Event Notification Report for October 09, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/08/2001 - 10/09/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
38366383673836838369
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38366
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/09/2001
Notification Time: 12:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2001
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 12:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2001
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CLIFF ANDERSON (R1)
CLIFF ANDERSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Intermediate Shutdown | 0 | Intermediate Shutdown |
LANCASTER COUNTY EMERGENCY SIRENS WERE FOUND INOPERABLE
"At 11:30 AM on 10/9/01, TMI determined that the apparent inoperability of emergency sirens in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania for approximately 3 days met the criteria set forth in NUREG 1022, Rev. 2 for a major loss of emergency offsite communications capability and that an immediate 8 hour notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) was required.
"At approximately 8:55 am on Tuesday, October 9, 2001 the emergency sirens in Lancaster County were inadvertently activated during routine maintenance by Capitol Area Communications, the siren vendor. During the weekly evaluation of system electronics on Tuesday, October 9, 2001, Capitol Area Communications had discovered an anomaly with the system communications with Lancaster County. Capitol Area Communications called Lancaster County and it was found that apparently the transmitter for Lancaster County had been incorrectly left turned off following recent maintenance performed on Saturday, October 6, 2001 that occurred in the vicinity of the transmitter.
"The transmitter was turned back on at approximately 8:55 am on Tuesday, October 9, 2001. When the transmitter was turned on, a signal that had been sent on Saturday, October 6, 2001 for the monthly Saturday test of the sirens that had been received but not acted upon, was acted upon by the transmitter which then activated the sirens. The sirens were silenced upon recognition of the inadvertent actuation. Lancaster County is notifying local media of the cause of the inadvertent siren actuation.
"Subsequent discussions between Exelon Emergency Management personnel and the siren vendor determined that the sirens for Lancaster County had apparently been inoperable from sometime on Saturday, October 6 until today, Tuesday, October 9.
"The sirens in Lancaster County were reactivated when the transmitter [was turned] back on.
"The Lancaster County 911 dispatcher number 41 called the TMI Control Room at approximately 9:00 AM. The Control notified a duty public information representative of the siren malfunction. The duty Public Information Representative spoke with Lancaster County Emergency Management at 9:13 am who confirmed the information received from the 911 dispatcher. Subsequently, at 9:15 am Exelon emergency management reconfirmed the information received.
"The site Sr. Resident Inspector has been informed of the event and the 8 hour report. TMI Communications contacted the Lancaster County Commissioners and PEMA to inform them of the event."
* * * UPDATE 1423 10/10/2001 FROM SCHORK TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"This is a revision of the initial 8 hour notification made by TMI-1 per Event Notification 38366 on October 9, 2001 at 1222 hours. The revised notification is being submitted to document that the sirens in question were out of service for approximately 4 days instead of the initial report of 3 days and that a contributing cause to the event may be the software that is used in performing the test.
"Additional discussions between TMI Emergency Preparedness, Exelon Emergency Preparedness, Lancaster County Emergency Management and Capitol Area Communications that took place on Wednesday, October 10, 2001 determined that the siren transmitter was out of service from Friday, October 5 to Tuesday, October 9. In addition, a functional test of the computer software used to perform the weekly test in Lancaster County found that the software did not detect a failure of the sirens to actuate when the transmitter is de-energized. The software does detect siren failures when the transmitter is energized. Exelon Emergency Preparedness is contacting the software vendor to obtain additional information. The software in question was provided by AmerGen to the 5 risk counties for Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by the licensee. Notified R1 IRC.
"At 11:30 AM on 10/9/01, TMI determined that the apparent inoperability of emergency sirens in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania for approximately 3 days met the criteria set forth in NUREG 1022, Rev. 2 for a major loss of emergency offsite communications capability and that an immediate 8 hour notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) was required.
