Event Notification Report for October 15, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/14/2001 - 10/15/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
38389383903839138559
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38389
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN MANLY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN MANLY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/15/2001
Notification Time: 13:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2001
Event Time: 09:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2001
Notification Time: 13:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2001
Event Time: 09:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO MAIN STEAM ISOLATION FOR UNKNOWN CAUSE
Unit 2 was operating at 100% power, steady state, when the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) fast closed causing a Reactor Protection System (RPS) full scram, all rods fully inserted. The reactor feedwater pumps tripped on Reactor Vessel Water Level 8 due to controlling reactor pressure with Safety Relief Valves. After the feedwater trip, reactor pressure was reduced to 550-650 psig so condensate booster pumps could inject to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV). At 1043 the Reactor Vessel Water Level 2 was reached on the shrink from closure of the Safety Relief Valves. This in turn caused a valid initiation and injection of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) and isolation of various containment isolation valves.
Reactor vessel water level and pressure has been stabilized. HPCS has been restored to standby. The plant is stable in Mode 3. The cause of the MSIV isolation is still under investigation and a normal post scram review is underway.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will issue a media release.
Unit 2 was operating at 100% power, steady state, when the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) fast closed causing a Reactor Protection System (RPS) full scram, all rods fully inserted. The reactor feedwater pumps tripped on Reactor Vessel Water Level 8 due to controlling reactor pressure with Safety Relief Valves. After the feedwater trip, reactor pressure was reduced to 550-650 psig so condensate booster pumps could inject to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV). At 1043 the Reactor Vessel Water Level 2 was reached on the shrink from closure of the Safety Relief Valves. This in turn caused a valid initiation and injection of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) and isolation of various containment isolation valves.
Reactor vessel water level and pressure has been stabilized. HPCS has been restored to standby. The plant is stable in Mode 3. The cause of the MSIV isolation is still under investigation and a normal post scram review is underway.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will issue a media release.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38390
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER O'CONNOR
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER O'CONNOR
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/15/2001
Notification Time: 14:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2001
Event Time: 13:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2001
Notification Time: 14:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2001
Event Time: 13:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DURING PERFORMANCE OF QUARTERLY ROD OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE
The licensee reported that during a normal quarterly rod operability surveillance an automatic reactor trip occurred, all rods fully inserted. Preliminary investigation indicates that one rod dropped during rod motion causing a negative rate trip to occur.
The Emergency Feedwater system actuated, as expected on a reactor trip, and is providing feedwater to the steam generators. Excess heat is being rejected to the main condensers via the steam dumps. No safety or relief valves opened during the transient.
The plant is stable in Mode 3 and an investigation into the event is underway.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will issue a media release.
The licensee reported that during a normal quarterly rod operability surveillance an automatic reactor trip occurred, all rods fully inserted. Preliminary investigation indicates that one rod dropped during rod motion causing a negative rate trip to occur.
The Emergency Feedwater system actuated, as expected on a reactor trip, and is providing feedwater to the steam generators. Excess heat is being rejected to the main condensers via the steam dumps. No safety or relief valves opened during the transient.
The plant is stable in Mode 3 and an investigation into the event is underway.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will issue a media release.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38391
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM McCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM McCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/15/2001
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2001
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2001
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2001
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
24 HOUR REPORT - NRC BULLETIN 91-01
The following is a faxed report of finding in building X-330:
During a building walk down, contaminated items in a category II staging area were observed to be closer than the NCSA plant-048 allowed. The PSS entered an anomalous condition. The items were moved to the appropriate spacing requirements. The anomalous condition was exited.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The safety significance is low, The safe mass quantity is less than half of the minimum critical mass, in a spherical geometry. and with optimum moderation. The NCSE evaluated two items touching, these items were still separated, had little moderation present, and are not spherical.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
In order for a criticality to occur more spacing violations, to increase mass would have had to occur and additional moderating material would be required.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Mass and spacing are controlled.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
Items involved were less than safe mass and enriched to 10% or less.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The controls were mass and spacing. Spacing was the control violated.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The items observed inside the spacing requirements were moved to required spacing requirements.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE representative.
