Event Notification Report for October 07, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/06/2001 - 10/07/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38360
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RONALD GREEN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RONALD GREEN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/07/2001
Notification Time: 03:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2001
Notification Time: 03:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING TESTING
"On 10/06/01, testing personnel and the Control Room crew were performing 1BVT-1 .1.7, 'Rod Position Indication System Calibration Verification' and 1BVT-1.1.1, 'Rod Drop Testing' in preparation for reactor startup after Unit 1's 14th Refueling Outage. At 1959 hours, the Control Room operators observed indications of 2 dropped control rods (rod position indication reading zero steps and rod bottom lights on), and entered 1AOP-1.1.8 (Abnormal Operating Procedure - Rod Inoperability). The Reactor Operator opened the reactor trip breakers in accordance with the Abnormal Operating Procedure and the Reactivity Management Plan that included reactivity limits and recommended contingency actions. It was subsequently discovered that the indications were caused by the test crew repositioning knife switches to place the rod drop computer in service. The action and resulting indications were not communicated to the Control Room crew. This event is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as a Specified System Actuation (RPS), because a valid manual RPS signal (opening the reactor trip breakers from the Control Room) was initiated which was not part of the pre-planned testing in progress. All equipment functioned as expected, and no additional failures or equipment challenges occurred as a result of this event. There were no radiological releases associated with this event."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
"On 10/06/01, testing personnel and the Control Room crew were performing 1BVT-1 .1.7, 'Rod Position Indication System Calibration Verification' and 1BVT-1.1.1, 'Rod Drop Testing' in preparation for reactor startup after Unit 1's 14th Refueling Outage. At 1959 hours, the Control Room operators observed indications of 2 dropped control rods (rod position indication reading zero steps and rod bottom lights on), and entered 1AOP-1.1.8 (Abnormal Operating Procedure - Rod Inoperability). The Reactor Operator opened the reactor trip breakers in accordance with the Abnormal Operating Procedure and the Reactivity Management Plan that included reactivity limits and recommended contingency actions. It was subsequently discovered that the indications were caused by the test crew repositioning knife switches to place the rod drop computer in service. The action and resulting indications were not communicated to the Control Room crew. This event is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as a Specified System Actuation (RPS), because a valid manual RPS signal (opening the reactor trip breakers from the Control Room) was initiated which was not part of the pre-planned testing in progress. All equipment functioned as expected, and no additional failures or equipment challenges occurred as a result of this event. There were no radiological releases associated with this event."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38361
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN WEEKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN WEEKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/07/2001
Notification Time: 06:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2001
Event Time: 04:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2001
Notification Time: 06:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2001
Event Time: 04:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITHOUT ELECTRICAL POWER FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
The licensee reported that the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be without power for approximately eight hours so that preplanned maintenance can be performed. The NRC resident inspector has been informed.
The licensee reported that the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be without power for approximately eight hours so that preplanned maintenance can be performed. The NRC resident inspector has been informed.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38362
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHERBA
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHERBA
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/07/2001
Notification Time: 13:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2001
Event Time: 09:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 13:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2001
Event Time: 09:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 8 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNEXPECTED REACTOR TRIP DURING PLANT STARTUP OPERATIONS
". . . . This event occurred at 0950 hours this morning (10-7-01). Currently the Unit is in Mode 3 with all systems normal. At the time of the trip the unit was at approximately 8 % power (by RCS AT indication, about 6 to 7 % on Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation) in power ascension and was just preparing to roll the main turbine.