"At approximately 8:55 am on Tuesday, October 9, 2001 the emergency sirens in Lancaster County were inadvertently activated during routine maintenance by Capitol Area Communications, the siren vendor. During the weekly evaluation of system electronics on Tuesday, October 9, 2001, Capitol Area Communications had discovered an anomaly with the system communications with Lancaster County. Capitol Area Communications called Lancaster County and it was found that apparently the transmitter for Lancaster County had been incorrectly left turned off following recent maintenance performed on Saturday, October 6, 2001 that occurred in the vicinity of the transmitter.
"The transmitter was turned back on at approximately 8:55 am on Tuesday, October 9, 2001. When the transmitter was turned on, a signal that had been sent on Saturday, October 6, 2001 for the monthly Saturday test of the sirens that had been received but not acted upon, was acted upon by the transmitter which then activated the sirens. The sirens were silenced upon recognition of the inadvertent actuation. Lancaster County is notifying local media of the cause of the inadvertent siren actuation.
"Subsequent discussions between Exelon Emergency Management personnel and the siren vendor determined that the sirens for Lancaster County had apparently been inoperable from sometime on Saturday, October 6 until today, Tuesday, October 9.
"The sirens in Lancaster County were reactivated when the transmitter [was turned] back on.
"The Lancaster County 911 dispatcher number 41 called the TMI Control Room at approximately 9:00 AM. The Control notified a duty public information representative of the siren malfunction. The duty Public Information Representative spoke with Lancaster County Emergency Management at 9:13 am who confirmed the information received from the 911 dispatcher. Subsequently, at 9:15 am Exelon emergency management reconfirmed the information received.
"The site Sr. Resident Inspector has been informed of the event and the 8 hour report. TMI Communications contacted the Lancaster County Commissioners and PEMA to inform them of the event."
* * * UPDATE 1423 10/10/2001 FROM SCHORK TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"This is a revision of the initial 8 hour notification made by TMI-1 per Event Notification 38366 on October 9, 2001 at 1222 hours. The revised notification is being submitted to document that the sirens in question were out of service for approximately 4 days instead of the initial report of 3 days and that a contributing cause to the event may be the software that is used in performing the test.
"Additional discussions between TMI Emergency Preparedness, Exelon Emergency Preparedness, Lancaster County Emergency Management and Capitol Area Communications that took place on Wednesday, October 10, 2001 determined that the siren transmitter was out of service from Friday, October 5 to Tuesday, October 9. In addition, a functional test of the computer software used to perform the weekly test in Lancaster County found that the software did not detect a failure of the sirens to actuate when the transmitter is de-energized. The software does detect siren failures when the transmitter is energized. Exelon Emergency Preparedness is contacting the software vendor to obtain additional information. The software in question was provided by AmerGen to the 5 risk counties for Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by the licensee. Notified R1 IRC.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38367
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY HARRINGTON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY HARRINGTON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/09/2001
Notification Time: 14:42 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2001
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2001
Notification Time: 14:42 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2001
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
DISCOVERY THAT ANTICIPATED FLOW MAY RESULT IN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE EQUIPMENT BEING INCAPABLE OF PERFORMING DESIGN FUNCTIONS
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Prior to entering the scheduled refueling outage and while the plant was removed from service on 09/23/01, operating flow and temperature data for the Turbine Building Service Water (SW) system header was obtained. The Turbine Building SW header is a branch connection off the Engineered Safeguards (ESF) SW header, which is manually selected to either 'A' or 'B' train ESF SW header. Preliminary reviews of the data indicate that anticipated flows under accident conditions, using existing analysis limits, result in ESF equipment being incapable of performing design functions. The current accident analyses for the SW ESF equipment only assumes a Turbine Building demand on the selected ESF header of 2000 gallons per minute (gpm). The gathered data, when projected to accident temperature limits for design basis cooling requirements, shows the Turbine Building header flow to be significantly greater than 2000 gpm. The data indicates that a lake water temperature of 55 degrees F would be the maximum that would support the previously assumed ESF operation Turbine Building header flow at 2000 gpm. Current accident analysis assumes that ESF equipment will remain operable up to 80 degrees F lake water while supplying the Turbine Building header."