The following is a faxed report of finding in building X-330:
During a building walk down, contaminated items in a category II staging area were observed to be closer than the NCSA plant-048 allowed. The PSS entered an anomalous condition. The items were moved to the appropriate spacing requirements. The anomalous condition was exited.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The safety significance is low, The safe mass quantity is less than half of the minimum critical mass, in a spherical geometry. and with optimum moderation. The NCSE evaluated two items touching, these items were still separated, had little moderation present, and are not spherical.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
In order for a criticality to occur more spacing violations, to increase mass would have had to occur and additional moderating material would be required.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Mass and spacing are controlled.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
Items involved were less than safe mass and enriched to 10% or less.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The controls were mass and spacing. Spacing was the control violated.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The items observed inside the spacing requirements were moved to required spacing requirements.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE representative.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38559
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID CLYMER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID CLYMER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/12/2001
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2001
Event Time: 00:01 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2001
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2001
Event Time: 00:01 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG PICK (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 80 | Power Operation | 80 | Power Operation |
ISOLATION OF DIVISION I CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DUE TO THE UNEXPECTED TRIP OF THE FEEDER BREAKER FOR A NON-SAFETY 480-VOLT AC SWITCHGEAR (60-Day Report)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On October 15, 2001, at approximately 12:01 a.m., with the plant at approximately 80% power, an isolation of Division I containment isolation valves occurred. This event was caused by the unexpected trip of the feeder breaker for one of the plant's non-safety 480-volt AC switchgears. In addition, five manual breakers on the same switchgear opened. This deenergized the normal power supply to the Division I reactor protection system (RPS), which caused the actuation of Division I containment isolation valves. This event is being reported in accordance with the 60-day telephone notification provision in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid general containment isolation signal."
"Division I containment isolation valves automatically closed, and the Division I annulus mixing and standby gas treatment systems received an automatic start signal. Consistent with plant design, isolation of the annulus pressure control system subsequently caused the Division II annulus mixing and standby gas treatment systems to start. However, the Division II annulus mixing fan breaker tripped open after receiving a close signal. Both divisions of the fuel building charcoal filter trains started. The Division I containment atmosphere hydrogen analyzer automatically started."
"After an initial assessment, operators implemented abnormal operating procedures and restored systems in containment to their normal alignment. Plant operation was not interrupted. Except for the trip of the Division II annulus mixing fan, all plant systems responded as designed to the event. The fan trip is being addressed within the stations corrective action program."
"The investigation of the spurious breaker trips is still in progress. Tests completed thus far have not determined the cause of the trip, and switchgear inspections performed during a brief plant outage in the interim found no hardware deficiencies. The Division I RPS system remains powered from its alternate source, which will prevent its loss should the switchgear again be de-energized. The switchgear has been instrumented in order to collect transient data in the event the trips recur."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On October 15, 2001, at approximately 12:01 a.m., with the plant at approximately 80% power, an isolation of Division I containment isolation valves occurred. This event was caused by the unexpected trip of the feeder breaker for one of the plant's non-safety 480-volt AC switchgears. In addition, five manual breakers on the same switchgear opened. This deenergized the normal power supply to the Division I reactor protection system (RPS), which caused the actuation of Division I containment isolation valves. This event is being reported in accordance with the 60-day telephone notification provision in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid general containment isolation signal."
"Division I containment isolation valves automatically closed, and the Division I annulus mixing and standby gas treatment systems received an automatic start signal. Consistent with plant design, isolation of the annulus pressure control system subsequently caused the Division II annulus mixing and standby gas treatment systems to start. However, the Division II annulus mixing fan breaker tripped open after receiving a close signal. Both divisions of the fuel building charcoal filter trains started. The Division I containment atmosphere hydrogen analyzer automatically started."
"After an initial assessment, operators implemented abnormal operating procedures and restored systems in containment to their normal alignment. Plant operation was not interrupted. Except for the trip of the Division II annulus mixing fan, all plant systems responded as designed to the event. The fan trip is being addressed within the stations corrective action program."
"The investigation of the spurious breaker trips is still in progress. Tests completed thus far have not determined the cause of the trip, and switchgear inspections performed during a brief plant outage in the interim found no hardware deficiencies. The Division I RPS system remains powered from its alternate source, which will prevent its loss should the switchgear again be de-energized. The switchgear has been instrumented in order to collect transient data in the event the trips recur."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.