"RCS Tavg was noted to decrease below the normal 547 °F no-load post-trip value to about 535 °F by the Reactor Operator monitoring the temperature. At the time of the trip one main feedwater pump was supplying the Steam Generators (SG), with low-flow feedwater pre-heating in service. Main feedwater isolated on the trip with the SGs being supplied post trip by the motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumps. The RCS cooldown was attributed to the #4 SG AFW flow control valve not closing as expected on high flow thus allowing too much flow to #4 SG, as well as steam that was still being supplied to low flow feedwater preheating. Operator actions taken in response to the cooldown were to close the main steam stop valves, and review AFW valve positions so as to limit steam flow from, and feed flow to, the SGs. These actions were completed by 0959 hours, and were sufficient to maintain temperature control. RCS temperature shortly recovered to 547 °F at about 1032 hours, 10-7-01. No other significant abnormalities were noted, pressurizer pressure decreased in response to the temperature transient, and the subsequent RCS shrink caused RCS letdown to isolate on low pressurizer level. The plant is presently stable in Mode 3. No other RPS or SI setpoints were exceeded due to the trip and subsequent temperature transient. All other systems and equipment functioned normally.
"The initiating RPS signal was a high Power Range Nuclear Instrument Rate Trip on 2 out of 4 channels. Cause of this rate trip is not definitively known at this time, rapid event teams to investigate and evaluate the trip have been initiated. Suspected cause is a Rod Control System problem."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 0353EDT ON 10/10/01 FROM DALE TURINETTI TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information was received as an update to this report:
"The cause of the Unit 2 reactor trip was a negative rate trip as a result of a loss of Rod Control Motor Generator set voltage. The loss of voltage was attributed to a failed open resistor on the North motor generator set which caused a loss of voltage regulation. It is believed this loss of voltage caused the north motor generator set to act as a load; and the south motor generator set could not maintain the output voltage. The reduction in voltage caused a collapse of field and the subsequent release of control rods and resultant negative rate trip.
"The motor generator set resistors have been replaced and associated relays have been tested to ensure proper operation of the motor generator sets. Plant power ascension is in progress with the unit in mode 1 and at 25%."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. Notified R3DO(Parker).
". . . . This event occurred at 0950 hours this morning (10-7-01). Currently the Unit is in Mode 3 with all systems normal. At the time of the trip the unit was at approximately 8 % power (by RCS AT indication, about 6 to 7 % on Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation) in power ascension and was just preparing to roll the main turbine.
"RCS Tavg was noted to decrease below the normal 547 °F no-load post-trip value to about 535 °F by the Reactor Operator monitoring the temperature. At the time of the trip one main feedwater pump was supplying the Steam Generators (SG), with low-flow feedwater pre-heating in service. Main feedwater isolated on the trip with the SGs being supplied post trip by the motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumps. The RCS cooldown was attributed to the #4 SG AFW flow control valve not closing as expected on high flow thus allowing too much flow to #4 SG, as well as steam that was still being supplied to low flow feedwater preheating. Operator actions taken in response to the cooldown were to close the main steam stop valves, and review AFW valve positions so as to limit steam flow from, and feed flow to, the SGs. These actions were completed by 0959 hours, and were sufficient to maintain temperature control. RCS temperature shortly recovered to 547 °F at about 1032 hours, 10-7-01. No other significant abnormalities were noted, pressurizer pressure decreased in response to the temperature transient, and the subsequent RCS shrink caused RCS letdown to isolate on low pressurizer level. The plant is presently stable in Mode 3. No other RPS or SI setpoints were exceeded due to the trip and subsequent temperature transient. All other systems and equipment functioned normally.
"The initiating RPS signal was a high Power Range Nuclear Instrument Rate Trip on 2 out of 4 channels. Cause of this rate trip is not definitively known at this time, rapid event teams to investigate and evaluate the trip have been initiated. Suspected cause is a Rod Control System problem."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 0353EDT ON 10/10/01 FROM DALE TURINETTI TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information was received as an update to this report:
"The cause of the Unit 2 reactor trip was a negative rate trip as a result of a loss of Rod Control Motor Generator set voltage. The loss of voltage was attributed to a failed open resistor on the North motor generator set which caused a loss of voltage regulation. It is believed this loss of voltage caused the north motor generator set to act as a load; and the south motor generator set could not maintain the output voltage. The reduction in voltage caused a collapse of field and the subsequent release of control rods and resultant negative rate trip.
"The motor generator set resistors have been replaced and associated relays have been tested to ensure proper operation of the motor generator sets. Plant power ascension is in progress with the unit in mode 1 and at 25%."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. Notified R3DO(Parker).