Event Notification Report for October 25, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/24/2001 - 10/25/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
38427384283842538501
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38427
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: T. E. WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: T. E. WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/25/2001
Notification Time: 23:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2001
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2001
Notification Time: 23:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2001
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
At 1000, on 10/25/01, the Plant Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the independent verification for selecting the correct cylinder for washing was performed by the same operator, violating NCSA 400-002. This NCSA states that a second person, independent of the first person, verify that the correct cylinder is being washed. The purpose of this requirement is to preclude washing an unintended cylinder.
The cylinder which was being washed was a non-fissile cylinder.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Double contingency for cylinder was operation is based on selecting the correct cylinder to wash. A cylinder was on the washstand that was not verified, by two independent people, to be an approved cylinder. The cylinder was subsequently verified independently to be non-fissile.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to be possible, a cylinder would have to be washed which contained greater than a critical mass of fissile material.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Independent verification of correct cylinder.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
This cylinder contained non-fissile material.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls to ensure the correct cylinder is washed.
The first leg of double contingency is based on ensuring that the cylinder selected for washing has been approved. The cylinder met the criteria and was approved for washing. This control was not violated.
The second leg of double contingency is based on independent verification that the cylinder, after being put on the washstand but prior to being washed, is an approved cylinder. Since the independent verification was done incorrectly the control was violated and double contingency was not maintained.
Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Continue processing the cylinder according to CP4-CU-CH2110. (A second person has independently verified that the cylinder washed was an approved cylinder according to step 8.4.3, of procedure CP4-CU-CH2110.)
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
At 1000, on 10/25/01, the Plant Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the independent verification for selecting the correct cylinder for washing was performed by the same operator, violating NCSA 400-002. This NCSA states that a second person, independent of the first person, verify that the correct cylinder is being washed. The purpose of this requirement is to preclude washing an unintended cylinder.
The cylinder which was being washed was a non-fissile cylinder.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Double contingency for cylinder was operation is based on selecting the correct cylinder to wash. A cylinder was on the washstand that was not verified, by two independent people, to be an approved cylinder. The cylinder was subsequently verified independently to be non-fissile.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to be possible, a cylinder would have to be washed which contained greater than a critical mass of fissile material.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Independent verification of correct cylinder.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
This cylinder contained non-fissile material.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls to ensure the correct cylinder is washed.
The first leg of double contingency is based on ensuring that the cylinder selected for washing has been approved. The cylinder met the criteria and was approved for washing. This control was not violated.
The second leg of double contingency is based on independent verification that the cylinder, after being put on the washstand but prior to being washed, is an approved cylinder. Since the independent verification was done incorrectly the control was violated and double contingency was not maintained.
Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Continue processing the cylinder according to CP4-CU-CH2110. (A second person has independently verified that the cylinder washed was an approved cylinder according to step 8.4.3, of procedure CP4-CU-CH2110.)
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38428
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: T. E. WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: T. E. WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/25/2001
Notification Time: 23:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2001
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2002
Notification Time: 23:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2001
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
At 1530, on 10/25/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the 70-foot stack in the C-310 building was discovered to contain a deposit of fissile material. There is no NCSE/A which covers operation, maintenance, storage, etc. of this equipment.
The presence of a deposit in the stack was not expected. A single NDA has been performed and indicates a deposit of less than 61 lbs.(U). Assay smears taken on the stack previously indicated an assay of approximately 1.6%.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS:
For the assay of the deposit, the piping geometry and deposit mass are not sufficient to support a criticality. However, no NCSA controls have been established to address this fissile material operation.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
Based on the assay and geometry of the piping it is not feasible for a criticality to occur in the pipe. Additionally, the pipe located approximately 8 feet above the floor and is therefore not feasible to have spacing violations.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Since this equipment does not have an NCSA for it, there is no controlled parameter.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
61 lbs. U with an enrichment of 1.6% U-235.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTIONS OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The 70-foot discharge stack has been abandoned in place since the 200-foot stack was placed into service in the early 1980s. The 70-foot stack was last used briefly in the 1996 timeframe. The 70-foot stack has not been previously identified as a fissile material operation. This operation has not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Characterize the remaining sections of the 70-foot stack system. Control the are around the stack and post as required by CP2-EG-NS1031.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
* * * UPDATE 1845EST ON 2/21/02 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information is provided as an update:
"Further walk downs identified exhaust oil filters (located near the C-335 Seal Exhaust/Wet Air Station) as potentially fissile material operation without an approved NCS evaluation.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS: The oil filters are of favorable geometry for the plant maximum assay at the time the filters were cut from the seal exhaust system.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: The oil filters are separated from the seal exhaust system by air gaps. The use of the filters had been discontinued, therefore there is no potential for fissile material to be added to the filters. In order for a criticality to be possible, a spacing violation would have to occur.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The amount of material in the oil filters is unknown at this time but activity levels in the filters indicates less than a safe mass. Further analysis will be performed in accordance with the approved remediation plan.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTIONS OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The seal exhaust oil filters have not been previously identified as a fissile material operation. This operation has not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: The filters will be characterized in accordance with NCS guidance, which will be provided in a remediation guide."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder. Notified R3DO(Jorgensen and NMSS(Brach).
