Event Notification Report for October 23, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/22/2001 - 10/23/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
38417384183841938420
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38417
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS
Region: 4
City: COLORADO SPRINGS State: CO
County:
License #: 48-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JACOBI by FAX
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS
Region: 4
City: COLORADO SPRINGS State: CO
County:
License #: 48-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JACOBI by FAX
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/23/2001
Notification Time: 12:59 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2001
Notification Time: 12:59 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
THE CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS REPORTED A MISSING Ni-63 RADIATION SOURCE
The wastewater treatment plant has gas chromatography equipment that uses electron capture detectors containing 8-15 mCi Ni-63. For as long as anyone now present can remember, the instruments in use there have been made by Hewlett Packard. There have been 4 detectors made by Varian in a box in storage on a shelf in a cabinet in the lab. Those detector cells did not fit on the HP GCs. The lab manager discovered another laboratory that wanted the detectors that were in storage. They solicited and received a copy of that laboratories license to possess radioactive material (as well as the license for CJ Bruyn, a detector maintenance facility). The 4 detectors were sent to C.J. Bruyn of Bellingham Washington, who upon receiving the detectors and opening the cases for cleaning reported that one of them did not contain the radioactive source.
An exhaustive search of the lab, concentrating on the cabinet area where the sources were stored revealed no hint of the source. The emissions or Ni-63 are of such energy that external readings with a survey instrument would never indicate the presence of such a source. Areas of the laboratory have been wipe tested for contamination from the time that sources have been in use there, and no lost source has been so revealed.
The source housings for the Varian sources have not been opened at the Laboratory, to the best of anyone's knowledge. In the past, the HP sources were opened for cleaning and maintenance, but never the Varian sources. No one now at the lab can remember using Varian GCs and so cannot remember that one of those detectors did not work (possibly indicating a missing source).
The only scenarios that make any sense is that either
1. The detector cell was received without the radioactive source from the original vendor or a facility that cleaned it.
2. The source inadvertently fell out of the detector cell when it was opened at CJ Bruyn and was not detected. The individual involved at CJ Bruyn denies this possibility.
Ni-63 is a beta emitter with 67 keV electron energy and approximately 100y half-life. The range of the emissions in air is ~10 inches, if the source was in contact with an individuals skin the electrons would penetrate ~0.35mm. A significant radiological hazard is hard to imagine unless the source was ingested, inhaled, or held against the skin for a protracted period. It has been discussed with the department that ingesting Ni-63 is not even a hazard of significance. Nickel is not absorbed by the body and the beta particles are absorbed by the fecal matter.
Modifying the procedures to avoid a future occurrence of a similar instance is not indicated due to the extremely unlikely probability. We no longer have EC detectors that are in long-term storage and use the ones that we have on a regular rotation, so we will know if the source is not present.
The wastewater treatment plant has gas chromatography equipment that uses electron capture detectors containing 8-15 mCi Ni-63. For as long as anyone now present can remember, the instruments in use there have been made by Hewlett Packard. There have been 4 detectors made by Varian in a box in storage on a shelf in a cabinet in the lab. Those detector cells did not fit on the HP GCs. The lab manager discovered another laboratory that wanted the detectors that were in storage. They solicited and received a copy of that laboratories license to possess radioactive material (as well as the license for CJ Bruyn, a detector maintenance facility). The 4 detectors were sent to C.J. Bruyn of Bellingham Washington, who upon receiving the detectors and opening the cases for cleaning reported that one of them did not contain the radioactive source.
An exhaustive search of the lab, concentrating on the cabinet area where the sources were stored revealed no hint of the source. The emissions or Ni-63 are of such energy that external readings with a survey instrument would never indicate the presence of such a source. Areas of the laboratory have been wipe tested for contamination from the time that sources have been in use there, and no lost source has been so revealed.
The source housings for the Varian sources have not been opened at the Laboratory, to the best of anyone's knowledge. In the past, the HP sources were opened for cleaning and maintenance, but never the Varian sources. No one now at the lab can remember using Varian GCs and so cannot remember that one of those detectors did not work (possibly indicating a missing source).
The only scenarios that make any sense is that either
1. The detector cell was received without the radioactive source from the original vendor or a facility that cleaned it.
2. The source inadvertently fell out of the detector cell when it was opened at CJ Bruyn and was not detected. The individual involved at CJ Bruyn denies this possibility.
