Event Notification Report for September 30, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/29/2001 - 09/30/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38332
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVE BANKS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVE BANKS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 09/30/2001
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2001
Event Time: 14:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2001
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2001
Event Time: 14:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
JOHN ZWOLINSKI (NRR)
GREG PICK (R4)
JOHN ZWOLINSKI (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
EVIDENCE OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE DISCOVERED WHILE IN COLD SHUTDOWN.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73."
"On September 30, 2001, at approximately 1400 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3 discovered evidence of reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. PVNGS Unit 3 was shut down in Mode 5 conducting cooldown and depressurization in its [ninth] refueling outage at the time of discovery. Current RCS temperature is approximately 135 degrees Fahrenheit and RCS pressure is approximately 20 psia."
"The leakage was discovered at two [Inconel] alloy 600 nozzle locations during inservice inspection (ISI); one in a RCS hot leg temperature detector nozzle and another in a pressurizer heater sleeve. The RCS hot leg leakage is located in the RTD nozzle for an inservice temperature [detector] (Loop #1, Equipment ID: 3JRCETW112HD). The pressurizer heater sleeve leakage is located at pressurizer heater B17. The leakage was identified in the form of small deposits of boron accumulation around the circumferences of the hot leg nozzle and that of the pressurizer sleeve. PVNGS has conducted inspections of these nozzles [and] sleeves during each refueling outage since the discovery that Inconel alloy 600 nozzles are susceptible to axial cracking. No evidence of leakage was identified when inspected during the last refueling outage approximately 18 months ago."
"The timing of this ENS report was based on the determination at 14:00 MST on September 30, 2001, that the boron accumulation represented a serious of a principle safety barrier. PVNGS Unit 3 Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 (RCS Operational Leakage) permits no reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage. It was therefore conservatively concluded that any evidence of pressure boundary leakage, regardless of magnitude, represents serious degradation of a principle safety barrier. Technical Specification [LCO] 3.4.14 is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. Unit 3 was in Mode 5 in a planned refueling outage at the time of discovery; therefore, LCO 3.4.14 is currently not applicable. The-hot leg nozzle and pressurizer sleeve will be repaired prior to re-entering Mode 4. It is anticipated that the repair will be utilizing the Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (MNSA). No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. No structures systems or components were inoperable that contributed to this event particularly the fuel cladding and the containment fission product barriers. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
***** UPDATE FROM DAN MARKS TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1304 EDT ON 10/02/01 *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73."
"This is a follow-up notification from the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3 to remove the references to reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage at a pressurizer heater sleeve. The notification of pressure boundary leakage from a Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) nozzle remains as identified in the original ENS report #38332 of September 30, 2001 at 1728 ET. Chemistry and radiological analysis of the residue located in the vicinity of the pressurizer heater sleeve and engineering personnel review of the analysis results determined the residue was not evidence of pressure boundary leakage."
"On September 30, 2001, at approximately 1400 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 discovered evidence of RCS pressure boundary leakage. PVNGS Unit 3 was shut down in Mode 5 conducting cooldown and depressurization in its ninth refueling outage at the time of discovery. Current RCS temperature is approximately 100 degrees Fahrenheit and RCS pressure is approximately 18 psia."
"The leakage was discovered at one Inconel alloy 600 nozzle location during inservice inspection (ISI), in a RCS hot leg temperature detector nozzle. The RCS hot leg leakage is located in the RTD nozzle for an inservice temperature [detector] (Loop #1 Equipment ID: 3JRCETW112HD). The leakage was identified in the form of small deposits of boron accumulation around the circumference of the hot leg nozzle. PVNGS has conducted inspections of these nozzles during each refueling outage since the discovery that Inconel alloy 600 nozzles are susceptible to axial cracking. No evidence of leakage was identified when inspected during the last refueling outage approximately 18 months ago."
"The timing of the Initial ENS #38332 report at 1428 MST (1728 ET) on September 30, 2001, was based on the determination at 1400 MST that the boron accumulation represented a serious degradation of a principal safety barrier. PVNGS Unit 3 Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 (RCS Operational Leakage) permits no reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage."
"It was therefore conservatively concluded that any evidence of pressure boundary leakage, regardless of magnitude, represents serious degradation of a principle safety barrier. Technical Specification [LCO] 3.4.14 is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. Unit 3 was in Mode 5 in a planned refueling outage at the time of discovery; therefore, LCO 3.4.14 is currently not applicable. The hot leg nozzle will be repaired prior to re-entering Mode 4."
"No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. No structures systems or components were inoperable that contributed to this event, particularly the fuel cladding and the containment fission product barriers. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Claude Johnson) and NRR EO (Tad Marsh).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73."
"On September 30, 2001, at approximately 1400 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3 discovered evidence of reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. PVNGS Unit 3 was shut down in Mode 5 conducting cooldown and depressurization in its [ninth] refueling outage at the time of discovery. Current RCS temperature is approximately 135 degrees Fahrenheit and RCS pressure is approximately 20 psia."
"The leakage was discovered at two [Inconel] alloy 600 nozzle locations during inservice inspection (ISI); one in a RCS hot leg temperature detector nozzle and another in a pressurizer heater sleeve. The RCS hot leg leakage is located in the RTD nozzle for an inservice temperature [detector] (Loop #1, Equipment ID: 3JRCETW112HD). The pressurizer heater sleeve leakage is located at pressurizer heater B17. The leakage was identified in the form of small deposits of boron accumulation around the circumferences of the hot leg nozzle and that of the pressurizer sleeve. PVNGS has conducted inspections of these nozzles [and] sleeves during each refueling outage since the discovery that Inconel alloy 600 nozzles are susceptible to axial cracking. No evidence of leakage was identified when inspected during the last refueling outage approximately 18 months ago."
