Event Notification Report for October 03, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/02/2001 - 10/03/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
38347383433834438401
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38347
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETER ORPHANOS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETER ORPHANOS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/04/2001
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2001
Event Time: 23:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2001
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2001
Event Time: 23:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24-HOUR REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATING LICENSE DUE TO POTENTIAL MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL VIOLATION
"This report is being made in accordance with Limerick Generating Station Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.E. as a potential violation of License Condition 2.C(1), Maximum Power Level
"GE Report titled 'Impact of Steam Carryover Fraction on Process Computer Heat Balance Calculations', September 2001, documents a non-conservative assumption for the moisture carryover fraction used in the calculation of core thermal power. The assumed carryover fraction of 0.1% was discovered to be potentially closer to zero and therefore non-conservative in later model GE BWRs.
"A review of Limerick Unit 2 moisture carryover data from an ASME PTC 6 test performed in October of 1999 found a moisture carryover value of 0.0277%, inducing an estimated bias of approximately 2.8 MWth. Similar testing on Limerick Unit 1 found a value of greater than 0.1%. Based on this data Limerick Unit 1 is not considered affected at this time.
"Based on this potential non-conservatism on Unit 2, indicated Maximum Power Level shift average is being administratively controlled 3 MWth below the licensed power level of 3458 MWth.
"Exelon staff is continuing to evaluate the effect of the moisture carryover term in the heat balance calculation."
The NRC resident has been notified.
(Refer to event numbers 38330, 38337, 38340, 38344, 38445, 38349, 38356, and 38357 for similar events at Fermi, Perry, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Columbia Generating Station, River Bend, Clinton, and Limerick 1.)
"This report is being made in accordance with Limerick Generating Station Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.E. as a potential violation of License Condition 2.C(1), Maximum Power Level
"GE Report titled 'Impact of Steam Carryover Fraction on Process Computer Heat Balance Calculations', September 2001, documents a non-conservative assumption for the moisture carryover fraction used in the calculation of core thermal power. The assumed carryover fraction of 0.1% was discovered to be potentially closer to zero and therefore non-conservative in later model GE BWRs.
"A review of Limerick Unit 2 moisture carryover data from an ASME PTC 6 test performed in October of 1999 found a moisture carryover value of 0.0277%, inducing an estimated bias of approximately 2.8 MWth. Similar testing on Limerick Unit 1 found a value of greater than 0.1%. Based on this data Limerick Unit 1 is not considered affected at this time.
"Based on this potential non-conservatism on Unit 2, indicated Maximum Power Level shift average is being administratively controlled 3 MWth below the licensed power level of 3458 MWth.
"Exelon staff is continuing to evaluate the effect of the moisture carryover term in the heat balance calculation."
The NRC resident has been notified.
(Refer to event numbers 38330, 38337, 38340, 38344, 38445, 38349, 38356, and 38357 for similar events at Fermi, Perry, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Columbia Generating Station, River Bend, Clinton, and Limerick 1.)
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38343
Rep Org: SORRENTO ELECTRONICS
Licensee: SORRENTO ELECTRONICS
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DIRK KOOPMAN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: SORRENTO ELECTRONICS
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DIRK KOOPMAN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/03/2001
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2001
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
KEVIN RAMSEY, MOB (NMSS)
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
KEVIN RAMSEY, MOB (NMSS)
10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING MICROPROCESSOR BASED RADIATION MONITOR RM-2000
The following text is portion of a facsimile received from Sorrento Electronics:
"The information following is in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4):"
"ii) Identification of the basic component which contains the defect: The basic component which contains the defect is software version 16.0 and higher of the microprocessor based radiation monitor, RM-2000, with the 'SAVE MASTER DATABASE' function, where the master database has been restored at least once."
"iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component: Sorrento Electronics, Inc. [...]"
"iv) Nature of the defect and the safety hazard which is created by the defect: The defect was noted at Sorrento Electronics following a power up on a RM-2000 skid, where the detectors had been detached while the monitor was powered down. When the monitor was powered up, the channels associated with the detectors continued to indicate a green operate status rather than indicating a NO PULSES operate failure condition. Further interrogation of the database revealed the monitor was not responding to taking the channel in and out of service or to changing the alarm status. The monitor showed a constant radiation on the channel display. The affected channels would not return to a normal operating condition until the detector was reconnected."
"This failure will cause the RM-2000 to not process the following tasks associated with the affected channel:
1. Temperature correction
2. Tracking algorithm
3. No pulses
4. Display checksource value
5. Over range
6. Background subtract
7. Pressure correction
8. Limit to minimum value
9. Display current count rate
10. Limit to maximum value
11. Perform checksource
12. Channel in service
13. Check alarms
14. Reset alarms after power failure"
"v) Date on which the information was obtained: The information was noted on software discrepancy notice, (SDN 545), on August 14, 2001, for review of possible 10 CFR [Part] 21 implications. Evaluation by [Sorrento Electronics'] engineering of the problem for 10 CFR [Part] 21 applicability was immediately begun. The evaluation was completed and declared reportable on October 1, 2001."