"Kewaunee will continue to review available and previously assumed analytical data to determine what plant operational limitations may apply and or what changes may be necessary to support a return to power operation. The current schedule for the refueling outage includes a return to power operation on December 5, 2001."
The licensee stated that the unit is currently defueled as part of the ongoing refueling outage.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Prior to entering the scheduled refueling outage and while the plant was removed from service on 09/23/01, operating flow and temperature data for the Turbine Building Service Water (SW) system header was obtained. The Turbine Building SW header is a branch connection off the Engineered Safeguards (ESF) SW header, which is manually selected to either 'A' or 'B' train ESF SW header. Preliminary reviews of the data indicate that anticipated flows under accident conditions, using existing analysis limits, result in ESF equipment being incapable of performing design functions. The current accident analyses for the SW ESF equipment only assumes a Turbine Building demand on the selected ESF header of 2000 gallons per minute (gpm). The gathered data, when projected to accident temperature limits for design basis cooling requirements, shows the Turbine Building header flow to be significantly greater than 2000 gpm. The data indicates that a lake water temperature of 55 degrees F would be the maximum that would support the previously assumed ESF operation Turbine Building header flow at 2000 gpm. Current accident analysis assumes that ESF equipment will remain operable up to 80 degrees F lake water while supplying the Turbine Building header."
"Kewaunee will continue to review available and previously assumed analytical data to determine what plant operational limitations may apply and or what changes may be necessary to support a return to power operation. The current schedule for the refueling outage includes a return to power operation on December 5, 2001."
The licensee stated that the unit is currently defueled as part of the ongoing refueling outage.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38368
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JAMES McKAY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JAMES McKAY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/09/2001
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2001
Event Time: 13:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2001
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2001
Event Time: 13:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO GASOLINE SPILL OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA
The licensee was filling a company minivan with gasoline when the automatic shut-off valve stuck and an uncontained spill occurred of greater than 5 gallons and less than 50 gallons. This occurred outside of the protected area. The licensee is conducting cleaning efforts in accordance with proper procedures.
The licensee notified the state and local authorities concerning the spill, making this notification necessary. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee was filling a company minivan with gasoline when the automatic shut-off valve stuck and an uncontained spill occurred of greater than 5 gallons and less than 50 gallons. This occurred outside of the protected area. The licensee is conducting cleaning efforts in accordance with proper procedures.
The licensee notified the state and local authorities concerning the spill, making this notification necessary. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38369
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BRYAN FERGUSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BRYAN FERGUSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/09/2001
Notification Time: 21:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2001
Event Time: 18:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2001
Notification Time: 21:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2001
Event Time: 18:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER, REG 2 (IRC)
BRIAN BONSER, REG 2 (IRC)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
TRANSPORT OF A RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED PERSON TO AN OFFSITE MEDICAL FACILITY FOR TREATMENT
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On October 09, 2001, a contract worker injured his leg while working in the Reactor Building at Crystal River Unit 3. The injury required the worker to be transported offsite to a local medical facility. A Health Physics technician accompanied the individual to the medical facility since he was potentially contaminated. The subsequent survey found radioactive contamination on the individual's clothing and on the backboard used for transport. The Health Physics technician took custody of the contaminated material and returned it to Crystal River Unit 3."
"This is reportable as an 8-hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii), 'any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.' "
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On October 09, 2001, a contract worker injured his leg while working in the Reactor Building at Crystal River Unit 3. The injury required the worker to be transported offsite to a local medical facility. A Health Physics technician accompanied the individual to the medical facility since he was potentially contaminated. The subsequent survey found radioactive contamination on the individual's clothing and on the backboard used for transport. The Health Physics technician took custody of the contaminated material and returned it to Crystal River Unit 3."
"This is reportable as an 8-hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii), 'any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.' "
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.