"The timing of this ENS report was based on the determination at 14:00 MST on September 30, 2001, that the boron accumulation represented a serious of a principle safety barrier. PVNGS Unit 3 Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 (RCS Operational Leakage) permits no reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage. It was therefore conservatively concluded that any evidence of pressure boundary leakage, regardless of magnitude, represents serious degradation of a principle safety barrier. Technical Specification [LCO] 3.4.14 is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. Unit 3 was in Mode 5 in a planned refueling outage at the time of discovery; therefore, LCO 3.4.14 is currently not applicable. The-hot leg nozzle and pressurizer sleeve will be repaired prior to re-entering Mode 4. It is anticipated that the repair will be utilizing the Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (MNSA). No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. No structures systems or components were inoperable that contributed to this event particularly the fuel cladding and the containment fission product barriers. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
***** UPDATE FROM DAN MARKS TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1304 EDT ON 10/02/01 *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73."
"This is a follow-up notification from the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3 to remove the references to reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage at a pressurizer heater sleeve. The notification of pressure boundary leakage from a Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) nozzle remains as identified in the original ENS report #38332 of September 30, 2001 at 1728 ET. Chemistry and radiological analysis of the residue located in the vicinity of the pressurizer heater sleeve and engineering personnel review of the analysis results determined the residue was not evidence of pressure boundary leakage."
"On September 30, 2001, at approximately 1400 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 discovered evidence of RCS pressure boundary leakage. PVNGS Unit 3 was shut down in Mode 5 conducting cooldown and depressurization in its ninth refueling outage at the time of discovery. Current RCS temperature is approximately 100 degrees Fahrenheit and RCS pressure is approximately 18 psia."
"The leakage was discovered at one Inconel alloy 600 nozzle location during inservice inspection (ISI), in a RCS hot leg temperature detector nozzle. The RCS hot leg leakage is located in the RTD nozzle for an inservice temperature [detector] (Loop #1 Equipment ID: 3JRCETW112HD). The leakage was identified in the form of small deposits of boron accumulation around the circumference of the hot leg nozzle. PVNGS has conducted inspections of these nozzles during each refueling outage since the discovery that Inconel alloy 600 nozzles are susceptible to axial cracking. No evidence of leakage was identified when inspected during the last refueling outage approximately 18 months ago."
"The timing of the Initial ENS #38332 report at 1428 MST (1728 ET) on September 30, 2001, was based on the determination at 1400 MST that the boron accumulation represented a serious degradation of a principal safety barrier. PVNGS Unit 3 Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 (RCS Operational Leakage) permits no reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage."
"It was therefore conservatively concluded that any evidence of pressure boundary leakage, regardless of magnitude, represents serious degradation of a principle safety barrier. Technical Specification [LCO] 3.4.14 is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. Unit 3 was in Mode 5 in a planned refueling outage at the time of discovery; therefore, LCO 3.4.14 is currently not applicable. The hot leg nozzle will be repaired prior to re-entering Mode 4."
"No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. No structures systems or components were inoperable that contributed to this event, particularly the fuel cladding and the containment fission product barriers. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Claude Johnson) and NRR EO (Tad Marsh).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38512
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 11/20/2001
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2001
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID PCIS GROUP 3 ISOLATION - ALTERNATE LER REPORT
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) (A), which provides for an optional telephone notification, instead of submitting an LER.
"The purpose of this communication is to provide notification pertaining to the invalid actuation of the PCIS Group 3 isolation signals which affected containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On September 30, 2001, with the reactor at full power, an invalid actuation of a Refuel Floor High Radiation Monitor caused a Group 3 isolation to occur. A spike due to electronic noise invoked the High Level Trip to this monitor (RM-17-453B), which resulted in a trip to PCIS logic Channel B1.
"The system started and functioned successfully since either Channel A1 or Channel B1 provides for a complete group 3 isolation.
"The train actuation was complete. The PCIS Group 3 isolation occurred and both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System started as designed.
"It was determined that the Group 3 isolation was invalid, due the Refuel Floor High Radiation Level Trip occurring at 35 mR/hr. General area radiation levels on the refuel floor were 10 mR/hr. The prescribed set point of 70 mR/hr had drifted to 35 mR/hr. "
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) (A), which provides for an optional telephone notification, instead of submitting an LER.
"The purpose of this communication is to provide notification pertaining to the invalid actuation of the PCIS Group 3 isolation signals which affected containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On September 30, 2001, with the reactor at full power, an invalid actuation of a Refuel Floor High Radiation Monitor caused a Group 3 isolation to occur. A spike due to electronic noise invoked the High Level Trip to this monitor (RM-17-453B), which resulted in a trip to PCIS logic Channel B1.
"The system started and functioned successfully since either Channel A1 or Channel B1 provides for a complete group 3 isolation.
"The train actuation was complete. The PCIS Group 3 isolation occurred and both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System started as designed.
"It was determined that the Group 3 isolation was invalid, due the Refuel Floor High Radiation Level Trip occurring at 35 mR/hr. General area radiation levels on the refuel floor were 10 mR/hr. The prescribed set point of 70 mR/hr had drifted to 35 mR/hr. "
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.