"vi) The number and location of the components subject to the regulations per 10 CFR [Part] 21: The following safety-related equipment is affected:
PLANT RADIATION MONITOR ASSEMBLY NUMBER RM-2000 VERSION
Salem (PG & E) 04231701-001, S/N: 001 (Gas Monitor) 16.6
Salem (PG & E) 04233101-001, S/N: 001 (Duct Monitor) 16.6
Salem (PG & E) 04231201-001, S/N: 001 (Particulate Iodine Gas Monitor) 16.6
"vii) Name of the implementing organization and time frame for implementing the corrective action: The responsibility for the implementing the corrective action has been delegated to [...] RMS Engineering. Sorrento Electronics will make the individual purchasers aware of this possible problem. Further, the RM-2000 operating code will be revised to correct the deficiency. The new corrected version of the RM-2000 code will be available to customers after November 1, 2001."
"viii) Advise related to the defect that will be given to the purchasers: While this defect is not likely to occur during normal operation at a nuclear power plant, it is possible. Therefore, Sorrento Electronics will advise the affected purchasers via a Quality Bulletin of the following interim test procedure to verify operability of the affected RM-2000:"
"There are two methods to verify that a RM-2000 has not failed after a power fail sequence. First, if the radiation value being displayed is changing, the monitor is operating correctly. Second, if the radiation value is not changing, then the user should remove the monitor from operation by taking a channel out of service by database manipulation. If the channel goes into a operate fail condition, the RM-2000 is working correctly and the channel can be returned to service. If the monitor does not go into an operate fail condition, the monitor has failed and is not receiving any pulses from the associated detector."
(Call the NRC operations officer for reporting organization contact information.)
The following text is portion of a facsimile received from Sorrento Electronics:
"The information following is in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4):"
"ii) Identification of the basic component which contains the defect: The basic component which contains the defect is software version 16.0 and higher of the microprocessor based radiation monitor, RM-2000, with the 'SAVE MASTER DATABASE' function, where the master database has been restored at least once."
"iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component: Sorrento Electronics, Inc. [...]"
"iv) Nature of the defect and the safety hazard which is created by the defect: The defect was noted at Sorrento Electronics following a power up on a RM-2000 skid, where the detectors had been detached while the monitor was powered down. When the monitor was powered up, the channels associated with the detectors continued to indicate a green operate status rather than indicating a NO PULSES operate failure condition. Further interrogation of the database revealed the monitor was not responding to taking the channel in and out of service or to changing the alarm status. The monitor showed a constant radiation on the channel display. The affected channels would not return to a normal operating condition until the detector was reconnected."
"This failure will cause the RM-2000 to not process the following tasks associated with the affected channel:
1. Temperature correction
2. Tracking algorithm
3. No pulses
4. Display checksource value
5. Over range
6. Background subtract
7. Pressure correction
8. Limit to minimum value
9. Display current count rate
10. Limit to maximum value
11. Perform checksource
12. Channel in service
13. Check alarms
14. Reset alarms after power failure"
"v) Date on which the information was obtained: The information was noted on software discrepancy notice, (SDN 545), on August 14, 2001, for review of possible 10 CFR [Part] 21 implications. Evaluation by [Sorrento Electronics'] engineering of the problem for 10 CFR [Part] 21 applicability was immediately begun. The evaluation was completed and declared reportable on October 1, 2001."
"vi) The number and location of the components subject to the regulations per 10 CFR [Part] 21: The following safety-related equipment is affected:
PLANT RADIATION MONITOR ASSEMBLY NUMBER RM-2000 VERSION
Salem (PG & E) 04231701-001, S/N: 001 (Gas Monitor) 16.6
Salem (PG & E) 04233101-001, S/N: 001 (Duct Monitor) 16.6
Salem (PG & E) 04231201-001, S/N: 001 (Particulate Iodine Gas Monitor) 16.6
"vii) Name of the implementing organization and time frame for implementing the corrective action: The responsibility for the implementing the corrective action has been delegated to [...] RMS Engineering. Sorrento Electronics will make the individual purchasers aware of this possible problem. Further, the RM-2000 operating code will be revised to correct the deficiency. The new corrected version of the RM-2000 code will be available to customers after November 1, 2001."