Ni-63 is a beta emitter with 67 keV electron energy and approximately 100y half-life. The range of the emissions in air is ~10 inches, if the source was in contact with an individuals skin the electrons would penetrate ~0.35mm. A significant radiological hazard is hard to imagine unless the source was ingested, inhaled, or held against the skin for a protracted period. It has been discussed with the department that ingesting Ni-63 is not even a hazard of significance. Nickel is not absorbed by the body and the beta particles are absorbed by the fecal matter.
Modifying the procedures to avoid a future occurrence of a similar instance is not indicated due to the extremely unlikely probability. We no longer have EC detectors that are in long-term storage and use the ones that we have on a regular rotation, so we will know if the source is not present.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38418
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: HAWKINS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: HAWKINS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/23/2001
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2001
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R2)
R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
THE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION NETWORK WAS INOPERABLE
The licensee reported that their Emergency Notification Network(ENN) was declared inoperable due to an on site switching problem. Three channel banks went down and did not automatically transfer to backup source. The problem has been identified and was restored(test satisfactory) at 1324 CDT. The problem with the automatic transfer is still being investigated. The licensee uses the Southern Line System as a backup for the ENN.
The NRC Resident inspector was notified.
The licensee reported that their Emergency Notification Network(ENN) was declared inoperable due to an on site switching problem. Three channel banks went down and did not automatically transfer to backup source. The problem has been identified and was restored(test satisfactory) at 1324 CDT. The problem with the automatic transfer is still being investigated. The licensee uses the Southern Line System as a backup for the ENN.
The NRC Resident inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38419
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CAMPBELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CAMPBELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/23/2001
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2001
Event Time: 11:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2001
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2001
Event Time: 11:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
GENE IMBRO (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
GENE IMBRO (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR SCRAMMED FROM 100% POWER DUE TO TURBINE VALVE FAST CLOSURE SIGNAL
Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when a Main Generator Lockout resulted in a Reactor SCRAM from a Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Signal. Reactor Pressure peaked at 1125 psig causing 5 Safety Relief Valves to open, and an automatic ARI (Alternate Rod Insertion) initiation on high reactor pressure. The SCRAM transient also caused an expected reactor low level condition of minus seven inches (-7 inches) resulting in PCIS (Primary Containment Isolation System) Group II and III Isolations and SBGTS (Standby Gas Treatment System) initiation. All plant systems operated as expected with all rods being fully inserted and all relief valves fully reseating.
The Unit 2 Reactor is shutdown, and cause of the Generator Lockout is being investigated. Reactor level is 23 inches, and a controlled reactor cool down is in progress.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when a Main Generator Lockout resulted in a Reactor SCRAM from a Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Signal. Reactor Pressure peaked at 1125 psig causing 5 Safety Relief Valves to open, and an automatic ARI (Alternate Rod Insertion) initiation on high reactor pressure. The SCRAM transient also caused an expected reactor low level condition of minus seven inches (-7 inches) resulting in PCIS (Primary Containment Isolation System) Group II and III Isolations and SBGTS (Standby Gas Treatment System) initiation. All plant systems operated as expected with all rods being fully inserted and all relief valves fully reseating.
The Unit 2 Reactor is shutdown, and cause of the Generator Lockout is being investigated. Reactor level is 23 inches, and a controlled reactor cool down is in progress.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38420
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: STOCKHAM
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: STOCKHAM
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/23/2001
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2001
Event Time: 17:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2001
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2001
Event Time: 17:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
THE PLANT HAD A REACTOR SCRAM FROM 98% POWER DUE TO A GROUP 1 ISOLATION
The group 1 MSIV isolation instrumentation was bumped in the plant causing an inadvertent group 1 isolation which resulted in a reactor scram. Group 2 and 3 isolations also occurred on low reactor level (+9") during the reactor scram. The low-low set controlled reactor pressure while the MSIV's were closed. The "H" SRV cycled approximately 6 times and fully reseated. All rods fully inserted and no ECCS actuation occurred.
The NRC Resident Inspector, the state, and local agencies were notified.
The group 1 MSIV isolation instrumentation was bumped in the plant causing an inadvertent group 1 isolation which resulted in a reactor scram. Group 2 and 3 isolations also occurred on low reactor level (+9") during the reactor scram. The low-low set controlled reactor pressure while the MSIV's were closed. The "H" SRV cycled approximately 6 times and fully reseated. All rods fully inserted and no ECCS actuation occurred.
The NRC Resident Inspector, the state, and local agencies were notified.