Event Notification Report for October 24, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/23/2001 - 10/24/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
38426384223842338424
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38426
Rep Org: TRAP ROCK INDUSTRIES
Licensee: TRAP ROCK INDUSTRIES
Region: 1
City: EWING State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-19707-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WAYNE BYARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: TRAP ROCK INDUSTRIES
Region: 1
City: EWING State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-19707-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WAYNE BYARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/25/2001
Notification Time: 12:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2001
Event Time: 22:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2001
Notification Time: 12:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2001
Event Time: 22:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
BRAIN SMITH (NMSS)
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
BRAIN SMITH (NMSS)
STOLEN TROXLER ASPHALT DENSITY GAUGE CONTAINING 10 MILLICURIES OF CESIUM-137
Prap Industries was performing work on a newly paved road which was closed to traffic at the intersection of Interstate 95 and Route 31 located in Ewing, NJ. A Prap Rock Industries employee placed the Troxler gauge, Model # 4640B, in a cart and moved the cart next to a tree and went off to perform other duties. When the person returned, time unknown how long the person was away from the unattained gauge, he discovered that the gauge and cart were missing. This individual immediately notified the onsite New Jersey State Troopers that the gauge was missing. A search of the area was conducted with not results in finding either the gauge or the cart. NRC Region 1 individual was notified of this event by the licensee.
***** UPDATE AT 0740 ON 10/28/01 FROM NRR (KATHY GRAY) TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
This event is being updated to correct the licensee's name. It should have been Trap Rock Industries in lieu of Prap Rock Industries.
Prap Industries was performing work on a newly paved road which was closed to traffic at the intersection of Interstate 95 and Route 31 located in Ewing, NJ. A Prap Rock Industries employee placed the Troxler gauge, Model # 4640B, in a cart and moved the cart next to a tree and went off to perform other duties. When the person returned, time unknown how long the person was away from the unattained gauge, he discovered that the gauge and cart were missing. This individual immediately notified the onsite New Jersey State Troopers that the gauge was missing. A search of the area was conducted with not results in finding either the gauge or the cart. NRC Region 1 individual was notified of this event by the licensee.
***** UPDATE AT 0740 ON 10/28/01 FROM NRR (KATHY GRAY) TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
This event is being updated to correct the licensee's name. It should have been Trap Rock Industries in lieu of Prap Rock Industries.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38422
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RAWLS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RAWLS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/24/2001
Notification Time: 13:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2001
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2001
Notification Time: 13:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2001
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R2)
R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
ACTUATION OF THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM
At 1000 on October 24, 2001, Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) was in MODE 3 withdrawing Safety Rod Group 2 in preparation for Reactor Startup following a refueling outage. In-plant Auxiliary Steam loads were being supplied from Crystal River Unit 1 (CR-1). Auxiliary Steam (AS) loads are normally supplied from CR-1 or Crystal River Unit 2 (CR-2) (sister fossil units) when Unit 3 is not operating at high power. CR-2 was off-line at the time and CR-1 tripped, resulting in a complete loss of Auxiliary Steam (AS) to Unit 3. Motive steam was lost for the running Main Feed Pump and Main Condenser vacuum lowered. Both Once Thru Steam Generator (OTSG) levels lowered resulting in an Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) actuation on low OTSG level. The OTSG levels were restored to normal by EFW. OTSG levels remained on scale throughout the transient. Safety Rod Group 2 was fully inserted and Reactor Startup preparations were suspended. The AS header was repressurized from the Main Steam System and Main Condenser vacuum was restored. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature and pressure are stable at normal hot standby values and plant startup will continue once AS is restored from CR-1. This event was an event or condition that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System and is thus reportable as an eight hour report.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
At 1000 on October 24, 2001, Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) was in MODE 3 withdrawing Safety Rod Group 2 in preparation for Reactor Startup following a refueling outage. In-plant Auxiliary Steam loads were being supplied from Crystal River Unit 1 (CR-1). Auxiliary Steam (AS) loads are normally supplied from CR-1 or Crystal River Unit 2 (CR-2) (sister fossil units) when Unit 3 is not operating at high power. CR-2 was off-line at the time and CR-1 tripped, resulting in a complete loss of Auxiliary Steam (AS) to Unit 3. Motive steam was lost for the running Main Feed Pump and Main Condenser vacuum lowered. Both Once Thru Steam Generator (OTSG) levels lowered resulting in an Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) actuation on low OTSG level. The OTSG levels were restored to normal by EFW. OTSG levels remained on scale throughout the transient. Safety Rod Group 2 was fully inserted and Reactor Startup preparations were suspended. The AS header was repressurized from the Main Steam System and Main Condenser vacuum was restored. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature and pressure are stable at normal hot standby values and plant startup will continue once AS is restored from CR-1. This event was an event or condition that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System and is thus reportable as an eight hour report.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38423
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MATHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MATHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/24/2001
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2001
Event Time: 17:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2001
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2001
Event Time: 17:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
GREATER THAN 25% OF THE OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS WERE OUT OF SERVICE
At 1523 on 10/24/01 16 of 44 emergency sirens were determined to be inoperable for greater than one hour due to a storm causing power outages. At 1620 six of the original non-functioning sirens were returned to service, leaving a total of ten sirens out of service which is less than 25% being out of service The remaining out of service sirens are expected to be returned to service on 10/25/01 as power is restored to these areas.
