Event Notification Report for September 22, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/21/2001 - 09/22/2001
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38315
Rep Org: NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: BAKER HUGHES OIL FIELD OPERATIONS INC
Region: 4
City: HOBBS State: NM
County:
License #: WL241
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: BAKER HUGHES OIL FIELD OPERATIONS INC
Region: 4
City: HOBBS State: NM
County:
License #: WL241
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 09/25/2001
Notification Time: 10:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2001
Notification Time: 10:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
GREG PICK (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
BAKER HUGHES OIL FIELD OPERATIONS INC. REPORTED A STUCK WELL LOGGING SOURCE
New Mexico state licensee Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations Inc. has a stuck source 2018 ft below the surface which they are currently fishing for retrieval. It contains 2 curies of Cesium-137, 18 curies Americium-241/Beryllium and 0.8 microcuries Cesium-137. The location is between Hobbs and Artesia, NM east of Loco Hills.
New Mexico state licensee Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations Inc. has a stuck source 2018 ft below the surface which they are currently fishing for retrieval. It contains 2 curies of Cesium-137, 18 curies Americium-241/Beryllium and 0.8 microcuries Cesium-137. The location is between Hobbs and Artesia, NM east of Loco Hills.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38304
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC WILKINSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC WILKINSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/22/2001
Notification Time: 03:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2001
Event Time: 00:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2001
Notification Time: 03:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2001
Event Time: 00:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES CASTO (R2)
CHARLES CASTO (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES DUE TO AN INCIDENT IN FRONT OF THE PLANT
The licensee's security department contacted the local police department about an incident just outside the plant at the highway entrance about a quarter mile from the protected area.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee's security department contacted the local police department about an incident just outside the plant at the highway entrance about a quarter mile from the protected area.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38305
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERICK SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERICK SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/22/2001
Notification Time: 06:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2001
Event Time: 02:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2001
Notification Time: 06:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2001
Event Time: 02:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
ERIC LEEDS (NMSS)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
ERIC LEEDS (NMSS)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
4 HOUR REPORT - NRC BULLETIN 91-01
On 9/22/01 at 0225 hrs., operations personnel in the X-330 process building discovered that a UO2F2 deposit with "Greater Than Safe Mass" (GSM) was no longer being buffered with dry air or N2, to greater than or equal to 14 psia. The deposit was located at 31-5, cell 6/8 drop. The buffer pressure had been monitored from an adjacent cell 31-5-8. Block valves marked as open on a pin chart, were found to be closed, thus isolating the deposit from the monitoring cell. The GSM deposit pressure was verified to be 5.81 psia with Maintenance and Test Equipment (M&TE).
NCSA-0330_004.A06 requirement #8a states in part, "If there is a deposit greater than a safe mass for systems conditions in the equipment, the pressure in the equipment shall monitored each shift and if the pressure is less than 14 psia it shall be adjusted with dry air or N2 to greater than 14 psia within 12 hours."
Buffer pressure was increased to greater than 14 psia at 0425 hours. Remaining areas of the plant with similar conditions were checked and verified to be compliant with the 14 psia Buffer pressure requirement.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
MODERATE, in this event the equipment was potentially without a buffer for 5 months which is insufficient time to allow enough water to enter the pipe and moderate the deposit to the level required to support a criticality.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): Sufficient moderation must be added to a deposit at > safe mass to potentially create a critical configuration. This is highly dependent on geometry and reflection conditions.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, FTC.):
In this event, moderation is the only available control, and it was not maintained. Other parameters, like geometry and reflection, are assumed to be optimum.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
Worst case 1549 pounds U02F2 +/- 50% (max. 2323 pounds) at 2.26% based on available Non-Destructive analysis Measurements. This mass is above the minimum critical mass (690 pounds U02F2 at optimum conditions) for this enrichment level.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
Moderation Control was not maintained for up to 5 months, change in system configuration unknowingly isolated the deposit from pressure monitoring point.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
0425 hours required buffer re-established, the valves involved were opened and tagged to remain open, verified remaining 4 like conditions were buffered as required. Investigation in progress.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the on-site DOE representative.
On 9/22/01 at 0225 hrs., operations personnel in the X-330 process building discovered that a UO2F2 deposit with "Greater Than Safe Mass" (GSM) was no longer being buffered with dry air or N2, to greater than or equal to 14 psia. The deposit was located at 31-5, cell 6/8 drop. The buffer pressure had been monitored from an adjacent cell 31-5-8. Block valves marked as open on a pin chart, were found to be closed, thus isolating the deposit from the monitoring cell. The GSM deposit pressure was verified to be 5.81 psia with Maintenance and Test Equipment (M&TE).
NCSA-0330_004.A06 requirement #8a states in part, "If there is a deposit greater than a safe mass for systems conditions in the equipment, the pressure in the equipment shall monitored each shift and if the pressure is less than 14 psia it shall be adjusted with dry air or N2 to greater than 14 psia within 12 hours."
Buffer pressure was increased to greater than 14 psia at 0425 hours. Remaining areas of the plant with similar conditions were checked and verified to be compliant with the 14 psia Buffer pressure requirement.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
MODERATE, in this event the equipment was potentially without a buffer for 5 months which is insufficient time to allow enough water to enter the pipe and moderate the deposit to the level required to support a criticality.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): Sufficient moderation must be added to a deposit at > safe mass to potentially create a critical configuration. This is highly dependent on geometry and reflection conditions.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, FTC.):
In this event, moderation is the only available control, and it was not maintained. Other parameters, like geometry and reflection, are assumed to be optimum.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
Worst case 1549 pounds U02F2 +/- 50% (max. 2323 pounds) at 2.26% based on available Non-Destructive analysis Measurements. This mass is above the minimum critical mass (690 pounds U02F2 at optimum conditions) for this enrichment level.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
Moderation Control was not maintained for up to 5 months, change in system configuration unknowingly isolated the deposit from pressure monitoring point.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
0425 hours required buffer re-established, the valves involved were opened and tagged to remain open, verified remaining 4 like conditions were buffered as required. Investigation in progress.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the on-site DOE representative.