental Specialist and HAZMAT qualified personnel were dispatched to the scene.
The Environmental Specialist notified the Main Control room that hydraulic fluid from the River intake structure equipment had leaked into the screenhouse inlet and due to a gap between in the floating boom and the concrete structure some hydraulic fluid had been released to the Illinois River. Current estimate is that approximately 5 gals of hydraulic fluid entered the inlet and approximately 100 milliliters was released into the Illinois River. Per the Exelon Reportability Manual ENV 3.19, and 40 CFR 110.10 Discharge of Oil into or upon Navigable Waters or Adjoining Shorelines the release of oil into the Illinois River is reportable to the National Response Center and Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) with in 1 hour. The National Response Center was notified at 1448 CST and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency was notified at 1505 CST. Pursuant to Exelon Reportability Manual SAP 1.9, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) notification to the NRC is required to be notified within 4 hours, this notification is being made to address this requirement.
"Currently, the HAZMAT team is at the scene and the oil release to the river has been stopped. Cleanup efforts are underway using oil booms and oil soak rags."
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.
"At 1423 hours CST Wednesday October 31, 2001 LaSalle control room received notification of an oil sheen at the Illinois River intake structure for LaSalle County Nuclear Stations Unit 1 and 2. Station procedures and the Spill Prevention Control and Counter Measures Plan was entered and the station Environmental Specialist and HAZMAT qualified personnel were dispatched to the scene.
The Environmental Specialist notified the Main Control room that hydraulic fluid from the River intake structure equipment had leaked into the screenhouse inlet and due to a gap between in the floating boom and the concrete structure some hydraulic fluid had been released to the Illinois River. Current estimate is that approximately 5 gals of hydraulic fluid entered the inlet and approximately 100 milliliters was released into the Illinois River. Per the Exelon Reportability Manual ENV 3.19, and 40 CFR 110.10 Discharge of Oil into or upon Navigable Waters or Adjoining Shorelines the release of oil into the Illinois River is reportable to the National Response Center and Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) with in 1 hour. The National Response Center was notified at 1448 CST and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency was notified at 1505 CST. Pursuant to Exelon Reportability Manual SAP 1.9, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) notification to the NRC is required to be notified within 4 hours, this notification is being made to address this requirement.
"Currently, the HAZMAT team is at the scene and the oil release to the river has been stopped. Cleanup efforts are underway using oil booms and oil soak rags."
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38453
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: HAWKINS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: HAWKINS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 11/01/2001
Notification Time: 09:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2001
Notification Time: 09:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R2)
R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
CONTROL RODS DID NOT FULLY INSERT DURING CONTROL ROD TEST
On October 31 and November 1, 2001 following reactor vessel assembly and heat up, control rod drop testing was performed in mode 3. Rods N-9 and C-9 did not fully insert into the dashpot region (24 steps) following operability and trip testing. Rod J-13 exhibited similar characteristics following operability and trip testing but shortly after trip testing it fully inserted. Four other rods fully inserted but were slower than normal in the dashpot region. All other control rods tested fully acceptable. The Unit is currently cooling down and plans are under way to replace unacceptable control rods as necessary. The Unit has remained borated above the all rods out critical boron concentration since core reload and adequate SDM exits.
On October 06, 2001 Farley Unit 1 commenced a normal Unit shutdown to start its 17th refueling outage. All control rods were fully inserted with no problems. During insert and control rod changeout in the Unit 1 fuel pool several control rods not scheduled to go back into the core experienced binding in older fuel assemblies that prevented the rods from fully inserting in the dashpot region of assemblies. Upon investigation of the old control rods scheduled to be replaced axial cracks were observed by visual exmination in several assemblies near the rod ends but above the rod tips. This resulted in an inspection program for 18 older control rods scheduled to go back into the core to confirm the acceptability for continued use in cycle 18. Visual inspection and drag testing was performed in the Unit 1 Spent Fuel. Westinghouse reviewed the test results and confirmed the acceptability of 18 control rods for Cycle 18 use.
The NRC Resident was notified.
On October 31 and November 1, 2001 following reactor vessel assembly and heat up, control rod drop testing was performed in mode 3. Rods N-9 and C-9 did not fully insert into the dashpot region (24 steps) following operability and trip testing. Rod J-13 exhibited similar characteristics following operability and trip testing but shortly after trip testing it fully inserted. Four other rods fully inserted but were slower than normal in the dashpot region. All other control rods tested fully acceptable. The Unit is currently cooling down and plans are under way to replace unacceptable control rods as necessary. The Unit has remained borated above the all rods out critical boron concentration since core reload and adequate SDM exits.
On October 06, 2001 Farley Unit 1 commenced a normal Unit shutdown to start its 17th refueling outage. All control rods were fully inserted with no problems. During insert and control rod changeout in the Unit 1 fuel pool several control rods not scheduled to go back into the core experienced binding in older fuel assemblies that prevented the rods from fully inserting in the dashpot region of assemblies. Upon investigation of the old control rods scheduled to be replaced axial cracks were observed by visual exmination in several assemblies near the rod ends but above the rod tips. This resulted in an inspection program for 18 older control rods scheduled to go back into the core to confirm the acceptability for continued use in cycle 18. Visual inspection and drag testing was performed in the Unit 1 Spent Fuel. Westinghouse reviewed the test results and confirmed the acceptability of 18 control rods for Cycle 18 use.
The NRC Resident was notified.