At 1530, on 10/25/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the 70-foot stack in the C-310 building was discovered to contain a deposit of fissile material. There is no NCSE/A which covers operation, maintenance, storage, etc. of this equipment.
The presence of a deposit in the stack was not expected. A single NDA has been performed and indicates a deposit of less than 61 lbs.(U). Assay smears taken on the stack previously indicated an assay of approximately 1.6%.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS:
For the assay of the deposit, the piping geometry and deposit mass are not sufficient to support a criticality. However, no NCSA controls have been established to address this fissile material operation.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
Based on the assay and geometry of the piping it is not feasible for a criticality to occur in the pipe. Additionally, the pipe located approximately 8 feet above the floor and is therefore not feasible to have spacing violations.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Since this equipment does not have an NCSA for it, there is no controlled parameter.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
61 lbs. U with an enrichment of 1.6% U-235.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTIONS OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The 70-foot discharge stack has been abandoned in place since the 200-foot stack was placed into service in the early 1980s. The 70-foot stack was last used briefly in the 1996 timeframe. The 70-foot stack has not been previously identified as a fissile material operation. This operation has not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Characterize the remaining sections of the 70-foot stack system. Control the are around the stack and post as required by CP2-EG-NS1031.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
* * * UPDATE 1845EST ON 2/21/02 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information is provided as an update:
"Further walk downs identified exhaust oil filters (located near the C-335 Seal Exhaust/Wet Air Station) as potentially fissile material operation without an approved NCS evaluation.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS: The oil filters are of favorable geometry for the plant maximum assay at the time the filters were cut from the seal exhaust system.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: The oil filters are separated from the seal exhaust system by air gaps. The use of the filters had been discontinued, therefore there is no potential for fissile material to be added to the filters. In order for a criticality to be possible, a spacing violation would have to occur.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The amount of material in the oil filters is unknown at this time but activity levels in the filters indicates less than a safe mass. Further analysis will be performed in accordance with the approved remediation plan.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTIONS OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The seal exhaust oil filters have not been previously identified as a fissile material operation. This operation has not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: The filters will be characterized in accordance with NCS guidance, which will be provided in a remediation guide."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder. Notified R3DO(Jorgensen and NMSS(Brach).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38425
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: FUCICH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: FUCICH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/25/2001
Notification Time: 02:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2001
Event Time: 00:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2001
Notification Time: 02:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2001
Event Time: 00:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
Person (Organization):
JOHN MONNINGER (R2)
JOHN MONNINGER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
WORKER OVERCOME BY HEAT TAKEN TO LOCAL MEDICAL FACILITY
The licensee evacuated a worker who was working in containment and was overcome by the heat. The worker was transported using the utility's emergency vehicle. There was a small area of contamination on the worker's neck which was decontaminated during the trip to the hospital. The worker was not contaminated when admitted to the hospital.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee evacuated a worker who was working in containment and was overcome by the heat. The worker was transported using the utility's emergency vehicle. There was a small area of contamination on the worker's neck which was decontaminated during the trip to the hospital. The worker was not contaminated when admitted to the hospital.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38501
Rep Org: US ARMY
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 1
City: ABERDEEN State: MD
County:
License #: 19-30563-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOYCE KUYKENDALL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 1
City: ABERDEEN State: MD
County:
License #: 19-30563-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOYCE KUYKENDALL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/13/2001
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/13/2001
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/13/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR CONTAINING AN AMERICIUM-241 SOURCE DETERMINED MISSING
An M43A1 Chemical Agent Detector (S/N Z03D23750/C24967) was assigned to the "A" Company 70th Engineer Battalion located at Ft. Riley, KS for use in a training exercise conducted at Ft. Irwin, CA between 9/18 - 9/23/01. During an inventory conducted on 10/25, it was determined that the 250 microcurie Americium-241 source was missing. An extensive search was conducted, however, the source could not be located.
An M43A1 Chemical Agent Detector (S/N Z03D23750/C24967) was assigned to the "A" Company 70th Engineer Battalion located at Ft. Riley, KS for use in a training exercise conducted at Ft. Irwin, CA between 9/18 - 9/23/01. During an inventory conducted on 10/25, it was determined that the 250 microcurie Americium-241 source was missing. An extensive search was conducted, however, the source could not be located.