"viii) Advise related to the defect that will be given to the purchasers: While this defect is not likely to occur during normal operation at a nuclear power plant, it is possible. Therefore, Sorrento Electronics will advise the affected purchasers via a Quality Bulletin of the following interim test procedure to verify operability of the affected RM-2000:"
"There are two methods to verify that a RM-2000 has not failed after a power fail sequence. First, if the radiation value being displayed is changing, the monitor is operating correctly. Second, if the radiation value is not changing, then the user should remove the monitor from operation by taking a channel out of service by database manipulation. If the channel goes into a operate fail condition, the RM-2000 is working correctly and the channel can be returned to service. If the monitor does not go into an operate fail condition, the monitor has failed and is not receiving any pulses from the associated detector."
(Call the NRC operations officer for reporting organization contact information.)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38344
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: BOB CARROLL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: BOB CARROLL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/03/2001
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2001
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2001
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2001
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24-HOUR REPORT REGARDING AN OPERATING LICENSE CONDITION VIOLATION (POTENTIAL MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL VIOLATION)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This report is made as required by Grand Gulf Nuclear Station License Condition 2F. Grand Gulf is reporting a potential violation of the maximum power level of 3833 MWT as stated in Licensee Condition 2.C.1."
"This event is similar to event number 38337 and 38340 called in by two other BWR plants. Based on the General Electric (GE) report titled, 'Impact of Steam Generator Carryover Fraction on Process Computer Heat Balance Calculations, September 2001.' It is possible that Grand Gulf [may] have exceeded the maximum power level on some occasions in the past by about 3 MWT. The plant has reduced the 100% power limit by 3 MWT until the Heat Balance Equation can be corrected."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
(Refer to event numbers 38330, 38337, 38340, 38445, 38347, 38349, 38356, and 38357 for similar events at Fermi, Perry, Hope Creek, Columbia Generating Station, Limerick 2, River Bend, Clinton, and Limerick 1.)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This report is made as required by Grand Gulf Nuclear Station License Condition 2F. Grand Gulf is reporting a potential violation of the maximum power level of 3833 MWT as stated in Licensee Condition 2.C.1."
"This event is similar to event number 38337 and 38340 called in by two other BWR plants. Based on the General Electric (GE) report titled, 'Impact of Steam Generator Carryover Fraction on Process Computer Heat Balance Calculations, September 2001.' It is possible that Grand Gulf [may] have exceeded the maximum power level on some occasions in the past by about 3 MWT. The plant has reduced the 100% power limit by 3 MWT until the Heat Balance Equation can be corrected."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
(Refer to event numbers 38330, 38337, 38340, 38445, 38347, 38349, 38356, and 38357 for similar events at Fermi, Perry, Hope Creek, Columbia Generating Station, Limerick 2, River Bend, Clinton, and Limerick 1.)
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38401
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: HTS, INC.
Region: 4
City: AUSTIN State: TX
County:
License #: L02757
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HELEN WATKINS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: HTS, INC.
Region: 4
City: AUSTIN State: TX
County:
License #: L02757
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HELEN WATKINS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/17/2001
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2001
Event Time: 05:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2001
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2001
Event Time: 05:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BILL JONES (R4)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
BILL JONES (R4)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE
The following is from a faxed report:
This is notification of a Campbell Pacific Nuclear Density Gauge (MC-2), Serial Number M20013097 that was stolen on 10/03/2001.
The gauge was stolen at a Stop-N-Go at 702 Mason Rd. in Katy, Texas. The gauge was chained in the back of a pick-up truck with the chain through the top handle and one side handle, with an additional lock on one of the hinges. The hinge was broken off and there was just enough slack in the chain to remove the gauge. The theft occurred at approximately 5:00 am.
... reported the theft to your office around 7:15 a.m. the morning of the theft. The theft was also reported to the Harris County Sheriffs Department and was assigned a case number (01110031145).
Since this event occurred as the result of an illegal act, we are unable to guarantee such occurrence will not be repeated. However, I've issued a memo and instructions to all employees that gauges must be chained through all three handles and that the chain shall be taught so that entry can only be obtained by unlocking the chain or cutting the chain.
It is possible that the gauge might not have been stolen if this procedure had been followed.
The following is from a faxed report:
This is notification of a Campbell Pacific Nuclear Density Gauge (MC-2), Serial Number M20013097 that was stolen on 10/03/2001.
The gauge was stolen at a Stop-N-Go at 702 Mason Rd. in Katy, Texas. The gauge was chained in the back of a pick-up truck with the chain through the top handle and one side handle, with an additional lock on one of the hinges. The hinge was broken off and there was just enough slack in the chain to remove the gauge. The theft occurred at approximately 5:00 am.
... reported the theft to your office around 7:15 a.m. the morning of the theft. The theft was also reported to the Harris County Sheriffs Department and was assigned a case number (01110031145).
Since this event occurred as the result of an illegal act, we are unable to guarantee such occurrence will not be repeated. However, I've issued a memo and instructions to all employees that gauges must be chained through all three handles and that the chain shall be taught so that entry can only be obtained by unlocking the chain or cutting the chain.
It is possible that the gauge might not have been stolen if this procedure had been followed.