The NRC Resident Inspector and local agencies were notified.
At 1523 on 10/24/01 16 of 44 emergency sirens were determined to be inoperable for greater than one hour due to a storm causing power outages. At 1620 six of the original non-functioning sirens were returned to service, leaving a total of ten sirens out of service which is less than 25% being out of service The remaining out of service sirens are expected to be returned to service on 10/25/01 as power is restored to these areas.
The NRC Resident Inspector and local agencies were notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38424
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RODE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RODE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/24/2001
Notification Time: 19:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2001
Event Time: 16:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2001
Notification Time: 19:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2001
Event Time: 16:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 63 | Power Operation | 63 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PROCEDURE USED FOR INSTALLATION OF TEMPORARY FIRE SEALS WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE CALCULATION QUALIFYING THE TEMPORARY FIRE SEALS
During an internal review of the fire protection program at Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, it was determined that the procedure used for the installation of temporary fire seals was not in compliance with the calculation qualifying the temporary fire seals. The procedure called for 4 inches of Kaowool while the calculation demonstrated the 5 inches would ensure adequate fire protection.
Out of the 9 barriers that were identified, 4 of them are required to provide train separation for safe shut down equipment. Due to the identified condition, these penetrations may not have adequately provided such separation as required by our safe shutdown analysis.
Immediate actions taken included: 1) Affected penetrations were identified and declared out of service. 2) Appropriate fire rounds were commenced. 3) Installed the required 5 inches of Kaowool in the identified barriers and returned the barriers back to service.
Pending corrective actions: Although the calculation determined 5 inches of Kaowool provides an adequate fire barrier, engineering will perform an additional evaluation to determine if 4 inches of Kaowool would suffice.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE 1409EST ON 12/18/2001 FROM RYAN RODE TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"Subsequent to this notification our Engineering Staff has prepared and approved, a Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation (FPEE 2001-003) of the as-found condition for these temporary fire seals following the guidelines of Generic Letter 86-10. This analysis demonstrates that a 4 inch temporary penetration seal constructed of 8 pounds per cubic feet ceramic fiber material satisfies the time function of a 3 hour rated seal by preventing fire propagation across the barrier. Accordingly, we have concluded that the presence of temporary fire seals with 4 inches of seal material did not significantly compromise plant safety with respect to separation of the safe shutdown equipment and this event notification should be retracted.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO(Phillips).
During an internal review of the fire protection program at Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, it was determined that the procedure used for the installation of temporary fire seals was not in compliance with the calculation qualifying the temporary fire seals. The procedure called for 4 inches of Kaowool while the calculation demonstrated the 5 inches would ensure adequate fire protection.
Out of the 9 barriers that were identified, 4 of them are required to provide train separation for safe shut down equipment. Due to the identified condition, these penetrations may not have adequately provided such separation as required by our safe shutdown analysis.
Immediate actions taken included: 1) Affected penetrations were identified and declared out of service. 2) Appropriate fire rounds were commenced. 3) Installed the required 5 inches of Kaowool in the identified barriers and returned the barriers back to service.
Pending corrective actions: Although the calculation determined 5 inches of Kaowool provides an adequate fire barrier, engineering will perform an additional evaluation to determine if 4 inches of Kaowool would suffice.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE 1409EST ON 12/18/2001 FROM RYAN RODE TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"Subsequent to this notification our Engineering Staff has prepared and approved, a Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation (FPEE 2001-003) of the as-found condition for these temporary fire seals following the guidelines of Generic Letter 86-10. This analysis demonstrates that a 4 inch temporary penetration seal constructed of 8 pounds per cubic feet ceramic fiber material satisfies the time function of a 3 hour rated seal by preventing fire propagation across the barrier. Accordingly, we have concluded that the presence of temporary fire seals with 4 inches of seal material did not significantly compromise plant safety with respect to separation of the safe shutdown equipment and this event notification should be retracted.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO(Phillips).