Event Notification Report for October 08, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/07/2001 - 10/08/2001
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38372
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: LEIGHTON AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: IRVINE State: CA
County:
License #: 3109-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: LEIGHTON AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: IRVINE State: CA
County:
License #: 3109-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2001
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
"Licensee reported that a Troxler 3440 portable gauge containing 10 mCi of cesium-137 and 50 mCi of americium-241:beryllium, in sealed sources, was stolen from one of their technician's pick-up while being kept overnight at the technician's home in Hemet. The gauge was in its transport case, locked down in the bed of the vehicle with a 'shell.'
"The gauge was stolen sometime after being parked at the technician' s home on the evening of 10-8-01.
"The stolen gauge was a Troxler 3440, S/N 14409."
* * * * UPDATE ON 10/25/01 AT 1520 ET BY ROBERT GREGER TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * *
The gauge was recovered on 10/23/01 after a reward was offered for the recovery of the gauge. No damage to the gauge. R4DO (Bill Johnson) and NMSS (Brian Smith) notified.
"Licensee reported that a Troxler 3440 portable gauge containing 10 mCi of cesium-137 and 50 mCi of americium-241:beryllium, in sealed sources, was stolen from one of their technician's pick-up while being kept overnight at the technician's home in Hemet. The gauge was in its transport case, locked down in the bed of the vehicle with a 'shell.'
"The gauge was stolen sometime after being parked at the technician' s home on the evening of 10-8-01.
"The stolen gauge was a Troxler 3440, S/N 14409."
* * * * UPDATE ON 10/25/01 AT 1520 ET BY ROBERT GREGER TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * *
The gauge was recovered on 10/23/01 after a reward was offered for the recovery of the gauge. No damage to the gauge. R4DO (Bill Johnson) and NMSS (Brian Smith) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38365
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RICKY RAWLS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RICKY RAWLS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/08/2001
Notification Time: 17:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2001
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2001
Notification Time: 17:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2001
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON, REGION 2 (IRC)
JAY HENSON, REGION 2 (IRC)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
DISCOVERY OF A THROUGH-WALL LEAK AROUND ONE CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM NOZZLE (REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAK)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On October 1, 2001, following shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage, Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) performed a visual inspection of the Reactor Vessel (RV) Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzles per NRC Bulletin 2001-01. The inspection revealed evidence of boric acid buildup around one CRDM nozzle (#32). No other CRDM nozzle showed similar boron buildup. After the RV head was removed and placed on the storage stand, additional inspections were performed. At approximately 1610 on October 8, 2001, Ultrasonic Test (UT) revealed a through-wall indication. This confirms that the boron deposits around CRDM #32 indicate a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leak. This condition is consistent with industry experience with Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) in similar components that have been evaluated as part of the NRC Generic Letter 97-01 and NRC Bulletin 2001-01. Additional nozzles are being examined by UT in accordance with CR-3's response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01. This condition did not pose a significant safety risk during plant operation. CR-3 plans to perform repairs during the current refueling outage. Since the condition resulted in leakage through the RCS pressure boundary, it is being reported as a non-emergency [8-hour] report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) and 50.73(A)(2)(II)."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On October 1, 2001, following shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage, Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) performed a visual inspection of the Reactor Vessel (RV) Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzles per NRC Bulletin 2001-01. The inspection revealed evidence of boric acid buildup around one CRDM nozzle (#32). No other CRDM nozzle showed similar boron buildup. After the RV head was removed and placed on the storage stand, additional inspections were performed. At approximately 1610 on October 8, 2001, Ultrasonic Test (UT) revealed a through-wall indication. This confirms that the boron deposits around CRDM #32 indicate a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leak. This condition is consistent with industry experience with Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) in similar components that have been evaluated as part of the NRC Generic Letter 97-01 and NRC Bulletin 2001-01. Additional nozzles are being examined by UT in accordance with CR-3's response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01. This condition did not pose a significant safety risk during plant operation. CR-3 plans to perform repairs during the current refueling outage. Since the condition resulted in leakage through the RCS pressure boundary, it is being reported as a non-emergency [8-hour] report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) and 50.73(A)(2)(II)."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38364
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SERATA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SERATA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/08/2001
Notification Time: 08:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2001
Event Time: 01:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2001
Notification Time: 08:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2001
Event Time: 01:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"During performance of the secondary containment drawdown test, reactor building vacuum fluctuated between 0.49 and 0.50 inches wg. The acceptance criterion for the test is greater than or equal to 0.50 inches wg vacuum. Secondary Containment was therefore declared inoperable at 01:10. Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.6.5.1.c requires verification that the FRVS will draw down the secondary containment to greater than or equal to 0.25 inches wg vacuum. The test acceptance criterion ensures that vacuum throughout the reactor building meets the SR acceptance criterion. Hope Creek entered Technical Specification action statement 3.6.5.1 .a which requires SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY to be restored within 4 hours or the plant to be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
"The FRVS reactor building pressure controller setpoint was found to be incorrectly set. The controller was returned to the required setpoint and reperformance of the test is in progress.
"PSEG Nuclear is evaluating the test acceptance criterion and the instrumentation used for the test."
The licensee will inform the Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC resident inspector.
"During performance of the secondary containment drawdown test, reactor building vacuum fluctuated between 0.49 and 0.50 inches wg. The acceptance criterion for the test is greater than or equal to 0.50 inches wg vacuum. Secondary Containment was therefore declared inoperable at 01:10. Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.6.5.1.c requires verification that the FRVS will draw down the secondary containment to greater than or equal to 0.25 inches wg vacuum. The test acceptance criterion ensures that vacuum throughout the reactor building meets the SR acceptance criterion. Hope Creek entered Technical Specification action statement 3.6.5.1 .a which requires SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY to be restored within 4 hours or the plant to be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
"The FRVS reactor building pressure controller setpoint was found to be incorrectly set. The controller was returned to the required setpoint and reperformance of the test is in progress.
"PSEG Nuclear is evaluating the test acceptance criterion and the instrumentation used for the test."
The licensee will inform the Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC resident inspector.